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ESCAPING LOCHNER'S SHADOW: TOWARD
A COHERENT JURISPRUDENCE OF
ECONOMIC RIGHTS
RICHARD E. LEVYt
During the Lochner era of the early twentieth century,
the United States Supreme Court emphasized the importance
of economic rights by overturning legislation that restricted
the right of contract or of individual economic autonomy.
However, with the fall of economic rights jurisprudence in the
late 1930s, the Court increasingly upheld legislation restricting
economic rights. At the same time, the Court developed a
strong and comprehensive jurisprudence protecting non-
economic individual rights. This dichotomy of jurisprudential
analysis not only continued, but strengthened throughout the
Warren Court era. However, over the last twenty years, the
United States Supreme Court has become increasingly more
conservative. The new justices look more favorably upon
economic rights and thus, have attempted to strengthen these
rights.
In this Article, Professor Levy examines the Supreme
Court's economic rights jurisprudence over the last two
decades. He traces the Court's "pattern of reinvigoration and
retreat," a series of cases in which the Court has attempted to
strengthen the protection of economic rights. He finds that
although the Court has succeeded in promoting economic
rights in individual decisions, it has failed to outline a
coherent constitutional position of economic rights
jurisprudence. He argues that the two conflicting goals of
conservative theory, protection of economic rights and judicial
restraint, have restricted the Court from integrating economic
rights with other constitutionally protected interests. Though
the Court has attempted to support economic rights
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protections under a number of constitutional doctrines, it has
been forced to retreat from this effort, thereby leaving the
jurisprudence in disarray. Finally, Professor Levy proposes
a new approach to economic rights jurisprudence grounded
in the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses that applies
fundamental rights proportionality principles and political
process theory.
It is time to rethink the jurisprudence of "economic rights."' For
nearly twenty years, the United States Supreme Court has revisited
economic rights doctrines that had lain dormant since the end of the
Lochner era in the late 1930s.2 The Court's renewed concern for in
economic rights has come at a time when various political and
jurisprudential forces are conducive to a reconsideration of the
appropriate role of economic interests in a jurisprudence of
constitutional rights. Public distrust of and dissatisfaction with
government has run high for a number of years, and tough economic
times have focused public attention on the costs of government
regulation. Likewise, prominent conservative scholars have argued on
behalf of economic rights at the theoretical level,' and even liberal
scholars have begun to recognize that the total rejection of economic
rights is difficult to square with constitutional text and history or with
the jurisprudential underpinnings of individual rights doctrine.'
Against the background of these developments, and to some degree
1. I use the term "economic rights" to describe rights pertaining to the acquisition,
ownership, and disposition of property, which may receive protection under various
constitutional provisions. In contrast, I use the term "individual rights" to describe other
constitutional rights, including freedom of expression, criminal procedure safeguards, rights
to equal treatment, and the right of privacy. While this distinction is a convenient means
of describing current doctrine, it is artificial because economic rights are a type of
individual right. See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
2. See infra part I.A.
3. See infra part I.B.1.
4. This "neoliberal" scholarship includes SuSAN-ROSE ACKERMAN, RETHINKING THE
PROGRESSIVE AGENDA: THE REFORM OF THE AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE (1992)
(applying tools of economic analysis and social choice to reform of the regulatory state);
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATO-
RY STATE (1990) [hereinafter RIGHTS REVOLTION] (arguing for various cannons of
statutory construction to protect economic interests in the modem regulatory state); see
also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONsTrrutiON 319-54 (1993) [hereinafter PARTIAL
CONSTITUTION] (implying that economic rights should be treated as judicially unenforce-
able constitutional norms); Carol M. Rose, Property Rights, Regulatory Regimes and the
New Takings Jurisprudence-An Evolutionary Approach, 57 TENN. L. REV. 577,594 (1990)
("Just as we have had to move beyond an 'anything goes' approach for landowners, so we
now must move beyond 'anything goes' for land regulation.").
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propelled by them, Republican presidents (particularly Presidents
Reagan and Bush) have sought to reshape the Court through a series
of conservative appointments.5
Although the rhetoric surrounding these appointments empha-
sized "judicial restraint" more than economic rights, some conser-
vative justices appear to look more favorably upon economic interests
than their liberal predecessors epitomized by the Warren Court.6 In
a series of striking decisions, the reconfigured Court appeared to
endorse enhanced protection of economic interests under a number
of constitutional doctrines, including the Contract and Takings
Clauses, separation of powers and federalism, and even the Equal
Protection Clause Despite the favorable climate, however, the
Court was soon forced to retreat from the implications of these
decisions.' As a result, the Court has not only failed in its apparent
effort to enhance the protection of economic rights, but also has left
various economic rights doctrines in a state of total disarray.
I believe that the Court has failed because it has been unwilling
to address the constitutional position of economic rights in a
straightforward and coherent manner. Resolution of the complex
problems associated with balancing constitutional protection for
economic interests against the legitimate demands of government
requires a solid doctrinal foundation for analyzing specific cases. In
the absence of such a foundation, we are left only with ad hoe, value-
laden, and at times intellectually dishonest opinions that undermine
the legitimacy of judicial review. Restoring coherence to this area of
5. I use the terms "conservative" and "liberal" in their modem, popular sense to
describe opposing attitudes regarding the importance of economic and individual rights.
See supra note 1. Liberals tend to favor broad protection of individual rights while
according the government significant latitude with respect to economic rights. Conversely,
conservatives tend to value economic rights, while favoring more governmental discretion
respecting other individual rights. Naturally, there are those who either favor the broadest
protection of all types of rights (whom we might call libertarians) and those who advocate
broad government power irrespective of the rights at issue (whom we might call statists).
These terms are used for purposes of convenience only, with full recognition that neither
term fully captures the range of views that it purportedly describes.
6. See infra part I.B.2.
7. See infra part I.A. For reasons that will be discussed infra part I.C., only the Due
Process Clause, U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1, has escaped serious attention. While I
recognize that the dormant Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, can be viewed
as a type of economic rights safeguard, I shall not attempt to analyze the Court's dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence in this article. The federalism component of this doctrine
gives it distinctive characteristics that warrant separate treatment, and thorough analysis
of this complex area would overburden an already lengthy article.
8. See infra part I.A. Although the jury may still be out oil takings law, there is
every indication that the Court will retreat from this area as well. See infra part II.C.
1995]
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the law is no easy task, however. The problems that beset economic
rights doctrine cut across doctrinal lines and reflect deep-seated
systemic difficulties, whose roots lie in the Lochner era and the
constitutional sea change precipitated by the New Deal. Put simply,
the Lochner era has been so thoroughly discredited as improper
judicial activism that serious discussion of the appropriate role of
economic rights in our constitutional jurisprudence is virtually
precluded.9 Reaction to Lochner distorted constitutional doctrine
during the heyday of liberal constitutional jurisprudence, and the
resulting doctrinal difficulties have been exacerbated by the political
and legal context of recent appointments to the Supreme Court.
In this Article I argue that the problems plaguing the Court in
this area can and should be resolved by emerging from Lochner's
shadow and integrating economic interests into a broader jurispru-
dence of constitutional rights. Part I of the Article explains the
pattern of reinvigoration and retreat in economic rights decisions as
the product of the tension between two strands of conservative
theory: deregulation and judicial restraint. This tension has forced
the Court into a misguided search for an "originalist escape"-i.e., an
economic rights doctrine whose textual or historical foundations
reconcile judicial intervention with principles of judicial restraint.
Parts II and III then consider how the search for that escape has
distorted the Court's recent efforts to develop a jurisprudence of
economic rights. Part II argues that the search for an originalist
escape prevented the Court from integrating economic rights into a
comprehensive jurisprudence of individual rights, compelling it instead
to maintain an unwarranted dichotomy between economic and other
individual rights. Part III contends that the search for an originalist
escape has also made it impossible for the Court to identify a
constitutional baseline against which to measure economic rights,
resulting in three inconsistent and unsuitable approaches to the
baseline problem. Finally, part IV considers the contours of a
coherent economic rights jurisprudence. It suggests that a modest, yet
significant, reinvigoration of economic rights can and should be
9. This conventional wisdom prevails despite some recent efforts to rehabilitate
Lochner. See, e.g., James L. Kainen, The Historical Framework for Reviving Constitutional
Protection for Property and Contract Rights, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 87, 142 (1993) (arguing
that, contrary to generally held views, Lochner was not a sharp break with the historical
tradition, and concluding that clarification of historical misconceptions "undermines the
historical foundations of attempts to limit debate about economic rights protection by
invoking Lochner"); see also id. at 98-102 (discussing revisionist historical Lochner
scholarship).
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accomplished by developing the fundamental rights and political-
process reasoning that underlies the liberal jurisprudence of the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses, which can be used to fashion
a coherent jurisprudence that encompasses both economic and other
constitutionally protected interests. On the other hand, the Contract
and Takings Clauses should be confined to their historical meanings
because they do not present suitable foundations for a broad
economic rights doctrine. Such a jurisprudence would increase
protection for economic rights but need not portend a return to the
extremes of the Lochner era.
I. THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR AN ORIGINALIST ESCAPE
The pattern of reinvigoration and retreat in recent decisions
suggests that the Court (or at least a majority of justices) is interested
in enhancing the protection accorded economic rights but has been
unable to find a suitable vehicle for accomplishing this objective. This
problem stems from the tension between the deregulation and judicial
restraint strands of conservative theory. To avoid an obvious conflict
between protection of economic rights and professions of restraint,
the Court has attempted to rest its economic rights decisions on
constitutional provisions that provide some plausible textual and
historical support for judicial intervention. It has sought an
"originalist escape."
A. The Pattern: Reinvigoration and Retreat
The starting point for my analysis is the pattern of reinvigoration
and retreat. From the demise of the Lochner era until recently, the
Court employed an extremely deferential standard of review for
economic regulation regardless of the constitutional provision
invoked.' ° Over the past two decades, decisions under the Contract
Clause," structural doctrines,"2 the Equal Protection Clause, 3 and
especially the Takings Clause 4 have reflected some dissatisfaction
with such toothless review. But while notable decisions in each of
these areas seemed to presage a fundamental shift toward enhanced
economic rights protection, the Court has quickly retreated from the
full implications of those decisions.
10. For discussion of these developments, see infra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 23-38 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
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Perhaps the first signs of a renewed interest in economic rights
came under the Contract Clause.15 The clause had figured promi-
nently in the Court's early constitutional jurisprudence, but by the
close of the Lochner era it had fallen into relative disuse.16 In two
late-1970s decisions, United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey7 and
Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus,8 the Court appeared to breathe
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cI. 1. See generally Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein,
The Contract Clause and the Corporation, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 767 (1989) (arguing that the
Contract Clause should be used to control state manipulation of corporations law); Leo
Clarke, The Contract Clause: A Basis for Limited Judicial Review of State Economic
Regulation, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 183 (1985) (arguing that the Contract Clause should be
read to prohibit retroactive contractual changes unless they respond to changed
circumstances and give due regard to private interests); Richard A. Epstein, Toward a
Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703 (1984) (arguing that the
Contract Clause should be read to restrict sharply the power of states to regulate economic
affairs); James L. Kainen, Nineteenth Century Interpretations of the Federal Contract Clause:
The Transformation from Vested to Substantive Rights Against the State, 31 BUFF. L. REV.
381 (1982) (interpreting the evolution of Contract Clause jurisprudence as a reflection of
the movement from vested rights to substantive rights analysis in constitutional law); Gale
Norton, Economic Rights Provisions of the Constitution, 11 GEO. MASON U. L. REv. 43
(1988) (exploring the various constitutional instruments available for protection of
economic liberties); Michael J. Phillips, The Life and Times of the Contract Clause, 20 AM.
Bus. L.J. 139 (1982) (describing the evolution of Contract Clause jurisprudence); Stephen
A. Siegel, Understanding the Nineteenth Century Contract Clause: The Role of the
Property-Privilege Distinction and "Takings" Clause Jurisprudence, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1
(1986) (interpreting 19th century application of the Contract Clause as reflecting
underlying conceptions of social control of property); Stewart E. Sterk, The Continuity of.
Legislatures: Of Contracts and the Contract Clause, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 647 (1988)
(examining legislative continuity as a basis for understanding Contract Clause doctrine
relating to contracts to which the state is a party); Michael B. Rappaport, Note, A
Procedural Approach to the Contract Clause, 93 YALE LJ. 918 (1984) (arguing that the
Contract Clause prohibits all retroactive impairments of contracts made without just
compensation); Note, Rediscovering the Contract Clause, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1414 (1984)
[hereinafter Rediscovering] (interpreting Contract Clause constraints as related to the rule
of law and separation of powers); Michael L. Zigler, Note, Takings Law and the Contract
Clause: A Takings Law Approach to Legislative Modifications of Public Contracts, 36
STAN. L. REV. 1447 (1984) (arguing that the Takings Clause, not the Contract Clause,
should be used to evaluate legislative modification of public contracts).
16. The Court effectively emptied the clause of content in Home Building & Loan
Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444-48 (1934) (holding that no contractual impairment
occurs when the state has exercised its police powers), which collapsed the Contract Clause
and substantive due process inquiries.
17. 431 U.S. 1, 32 (1977) (invalidating repeal of legislative covenant restricting ability
of New York and New Jersey Port Authority to engage in deficit financing of mass transit
because it impaired the state's obligation to Port Authority bondholders). For further
discussion, see infra note 172 and accompanying text.
18. 438 U.S. 234, 250-51 (1978) (invalidating legislation requiring employers quitting
business or leaving the state to fund pensions that had not vested pursuant to pension
plan); see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 622 (2d ed. 1988)
("The Allied [Structural] Steel decision could eventually be seen as an early signal of a
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new life into the Contract Clause by applying a form of heightened
scrutiny' 9 to state action impairing contracts. Any reinvigoration of
the clause, however, was cut short in Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton2 ° and
Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power and Light Co.,2 a pair
of 1983 cases in which the Court rejected Contract Clause arguments
and limited United States Trust and Spannaus. Decisions handed
down after 1983 cursorily rejected Contract Clause arguments.22
A similar pattern of reinvigoration and retreat is evident with
respect to structural doctrines, such as federalism and separation of
back-door return to the jurisprudence of Lochner, especially given the Court's exacting
economic scrutiny, using 'tests' that could easily be turned into engines of destruction for
many economic regulations."). For further discussion, see infra notes 173-76 and
accompanying text.
19. The term "heightened scrutiny" refers to the relative lack of deference accorded
to legislative judgments. In current constitutional jurisprudence, substantive review of
legislation involves some form of rationality review in which the Court examines the
purposes of the legislation and the fit between those purposes and the means chosen. See
generally JOHN E. NOwAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 573-90 (4th
ed. 1991) (describing standards of rationality review). The most deferential form of review
is the "rational basis test," which requires only that a law be reasonably related to some
conceivable legitimate purpose, and which almost always results in a decision upholding
the legislation. Id. at 574-75. This test applies unless there is some justification to employ
a stricter form of rationality review, i.e., heightened scrutiny. Id. Under current law, there
are two or perhaps three forms of heightened scrutiny. Strict scrutiny requires that a law
be narrowly tailored, or necessary, to fulfill a compelling governmental purpose, and
almost always requires the invalidation of the legislation in question. Id. at 575. Strict
scrutiny applies to legislation burdening fundamental rights or employing classifications
based on race and national origin. Id. at 575-76. Intermediate scrutiny requires that a law
be substantially related to an important governmental purpose, and applies to legislation
employing gender-based classifications, federal affirmative action programs, and probably
classifications respecting alienage and nonmarital children. Id. at 576-77. A number of
recent cases also appear to apply a kind of "rational basis with bite." to invalidate laws
ostensibly subject to the rational basis test. Id. at 576-78.
20. 462 U.S. 176,187-94 (1983) (rejecting a Contract Clause challenge to a statute that
barred natural gas producers from using escalator clauses to pass costs of state severance
tax on to consumers). For further discussion, see infra notes 179-81 and accompanying
text.
21. 459 U.S. 400,416-19 (1983) (rejecting a Contract Clause challenge to a statute that
barred natural gas producers from using escalator clauses to pass costs of federal
regulation on to consumers). For further discussion, see infra notes 177-78 and
accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 112 S. Ct. 1105,1111-12 (1992) (finding
that no obligation of contract was impaired by state law reversing state supreme court
interpretation of workers' compensation statute and retroactively requiring refund of
workers' compensation payments withheld under that interpretation); Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 502-06 (1987) (holding that a
measure requiring mineral owner to prevent or compensate for surface subsidence
substantially impaired contract but was nonetheless valid because reasonably related to
purpose of preventing environmental damage).
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powers, which may be invoked to protect economic rights.3 These
doctrines imposed significant barriers to federal economic regulation
during the Lochner era, but the Court essentially abandoned them
along with substantive due process in the late 1930s and early
1940s.24 Beginning in 1976 with National League of Cities v.
Usery, - the Court has struggled with a limited federalism-based
restriction that prevents the federal government from treating the
states themselves as subjects of regulation. Later cases consistently
distinguished Usery,26 and the Court finally overruled it in Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,' apparently abandoning
any judicially enforced federalism-based limits on federal power.
Recently, however, the Court reasserted a somewhat different
federalism-based limit in New York v. United States,' which prevents
the federal government from directly compelling states to implement
federal regulatory policy.29
23. Although my primary focus is on substantive rights, I will address separation of
powers and federalism to some extent because they figured prominently in the Court's
Lochner-era opposition to economic regulation and are part of the broader pattern of
reinvigoration and retreat. In addition, they provide a useful illustration of some of the
problems inherent in the search for an originalist escape. See infra part II.B.1.
24. See infra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
25. 426 U.S. 833, 840-52 (1976) (holding that minimum wage and maximum hour
requirements could not be applied to states as employers). This narrow limit applied only
to regulation of states as states, with respect to matters that were indisputably attributes
of state sovereignty, and thereby impaired the structuring of traditional government
functions. Id. at 852. It did create potentially significant loopholes in federal regulatory
regimes, however.
26. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226,236-39 (1983) (finding that application
of Age Discrimination in Employment Act did not significantly impair states' ability to
structure operations); United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678, 683-86
(1982) (ruling that application of the Railway Labor Act to the railroad is not regulation
of an integral part of traditional state activities generally immune from federal regulation).
27. 469 U.S. 528,547-55 (1985) (holding that Fair Labor Standards Act can be applied
to local mass transit authority).
28. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992). See generally Richard E. Levy, New York v. United States:
An Essay on the Uses and Misuses of Precedent, History, and Policy in Determining the
Scope of Federal Power, 41 KAN. L. REv. 493 (1993) (arguing that the opinion in New
York distorted precedent, misread history, and invoked misplaced policy arguments to
justify an unnecessarily broad per se rule, while ignoring more appropriate avenues to
address the legitimate federalism concerns raised in the case).
29. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2419-23. The resulting rule is narrower than Usery. It
relates only to the form of federal regulation rather than the permissible scope of its
application. New York places no limit on federal authority to regulate private actors or
even states directly, and the federal government may even "encourage" states to
implement federal policy by conditioning receipt of federal funds or threatening to
preempt a field of law if the state does not comply. See id. at 2423-24.
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A more pronounced pattern of reinvigoration and retreat is
evident in the separation of powers field. In the first half of the
1980s,30 the Court employed a restrictive, formalistic view of
separation of powers to invalidate federal regulatory measures in
cases such as Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Institute,31 Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co.,32  INS v. Chadha,33 and Bowsher v. Synar.4  Per-
haps in view of the sweeping implications of this analysis,35 however,
the Court soon retreated. In Morrison v. Olson36 and United States
v. Mistretta,37 it rejected separation of powers challenges under a
generous functional analysis. 38
In some recent cases the Court even appeared to suggest an
enhanced scrutiny of economic rights under the Equal Protection
Clause. Since the New Deal, equal protection challenges to economic
regulation have been routinely rejected under the deferential rational
basis test, but a few decisions in the 1980s applied a more aggressive
rational basis scrutiny.39  While some of these decisions might be
30. The beginnings of formalistic separation of powers analysis might actually be
traced to Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), in which the Court employed a formalistic
separation of powers analysis to invalidate provisions vesting executive authority in the
Federal Elections Commission because members were not appointed pursuant to methods
authorized by Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution. Id. at 109-43.
31. 448 U.S. 607, 658-59 (1980) (plurality opinion) (employing nondelegation doctrine
to construe narrowly OSHA authority and invalidate regulation setting workplace exposure
limits for the chemical benzene); id. at 671 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (arguing that
provision in question violates the nondelegation doctrine).
32. 458 U.S. 50,57-87 (1982) (ruling that bankruptcy court jurisdiction over traditional
common-law private actions violates Article III).
33. 462 U.S. 919,951-59 (1983) (holding that legislative veto violates bicameralism and
presentment requirements of Article I).
34. 478 U.S. 714, 721-27 (1986) (holding that vesting of executive power in an officer
removable by Congress interferes with the President's exclusive authority over the
execution of the laws).
35. See, e.g., David P. Currie, The Distribution of Powers after Bowsher, 1986 S. CT.
REV. 19, 21-40 (presenting an historical outline of separation of powers and examining
Bowsher's negative effects on the doctrine).
36. 487 U.S. 654, 670-77 (1988) (upholding independent counsel).
37. 488 U.S. 361, 371-412 (1989) (upholding Federal Sentencing Commission).
38. The Court also limited the reach of Marathon in cases such as Thomas v. Union
Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985), and CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833
(1986), while in Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 218-24 (1989), the
Court rejected the argument that the taxing power is nondelegable because of its
fundamental importance.
39. See, e.g., Jill Handley Andersen, Equal Protection During the 1984 Term:
Revitalized Rational Basis Examination in the Economic Sphere, 36 DRAKE L. REv. 25,31-
37 (1986-87). Application of the rational basis test is ordinarily so deferential that it leads
almost automatically to the validation of challenged governmental action. See, e.g.,
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explained more readily as limiting liberal fundamental rights
decisions' or reflecting structural considerations,4' Allegheny
Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster County42 seemed to portend a more
vigorous equal protection scrutiny of economic regulation because the
Court, for no apparent reason, engaged in less deferential review of
the measure in question.43 But any broad suggestions of more
Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110-11 (1949). Professor Gerald
Gunther, among others, has urged the Court to apply the rational basis test more seriously.
See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REv.
1, 20-21 (1972). The recent economic rights cases employing aggressive rational basis
scrutiny might be read to suggest that the Court is prepared to take this advice, especially
when considered in conjunction with another case decided in 1985, Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985), in which the Court applied the rational basis test to
invalidate the denial of a zoning variance to accommodate a group living arrangement for
adults with developmental disabilities. Id. at 447-50. Nonetheless, in the vast majority of
cases the Court continues to uphold measures subject to rational basis scrutiny.
40. See Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 23 (1985) (holding that compensating use
tax violates equal protection by arbitrarily exempting cars purchased out of state by
current residents but not those brought into the state by new residents); Hooper v.
Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 622 (1985) (rejecting tax exemption for Vietnam
veterans resident in the state before 1976 as not reasonably related to any legitimate state
purpose). In both cases, by taking the relatively unusual step of invalidating the measures
under the rational basis test, the Court avoided subjecting them to strict scrutiny as a
burden on the right to travel. See Williams, 472 U.S. at 28 (Brennan, J., concurring);
Hooper, 472 U.S. at 618. Insofar as the cases mark a retreat from cases such as Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969), which treat the right to travel as fundamental, they
do not suggest any broader invigoration of equal protection rational basis scrutiny.
41. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 878-79 (1985) (invalidating
Alabama law imposing higher tax rates on foreign than on domestic insurance companies
because discrimination against nonresidents is not a legitimate means of promoting
domestic insurance industry). Although discrimination against out-of-state companies
would ordinarily violate the Commerce Clause, the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
1011-1015 (1988), "exempts the insurance industry from Commerce Clause restrictions."
Ward, 470 U.S. at 880. The Court thus relied on the Equal Protection Clause to reach the
same result. Id. Insofar as Ward uses equal protection as a substitute for dormant
Commerce Clause analysis, it does not suggest any broad-based invigoration of rational
basis scrutiny.
42. 488 U.S. 336, 343 (1989) (finding appraisal of real property based upon price at
last sale not rationally related to state's goal of taxing real property according to its current
value). For a critical discussion of the case, see William Cohen, State Law in Equality
Clothing: A Comment on Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Company v. County Commission, 38
UCLA L. REv. 87 (1990).
43. By holding that reliance on the last sale price was not reasonably related to the
state's purpose of assessing property at its actual value and refusing to consider other
possible justifications for the assessment method, Allegheny, 488 U.S. at 344-46, the Court
apparently required the measure in question to be justified in terms of the "actual
purposes" articulated by state law, while the usual rational basis test allows the
government to assert any plausible purpose in support of regulatory action. See infra note
46.
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aggressive review were soon squashed in Nordlinger v. Hahn,' and
the unanimous 1993 decision in FCC v. Beach Communications,
Inc.4" confirmed the narrow reach of Allegheny by resoundingly
embracing the most deferential form of rational basis review.'
The Court's most recent, sustained, and visible exploration of
enhanced economic rights protections has come in the area of takings
law.47 The developments can generally be traced to a trilogy of 1987
44. 112 S. Ct. 2326, 2333 (1992) (holding tax appraisal based on last sale price to be
rationally related to state's purposes of protecting long-time homeowners from taxation
based on unrealized gains and promoting neighborhood stability). Since the Court in
Allegheny did not explore other possible "legitimate purposes" for relying on the last sale
price to determine Value, Allegheny, 488 U.S. at 344-46, it expressly left open the
possibility that California's similar method for assessing property values might be
sustained. Id. at 344 nA.
45. 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2103 (1993) (rejecting equal protection challenge to provisions of
the Cable Communication Policy Act exempting from regulation systems serving residents
of commonly owned apartment dwellings).
46. The Court expressly rejected any limitation of review to the actual purposes of
legislation, stating instead that those attacking the rationality of the legislative classification
have the burden "to negate every conceivable basis that might support it," and that
because the Court never requires a legislature to "articulate its reasons for enacting a
statute, it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the legislature was actually
motivated by the conceived reason for the challenged distinction." Id. at 2098 (emphasis
added). This discussion is not directly at odds with Allegheny, insofar as that case did not
involve a legislative act, but it certainly reflects quite a different attitude.
47. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Much of the development of takings jurisprudence seems
to have been prompted by Richard A. Epstein's influential work, TAKINGS: PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). For additional scholarly
discussion of takings law, see JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER
RIGHT, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (1992); WILLIAM B.
STOEBUCK, NONTRESPASSORY TAKINGS IN EMINENT DOMAIN (1977); Charles H. Clarke,
Constitutional Property Rights and the Taking of the Police Power: The Aftermath of
Nollan and First English, 20 Sw. U. L. REv. 1 (1991); Michael J. Davis & Robert L.
Glicksman, To the Promised Land& A Century of Wandering and a Final Homeland for
the Due Process and Takings Clauses, 68 ORE. L. REV. 393 (1989); John A. Humbach,
Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the Takings Clause, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1
(1993); Ann T. Kadlecek, The Effect of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council on the
Law of Regulatory Takings, 68 WASH. L. REV. 415 (1993); Jan G. Laitos, The Public Use
Paradox and the Takings Clause, 13 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 9 (1993);
Susan E. Looper-Friedman, Constitutional Rights as Property?: The Supreme. Court's
Solution to the "Takings Issue," 15 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 31 (1990); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.,
A Critical Reexamination of the Takings Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1892 (1992);
Norton, supra note 15; Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying
Principles, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1299 (1989); Rose, supra note 4; Siegel, supra note 15; William
B. Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057
(1980); Richard G. Wilkins, The Takings Clause: A Modern Plot for an Old Constitutional
Tale, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1989); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Legal Discourse, Social
Vision and the Supreme Court's Land Use Planning Law: The Genealogy of the
Lochnerian Recurrence in First English Lutheran Church and Nollan, 59 U. COLO. L. REV.
427 (1988); Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause
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decisions, Hodel v. Irving,4 First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. County of Los Angeles,49 and Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission.50 More recently, of course, Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council" has received considerable attention. These
decisions, however, are counterbalanced by other recent decisions that
found no taking despite fairly strong arguments to the contrary,
including Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis and FCC
v. Florida Power Corp.53 in 1987 and Yee v. City of Escondido in
1992.5  The long-term impact of these developments remains
of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE LJ. 694 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Origins]; Note, David
H. SaFavian, Re-Taking the Fifth Amendment-Property Rights Revisited, 2 DET. CL. REv.
955 (1993); Note, Taking Back Takings: A Coasean Approach to Regulation, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 914 (1993) [hereinafter Note, Taking Back Takings]; Comment, Taking on a New
Direction: The Rehnquist-Scalia Approach to Regulatory Takings, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 197
(1993).
48. 481 U.S. 704,716 (1987) (finding that law escheating highly fractionated shares of
Native American land to tribes constituted a taking because it totally abrogated the right
to pass property on death by descent or devise). For further discussion, see infra notes
200-03, 231-34 and accompanying text.
49. 482 U.S. 304,318 (1987) (requiring compensation for temporary taking caused by
flood control ordinance prior to invalidation by state court).
50. 483 U.S. 825,841 (1987) (holding that administrative order conditioning rebuilding
permit for beachfront property on cession of lateral access easement was a taking because
order was not sufficiently related to regulatory purpose of preserving public access from
the interior to the shore). For further discussion, see infra notes 204-27 and accompanying
text.
51. 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2896 (1992) (finding administrative order precluding owner from
developing beachfront property to be a per se taking because it completely destroyed all
economically viable uses). For further discussion, see infra notes 235-50 and accompanying
text. Justice Scalia, who wrote for the Court in Nollan and Lucas, is perhaps the Court's
leading advocate of an aggressive takings jurisprudence. He is joined by the Chief Justice,
whose dissent in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,138 (1978), was
the first sign of a renewed interest in takings law, and by Justice O'Connor, who wrote for
the Court in Hodel and Yee v. Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992). Despite Yee's negative
outcome for the property owner, the opinion contains dicta that might support heightened
scrutiny of regulations imposing a substantial burden on property owners. See infra notes
222-27 and accompanying text.
52. 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987) (upholding a law requiring owners of coal interests to
leave coal in place to provide surface support). For further discussion, see infra notes 197-
99 and accompanying text.
53. 480 U.S. 245, 253 (1987) (unanimously rejecting takings challenge to FCC order
setting rates utilities could charge for carrying television cables on poles).
54. 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1531 (1992) (sustaining local rent-control ordinance and state
regulatory regime effectively transferring premium on the sale of mobile homes from
mobile home park owners to mobile home owners against takings challenge); see also
Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1,10 (1988) (refusing on ripeness grounds to consider
takings challenge to rent-control ordinance allowing reduction of rent below otherwise
reasonable rate on grounds of tenant hardship). Although Yee rejected the per se taking
argument advanced by the owners in that case, it dropped numerous "hints" that the
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unclear, and the future of takings law depends on how the Court
answers a number of questions raised by the recent decisions. 5 If
the Court's performance in other areas is any guide, we might expect
that it will limit its most aggressive takings decisions because of their
far-reaching implications. The Supreme Court's most recent decision
in Dolan v. City of Tigard6 does not alter this conclusion. While
Dolan strengthened the Nollan principle, it did not expand its
applicability.
The one economic rights doctrine left untouched is due pro-
cess.' In this area, the Court continues to apply the deferential
rational basis test that has prevailed since the New Deal, 8 as
reflected in the cursory treatment of a due process claim in General
Motors Corp. v. Romein"9 and the rejection of industry's claims that
excessive punitive damages awards violate due process.' The Court
argument might have been more successful if couched in regulatory takings terms. For
further discussion of Yee, see infra notes 222-23, 226-27 and accompanying text.
55. These questions include: (1) what interests may be considered discrete property
interests for purposes of takings analysis; (2) how one measures total destruction; and (3)
whether heightened scrutiny of purposes will apply beyond the narrow facts of Nollan.
For discussion of these questions, see infra part II.C.
56. 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2319 (1994) (requiring "rough proportionality" in conditions
extracted in order to obtain building permit). For further discussion of Dolan, see infra
notes 208-09, 224 and accompanying text.
57. The decision to grant certiorari in PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 112 S. Ct. 414
(1991), a run-of-the-mill zoning dispute that the circuit court disposed of with little
difficulty, see PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 928 F.2d 28,29-30 (1st Cir. 1991), seemed
to reflect some interest in reinvigorating substantive due process, but the Court without
explanation dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. PFZ Properties, Inc.
v. Rodriguez, 112 S. Ct. 1151 (1992).
58. See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
59. 112 S. Ct. 1105, 1112 (1992) (holding that retroactive amendment to workers'
compensation statute requiring employer to make higher payments did not violate due
process); accord Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 731
(unanimous opinion) (upholding federal legislation retroactively subjecting employers to
liability for withdrawing from pension funds during period immediately prior to enactment
of the statute), vacated, Carpenters Pension Trust for S. Cal. v. Shelter Framing Corp., 467
U.S. 1257, cert. denied, G & R Roofing Co. v. Carpenters Pension Trust for S. Cal., 467
U.S. 1259 (1984).
60. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2722 (1993);
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1991); see also Browning-Ferris
Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 260 (1989) (rejecting Eighth Amendment
challenge to punitive damages award); Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S.
71, 76 (1988) (declining to consider, as not properly presented, a due process challenge to
pinitive damages award). While both cases recognized that at some point punitive
damages might become so unreasonable as to violate due process, TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2718;
Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18-19, in both cases the Court upheld extremely large awards as
sufficiently justified by "objective criteria" and left readers to wonder at what point
punitive damages might violate due process. See TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2722 (sustaining
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has been particularly unfriendly to due process arguments seeking to
impose affirmative duties on government.6'
B. Tension in Conservative Theory: Economic Rights and Judicial
Restraint
The pattern of reinvigoration and retreat described above raises
a fundamental question. If the Court's conservative majority wants
to enhance protection for traditional economic rights, as it seems to,
why has it been unwilling to follow through on the implications of its
exploratory cases? The answer lies in the connection between the
Court's renewed interest in economic rights and the forces that fueled
its reconfiguration over the past two decades. Whatever predilections
individual justices may have toward economic rights, they are
constrained from acting on them by the high profile rhetoric of
judicial restraint that accompanied their appointments. In light of
that rhetoric, any intervention on behalf of economic rights must be
justifiable in terms of judicial restraint and its theoretical corollary,
originalism.
1. Economic Rights and the Conservative Agenda
There can be little doubt that the pattern of Supreme Court
decisions described above reflects a renewed interest in economic
rights, which have received little or no protection since the end of the
so-called Lochner era. During the Lochner era, of course, the Court
stood in opposition to an ever-increasing tide of economic and social
punitive damages of $10,000,000 as reasonable even though actual damages limited to
$19,000); Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23 (upholding punitive damages component of $1,000,000
even though it was four times the amount of compensatory damages, over 200 times the
plaintiff's out-of-pocket expenses, and much greater than fine that could be imposed under
state law).
The Court did invalidate an amendment to the Oregon Constitution that precluded
judicial review of a jury's punitive damages award "unless the court can affirmatively say
there is no evidence to support the verdict." Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331,
2334 (1994). While Honda is an exception to the Court's otherwise uniform rejection of
challenges to punitive damage awards, it does not represent any significant change in
direction. The Oregon provision departed from the otherwise universal practice in other
states of allowing judicial review of awards, a practice the Court had relied on in its
previous decisions. Moreover, the Court treated this as a procedural due process claim,
rather than a substantive challenge to the rationality of large awards. Id. at 2339. Thus,
Honda may constrain the procedures under which punitive damages are awarded, but it
provides no support for substantive due process arguments against large awards.
61. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 112 S. Ct. 1061,1069 (1992); infra notes 312-
18 and accompanying text.
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legislation.62 Relying on substantive economic due process, 3 as
well as other substantive and structural doctrines to invalidate
regulatory efforts at the state and federal levels,' the Court effec-
62. This historic conflict was caused by the divergent ideological trends that influenced
the Court and political institutions, respectively. The Court was dominated by
conservatives, a pattern that began in 1888 with the appointment of Chief Justice Fuller,
followed in succession by a series of nominations by Presidents Cleveland and Harrison,
"whose politics were conservative and largely indistinguishable." Owen M. Fiss, The Fuller
Court, in AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY: SELECTIONS FROM THE ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 184 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1989); accord
ALFRED H. KELLY ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT 404 (6th ed. 1983). Although subsequent appointments brought less
uniformly conservative justices and some strong liberal voices to the bench, the dominant
theme of the Court from the 1890s until 1937 was conservative. See generally AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra, at 174-226 (discussing constitutional history during this
period); CLINT BOLICK, UNFINISHED BUsINESs: A CIVIL RIGHTS STRATEGY FOR
AMERICA'S THIRD CENTURY 68-76 (1990) (same); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION
IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY: 1888-1986 3-83 (1990) (analyzing
Supreme Court decisions during this period). In contrast, the formation of economic and
social policy in the political arena was driven by Progressivism and related reform
movements that gained prominence during the latter part of the 19th and early part of the
20th centuries. See generally LOREN P. BETH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN
CONsTrTUTION: 1877-1917 (1971) (discussing implications of social and political
movements of the progressive era for constitutional evolution); ARTHUR A. EKIRCH, JR.,
PROGRESSIVISM IN AMERICA: A STUDY OF THE ERA FROM THEODORE ROOSEVELT TO
WOODROW WILSON (1974) (reviewing history of the Progressive movement); JOHN B.
GATES, THE SUPREME COURT AND PARTISAN REALIGNMENT: A MACRO- AND
MICROLEVEL PERSPECtivE 57-140 (1992) (exploring relationship between political
realignment and the Supreme Court policymaking during the 1890s and from 1911-1945);
Alexander M. Bickel, The Judiciary and Responsible Government" 1910-21: Part One, IX
THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES 3-718 (1984) (describing in detail the political history of the Supreme
Court during important segment of early twentieth century).
63. Substantive economic due process was typified by the notorious decision in
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905) (finding maximum hour law for bakers not
related to valid health or safety purpose), from which the era derives its name. Most of
the additional substantive due process cases are discussed in CURRIE, supra note 62..
64. Substantive doctrines included the Takings Clause, see, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-15 (1922) (holding requirement that coal be left in place to
support surface to be a taking because it totally destroyed mineral owner's interest), the
Contract Clause, see, e.g., Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Wright, 248 U.S. 525, 527 (1919)
(rejecting revocation of tax exemption granted by state charter as a violation of the
Contract Clause), and the Equal Protection Clause, see, e.g., Quaker City Cab Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389, 402 (1928) (holding limitation of tax on taxicab receipts to
those operated by corporations violated equal protection). Structural doctrines included
a narrow reading of the commerce power, see, e.g., Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R.
Co., 295 U.S. 330, 362 (1935); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272-73 (1918),
overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S.
161, 179 (1908); Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 588 (1898); United States v. E.C.
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1895), and of other bases of federal authority. See, e.g.,
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 64 (1936); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20,
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tively constitutionalized the laissez-faire jurisprudence of the common
law.61
The Lochner era ended abruptly in 1937 with the famous "switch
in time that saved nine," which marked the beginning of an era of
liberal constitutional jurisprudence.66 Since that time, the Court has
routinely rejected challenges to economic regulation regardless of the
substantive or structural provisions invoked to protect economic
rights, by applying the deferential rational basis test.67 Under this
39 (1922) (the Child Labor Tax Case); see also Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157
U.S. 429, 583 (invalidating income tax as violation of apportionment clause, U.S. CONsT.
art. I, § 9, cl. 4), modified on reh'g, 158 U.S. 601 (1895), overruled by South Carolina v.
Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988). But see Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920)
(upholding legislation implementing treaty although provisions exceeded scope of
commerce power). Likewise, in several celebrated cases the Court also invoked separation
of powers to invalidate federal legislation. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935); see
also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 289-312 (1936) (relying on federalism,
separation of powers, and due process to invalidate federal regulation of coal mining).
65. See infra notes 253-58 and accompanying text.
66. In a story familiar to most students of constitutional law, in the mid-1930s the
Court struck down major pieces of New Deal legislation. See Carter, 298 U.S. at 317;
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 551; Panama Ref Co., 293 U.S. at 433. These
decisions provoked President Franklin Roosevelt to advance the infamous "Court packing
plan" which would have provided for the appointment of an additional justice for each
sitting justice over the age of 70. The plan, recognized even by Roosevelt's supporters as
a blatant power grab, proved to be unnecessary when Justice Roberts apparently switched
his position and provided the crucial fifth vote to uphold economic regulation. Whether
Justice Roberts' change of heart was a response to the plan (as is frequently assumed)
remains unclear. Compare NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 19, § 2.6, at 33 & n.16
(noting that Justice Roberts changed vote before announcement of the court packing
plan), with Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107 HARv. L. REV. 620,
625 (1994) (arguing that Justice Roberts' pre-Court packing plan conversion was an
historical fiction created by Justice Frankfurter to preserve the Court's legitimacy). In any
event, the new "liberal" majority was soon consolidated through a series of Roosevelt
appointments to the Court, which included Justices Black (1937), Reed (1938), Frankfurter
(1939), Douglas (1939), Murphy (1940), and Jackson (1941). By 1941, seven of the nine
justices were Roosevelt nominees, and the remaining two justices, Roberts and Chief
Justice Stone, could be expected to uphold economic regulation.
67. This test has been applied to due process and equal protection challenges to
economic regulation, see, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955);
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949); United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379, 391 (1937), was incorporated into the Court's Takings and Contract Clause analysis,
see, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,261 (1980) (regulatory taking); West Coast
Hotel, 300 U.S. at 391 (Contract Clause), and was also used to determine the scope of
federal power, see, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964).
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test, the government need only show that a measure is reasonably
related to some conceivable legitimate purpose.'
Viewed against the background of the Court's longstanding
disregard of economic rights, its recent decisions clearly demonstrate
a renewed interest in the area. This development is not surprising in
light of the conservative reconfiguration of the Court, which began
during the presidency of Richard Nixon and took on an added
urgency as part of the "Reagan Revolution" that transformed the
political landscape during the 1980s.69 Although these conservative
justices did not expressly avow an aggressive jurisprudence of
economic rights,70 the deregulation of business and industry was an
68. See, e.g., Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152.
69. See generally LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 27-73 (4th ed. 1992)
(describing politics surrounding the Supreme Court, including impact of Reagan and Bush
appointments); CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLU-
TION-A FIRSTHiAND ACCOUNT 132-71 (1991) (memoir of Solicitor General under Reagan
Administration); JOHN B. GATES, supra note 62, at 186-87 (describing implications of
reconfiguration of the Supreme Court); DAVID M. O'BRIEN, JUDICIAL ROULETTE:
REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL SELECrION 60-
64 (1988) (analyzing and criticizing Reagan Administration judicial appointments);
RICHARD L. PACELLE, JR., THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SUPREME COURT'S AGENDA:
FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 193-206 (1991) (discussing
implications of Reagan-Bush appointments on the agenda of the Supreme Court); TiE
REAGAN LEGACY: PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE 60-101 (Charles 0. Jones ed. 1988)
(describing policies of the Reagan Administration, including judicial appointments); THE
REAGAN PRESIDENCY: AN INCOMPLETE REVOLUTION? 68-93 (Dilys M. Hill et al. eds.,
1990) (describing policies of the Reagan Administration, including judicial appointments);
Colloquy, Essays on the Supreme Court Appointment Process, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1146
(1988) (collecting various views on the implications of Reagan Administration appoint-
ments and Bork controversy for the judicial selection process).
70. Since judicial restraint was emphasized as a criterion in the selection of these
justices, see infra notes 84-92 and accompanying text, any public embrace of economic
rights would have been problematic. Thus, for example, the slightest suggestion that
Clarence Thomas believed in "natural law" or "natural rights" that might be invoked to
protect economic interests provoked considerable outcry, see, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, The
Thomas Hearings, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1991, at Al; David Margolick, The Thomas
Hearings-Sizing up the Talk of 'Natural Law' Many Ideologies Discover a Precept, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 12,1991, at A22, although this feature of his confirmation has of course been
largely forgotten in the wake of subsequent developments. Two Reagan nominees, Justice
Scalia and Judge Robert Bork, were affiliated with the law and economics movement, and
might therefore be expected to oppose economic regulation. In addition, a number of
lower court judges nominated during this period were prominent conservative members
of the law and economics movement, such as Judges Posner and Easterbrook on the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. More generally, Republicans are
likely to oppose economic regulation, and Republican judicial appointments are likely to
reflect that view.
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important component* of the conservative agenda.71
Conservative critics of the modem regulatory state attributed
various domestic economic problems and the decline of the United
States' economic power abroad to excessive government taxation and
regulation that raised the costs of doing business and strangled the
"entrepreneurial spirit" of American industry. The solution to this
problem was, of course, to reduce taxes and remove unnecessary and
intrusive regulation, relieving industry of significant burdens and
enabling it to prosper again. Though this critique was leveled
primarily against Congress and the regulatory agencies, when viewed
in conjunction with the law and economics 72 and public choice
movements73 it also has significant implications for the courts.
71. See generally Joseph J. Hogan, Reaganomics and Economic Policy, in THE
REAGAN PRESIDENCY, supra note 69, at 135-60 (describing Reagan Administration efforts
to deregulate the economy); Peter L. Kahn, The Politics of Unregulation: Public Choice
and Limits on Government, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 280 (1990) (arguing that the success of
the deregulation movement demonstrates the limits of public choice theory).
72. The law and economics movement seeks to bring the insights of economics into
the analysis of legal rules. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW (4th ed. 1992) (applying law and economics theory to various areas of substantive
law). While law and economics is not inherently conservative, see, e.g., ROBIN P. MALLOY,
LAW AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIvE APPROACH TO THEORY AND PRACTICE 67-73
(1990), the most influential branch of the movement is premised on the superiority of
market forces, which are generally reinforced by the common law, as a mechanism for
maximizing aggregate social welfare by producing the optimal allocation of resources.
Under this view, regulation is appropriate only where market defects, such as imperfect
information or externalities, require correction. Insofar as law and economics is only a
descriptive theory, it offers no normative critique of redistributive efforts. But implicit in
the economic model is the conclusion that redistribution reduces total societal welfare by
skewing incentives and thereby diverting resources from their most productive uses. See,
e.g., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, REGULATORY LAW AND POLICY 55
(1993). Moreover, conservative adherents to the law and economics movement view the
situations in which market imperfections justify regulation as relatively rare, emphasizing
that government intervention is both imperfect and creates costs of its own. This
opposition to regulation rests on the premise that the redistributive effects of regulation
produce inappropriate incentives that divert resources from their most socially desirable
uses and thus reduce aggregate social welfare.
73. The public choice movement applies the tools of economics to the legislative
process. See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT (1962) (advancing public choice theory and describing its implications for
political theory); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE:
A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991) (describing and critiquing public choice theory);
WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COALITIONS (1962) (describing public
choice theory); Einer R. EIhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive
Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 44 (1991) (arguing that, even if correct, public choice
theory does not provide a basis for heightened judicial scrutiny of regulatory measures);
Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENTARY 279,288
(1992) (using public choice theory to analyze takings issues); Daniel A. Farber & Philip
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While not all proponents of economic analysis and public choice
theory agree regarding the implications of these insights for the
constitutional jurisprudence of economic rights,74 it should be clear
P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REV. 873, 879 (1987)
(describing public choice theory and considering its implications for legal theory); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-being, and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 63, 85 (1990)
(criticizing public choice theory and defending traditional welfare economics); Kahn, supra
note 71, at 286 (arguing that success of deregulation demonstrates flaws in public choice
theory); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223,227 (1986) (arguing that
interpreting statutes to effectuate their purported public interest goals is an effective means
of limiting the influence of special interests); Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice:
Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 5
(1991) (arguing that public choice theory does not adequately describe legislative process
and products, and offering comprehensive rationality model as a superior alternative
theory of the legislative process); Symposium, Positive Political Theory and Public
Law-Part 11, 80 GEO. L.J. 1737 (1992) (collecting papers on implications of public choice
theory for legal analysis); Symposium on Public Choice and the Judiciary, 1990 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 729 (collecting papers analyzing the implications of public choice theory for judicial
behavior); Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 167 (1988)
(collecting papers on implications of public choice theory for legal analysis).
In the view of public choice theorists, political actors (whether in Congress or the
bureaucracy) are not motivated in their regulatory decisions, by some overarching view of
the public good, but rather by personal incentives such as securing reelection, advancing
within the bureaucracy, and developing post-government career opportunities. From this
perspective, the regulation that emerges from the legislative and administrative process is
directed towards helping particular constituencies that in turn advance the interests of the
decisionmaker through campaign contributions, promotions, or the infamous revolving
door between industry and government. In the view of public choice theorists, Arrow's
theorem and other problems of group action prevent the electoral process from reflecting
and enforcing the "public" interest, assuming the concept of the public interest is
meaningful at all. See generally TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT SEEKING SOCIETY
(James M. Buchanon et al. eds., 1980) (collecting papers analyzing this phenomenon).
Under this view, regulation purportedly in the public interest is in fact preferential
treatment of powerful interests, and the resources spent on favorable regulation (rent
seeking) constitute a dead-weight loss. Id. Resources spent pursuing monopoly rents or
other redistributive regulation are diverted from productive activities and thus are wasted.
This view assumes that redistribution cannot increase aggregate social welfare, but that
assumption is not invariably correct. Even accepting the assumptions of economics,
redistribution may increase aggregate social welfare because of the decreasing marginal
utility of money, see BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra, at 192-94 (explaining unemployment
insurance in these terms), and when it addresses public goods problems, see infra notes
462-64 and accompanying text.
74. Compare, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533,
547 (1983) (arguing that courts should construe regulatory measures to enforce the interest
group bargains they reflect), with, e.g., Macey, supra note 73, at 227 (arguing that courts
should construe regulatory measures in light of the public interest they purport to serve),
and, e.g., Epstein, supra note 15, at 747 (arguing for activist judicial review of economic
regulation); see also Elhauge, supra note 73, at 48 (arguing that even if accurate, interest
group theory does not justify aggressive judicial review); Bernard Grofman, Public Choice,
Civil Republicanism, and American Politics: Perspectives of a "Reasonable Choice"
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that these views challenge the post-New Deal deference to economic
regulation.75 They posit the laissez-faire common-law system as
economically superior to extensive government regulation and are
highly skeptical of the supposedly "public" purposes advanced to
support economic regulation. Thus, many proponents of economic
analysis and public choice theory advocate a more aggressive judicial
posture respecting regulatory measures that burden economic
rights.76
2. The Problem of Judicial Restraint
Although the deregulation strand of conservative thought
supports a reinvigoration of economic rights, the Court could not
openly pursue such a goal because of the second strand of conserva-
tive theory-judicial restraint.77 At the same time that conservatives
criticized the modem regulatory state made possible by the repudia-
tion of economic rights, they also criticized judicial activism on behalf
of individual rights.7' Although the liberal Court rejected the
Modeler, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1541,1571 (1993) (same). This entire debate reflects an internal
inconsistency on the part of public choice theorists-to the extent that political actors,
including judges, are motivated by material benefits, "there is no point in addressing
scholarly arguments to them at all." Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice in Practice and
Theory, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1657, 1670 (1993).
75. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 73, at 63-87.
76. See, e.g., ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE JUDICIARY (James A. Dorn & Henry
G. Manne eds., 1987) (collecting papers in support of strong protection of property and
contract rights); PUBLIC CHOICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 181-205 (Jones D.
Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner eds., 1988); Bernard H. Siegan, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES
AND THE CONSTITUTION 248-331 (1980).
77. This term, while frequently used, is at best poorly defined. In its most general
sense, it means respect for the limits of the judicial function, but what that respect implies
for constitutional decisionmaking is the subject of considerable disagreement. At the very
least, judicial restraint has policy and institutional components. The policy component
requires that judges refrain from imposing their policy preferences in the name of law, and
(implicitly) that judges must ground their decisions on some external source. Most
conservative proponents of judicial restraint emphasize the text or history of the
Constitution, and perhaps precedent, as the proper sources of judicial decisions. Implicit
in the policy component of judicial restraint is the institutional component, which requires
that judges respect their institutional limitations and the prerogatives of more democrati-
cally accountable political institutions. It is frequently assumed, but not necessarily true,
that these two components of restraint coincide. See Richard E. Levy & Robert L.
Glicksman, Judicial Activism and Restraint in the Supreme Court's Environmental Law
Decisions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 343, 348 (1989). For purposes of this article, it is not
necessary to define the concept of judicial restraint with precision.
78. Not all conservatives subscribe to both views. See supra note 5. Indeed, one
might attribute the great political success of Ronald Reagan to his unique ability to bring
these two views together, and the ultimate failure of George Bush's reelection bid to his
failure to do so.
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Lochner-era jurisprudence of economic rights as improper judicial
activism, it eventually engaged in judicial activism of its own on behalf
of various individual rights. 9 Culminating in the 1960s under the
Warren Court, the liberal jurisprudence of individual rights estab-
lished constitutional safeguards in areas such as freedom of expression
and religion, ° criminal procedure," equal protection,' and the
unenumerated right of privacy.'
79. These developments began in 1938 with the suggestion in the famous footnote four
of Carolene Products that the presumption of rationality afforded economic regulation
might not apply in certain classes of cases involving individual rights. See United States
v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). The World War II period and the
Eisenhower presidency can hardly be described as a time of liberalism in society generally,
but the Court handed down some highly significant liberal decisions, such as Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942),
during that time. Moreover, Eisenhower was responsible for the appointment of both Earl
Warren and William Brennan, who proved to be strong liberal voices.
80. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,448-49 (1969) (per curiam) (holding
that a state could not punish advocacy of illegal conduct absent showing that speech was
intended to incite imminent unlawful conduct and likely to cause such conduct); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,283 (1964) (holding that a state ould not allow public
figure to recover for libel absent showing of "actual malice"); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,
425 (1962) (holding that voluntary nondenominational prayer in public schools violates
requirement of separation of church and state).
81. The most prominent feature of this development was the Court's Miranda decision
requiring police to advise suspects of the right to remain silent and the right to have
counsel present during questioning. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966).
Other areas included aggressive application of the Fourth Amendment's protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures, see, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961), the
Sixth Amendment's right to counsel, see, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,236-37
(1967); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963), and the application of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment to limit the death penalty, see
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam), and to require minimum
standards for prison conditions, see Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685-88 (1978).
82. The Court became dissatisfied with the pace of desegregation in the public schools
after Brown, cracking down on delaying tactics employed to avoid desegregation, see, e.g.,
Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218,233-34 (1964); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1,14-17
(1958), and approving broad remedial powers for the federal courts, including the power
to order busing, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 29-31 (1971)
(upholding busing as remedy for past segregation in public schools). The Court also began
to treat classifications other than race, including gender and illegitimacy, as subject to
higher forms of scrutiny. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (plurality
opinion) (gender); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968) (illegitimacy). Finally, the
Court used the Equal Protection Clause to protect substantive rights, such as the right to
travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-33 (1969), the right of access to courts,
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16-19 (1956) (plurality opinion), and the right to vote,
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 556 (1964).
83. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-86 (1965). It was, of course, the right
of privacy that formed the basis of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
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This judicial activism became a target for conservative critics who
charged the Court with improperly substituting its view of sound
social policy for that of politically accountable institutions. 4 The
judicial restraint critique, which tied into a broader 'emphasis on
traditional values,' figured prominently in the Reagan revolution.
Relying on this critique to further their political goals, Presidents
Reagan and Bush tried to appoint judges and justices committed to
judicial restraint and who would not "legislate from the bench. 86
The theoretical corollary of this judicial restraint critique is the
originalist school of constitutional interpretation. 7  This view,
propounded most publicly by then Attorney General Edwin Meese
and Judge Robert Bork,88 argues that the courts may invalidate
84. See generally Earl M. Maltz, The Prospects for a Revival of Conservative Activism
in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 24 GA. L. REV. 629, 640-43 (1990) (describing association
of judicial restraint with conservative ideology as a response to liberal judicial decisions).
85. Many conservatives attributed social ills such as the rise in single parent
households, crime and drug abuse, political and racial unrest, and the proliferation of
pornography and promiscuity to the breakdown of traditional institutions and values, such
as the family, religion, patriotism, and respect for law. These critics placed responsibility
for these social problems on the "liberal establishment," which undermined these
traditional values and promoted "moral relativism." While this critique was directed
primarily at social and political institutions, it also encompassed Supreme Court decisions
that invoked constitutional rights to limit society's ability to enforce these values through
law. See generally Robert H. Bork, Tradition and Morality in Constitutional Law, Francis
Boyer Lecture on Public Policy, delivered before the American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research 2-6 (1984) (arguing that communities should be entitled to suppress
moral harms as well as economic and physical ones); Kenneth L. Karst, Faiths, Flags, and
Family Values: The Constitution of the Theater State, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1993) (arguing
that judges should fight the use of government power to exclude certain groups). An
excellent example of this critique is George Wallace's contention that the Supreme Court's
school prayer decisions had caused the rise in drug abuse and other crimes. See BAUM,
supra note 69, at 227.
86. See authorities cited supra note 69.
87. The literature advancing and critiquing various forms of originalism is far too
extensive to detail here. For illustrative works supportive of originalism, see RAOUL
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1977); Earl Maltz, Some New Thoughts on an Old Problem-The Role of
the Intent of the Framers in Constitutional Theory, 63 B.U. L. REV. 811 (1983); Antonin
Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849 (1989); see also Richard S.
Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in ConstitutionalAdjudication: Three Objections
and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 226 (1988) (defending originalism against commonly
advanced criticisms). See generally The Federalist Society Sixth Annual Symposium on Law
and Public Policy: The Crisis in Legal Theory and the Revival of Classical Jurisprudence,
73 CORNELL L. REV. 281 (1988) (collecting papers discussing originalism).
88. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION
OF THE LAw (1990); Edwin Meese III, Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 11
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 5 (1988). For critical reviews of Judge Bork's book, see Bruce
Ackerman, Robert Bork's Grand Inquisition, 99 YALE L.L 1419 (1990); Lyle Denniston,
ESCAPING LOCHNER'S SHADOW
action by politically accountable institutions only when the text and
history of the Constitution clearly reveal that the action is contrary to
the framers' original intentions. In its most extreme form, this school
of thought rejects any extension of constitutional rights beyond those
clearly articulated in the text of the Constitution or otherwise shown
to have been specifically contemplated by the framers. To be sure,
few argued for such an extreme brand of originalism, but the absence
of an originalist foundation provided the basis for a conservative
.challenge to the liberal jurisprudence of individual rights.
The conservative Court followed this lead, relying on judicial
restraint to restrict individual rights, 9 although the outright reversal
of Warren Court precedents foreseen by many has not occurred.'
The Court has emphasized both its institutional incompetence to
dictate social policy or second-guess the outcome of the political
process and the need to identify a clear constitutional mandate before
the judiciary intervenes.
This highly public political and judicial commitment to judicial
restraint made any attempt to reinvigorate economic rights problemat-
ic. It does not take a particularly astute observer to recognize the
tension between the emphasis on judicial restraint that accompanied
the appointment of conservative justices and any systematic reinvigo-
The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1291
(1990); Ronald Dworkin, Bork's Jurisprudence, 57 U. CHi. L. REV. 657 (1990).
89. The secondary literature describing this retreat has been largely critical. See, e.g.,
RUSsELL W. GALLOWAY, JUSTICE FOR ALL? THE RICH AND POOR IN SUPREME COURT
HISTORY, 1790-1990 168-79 (1991); DAVID O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME
COURT IN AMERICAN POLrrICs 51-64 (3d ed. 1993); David Chang, Discriminatory Impact,
Affirmative Action, and Innocent Victims: Judicial Conservatism or Conservative Justices?,
91 COLUM. L. REv. 790 (1991); Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern
Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 282-318 (1991); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants
of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1991); Suzanna Sherry, Issue Manipulation by the
Burger Court: Saving the Community from Itself, 70 MINN. L. REv. 611 (1986); Tom Stacy,
The Search for the Truth in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1369
(1991); Robin West, Foreword- Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REv. 43, 43-60,
79-106 (1990).
90. Most obviously, although Roe was a prime target of Presidents Reagan and Bush,
and its life expectancy seemed quite short after Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs.,
492 U.S. 490 (1989), the Court ultimately reaffirmed Roe in greatly narrowed form in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2803-16 (1992). The Court has followed a
similar pattern in other areas as well, narrowing but not directly overruling leading Warren
Court precedents. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism: Reflections on the
Burger Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1436, 1441-48 (1987). In addition, the Court has
consistently refused to recognize new fundamental rights or expand previously recognized
ones. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-96 (1986) (refusing to recognize
fundamental right of consenting adults to engage in private homosexual activity).
1995]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ration of economic rights.91 To avoid charges of hypocrisy, the
Court had to differentiate enhanced economic rights protections both
from the substantive due process of the discredited Lochner era and
from the liberal jurisprudence of individual rights. 2
Conservatives might argue that, although there is no strictly
originalist justification for a broad economic rights doctrine, the
textual and historical foundation for economic rights is stronger than
for other types of individual rights. Such an approach, however, is
problematic for several reasons. First, such a "relative" justification
for intervention would not be sufficient to overcome the conser-
vatives' high-profile political condemnation of judicial activism in the
1980s, particularly in the eyes of the general public. Second, the
Lochner era has been so thoroughly discredited and so closely
associated with "improper" activism that it would be impossible to
characterize invalidation of economic legislation-in the absence of a
strict textual or historical justification-as restrained. Finally, such a
justification for economic rights effectively concedes the legitimacy of
the liberal individual rights methodology, and therefore would reduce
the conservative critique of individual rights decisions to a mere
quibble over how that methodology was applied in a given case.
C. An Originalist Escape?
The conservative Court therefore sought to rest economic rights
91. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 47, at 154 ("Although the current justices are far more
concerned with property rights than their liberal predecessors, [federalism and judicial
restraint] components of their judicial outlook will constrain the Court's review of
economic legislation."); Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic
Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 829-32 (1986) (arguing that economic rights activism
on the basis of political or economic theory is inconsistent with proper judicial role of
determining original intent); Stephen Macedo, Majority Power, Moral Skepticism, and the
New Right's Constitution, in ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE JUDICIARY, supra note 76,
at 111-36 (criticizing the original intent jurisprudence of the "new right" and proposing
"principled judicial activism" respecting economic rights). See generally Maltz, supra note
84, at 650-67 (arguing for a revival of conservative judicial activism).
92. Other aspects of the Court's recent jurisprudence, particularly its treatment of
affirmative action, have evoked strong criticism as inconsistent with the Court's confessed
commitment to judicial restraint. See, e.g., Chang, supra note 89, at 794; Klarman, supra
note 89, at 315; Sherry, supra note 89, at 611-12. Of course, it is unclear whether such
criticism actually constrains judicial decisions, and I do not mean to suggest that judges
respond directly to academic criticism, particularly if it reflects underlying ideological
differences. Nonetheless, judges are concerned with their reputations among legal circles
both present and future, and criticism-especially concerning intellectual honesty and
craft-has a significant impact on that reputation. See generally POSNER, supra note 72,
at 534 (citing "professional criticism" as an example of the "mild" penalties for unsound
judicial decisionmaking).
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on an originalist foundation.93 The pattern of the last two decades
is just what one might expect from a Court seeking to enhance
economic rights without creating an obvious inconsistency with its
reliance on judicial restraint to narrow individual rights decisions.
The Court has experimented with various doctrines that provide a
plausible originalist basis for judicial intervention, but has scrupulous-
ly avoided substantive due process. Because text and history support
only a narrow range of economic rights under these doctrines,
however, the Court was forced to retreat.
The most obvious consequence of the conservative commitment
to judicial restraint is that the Court cannot resurrect substantive
economic due process or anything that too closely resembles it.
Because the Lochner era reliance on due process has come to
epitomize improper activism, any use of due process as a source of
economic rights would reveal the Court's ostensible commitment to
judicial restraint as self-serving rhetoric. Likewise, reliance on the
Due Process Clause is foreclosed by the conservative critique of
unenumerated individual rights, such as the right of privacy. Thus, it
is unsurprising that the Court has broadly rejected economic rights
claims based on due process.94
A good example of the Court's desire to avoid reliance on
substantive economic due process is Industrial Union Department,
AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute (Benzene).95 The Benzene
plurality construed the Occupational Safety and Health Act to require
that OSHA demonstrate a "significant risk" to health. or safety before
imposing regulations limiting worker exposure to chemicals.96 The
plurality reasoned in part that a grant of administrative authority to
impose tremendous costs on industry with little or no discernable
benefit might be unconstitutional under the nondelegation doctrine.'
This cost-benefit analysis is more consistent with substantive economic
due process than the nondelegation doctrine, which is concerned with
whether Congress has provided an "intelligible principle" to guide and
93. Justice Scalia, for example, has advocated originalism and criticized broad-based
economic rights activism, see Antonin Scalia, Economic Affairs as Human Affairs, in
ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE JUDICIARY, supra note 76, at 33-37, but he has taken an
aggressive position with respect to application of the Takings Clause, see supra note 51.
94. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
95. 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (plurality opinion).
96. Id. at 653.
97. Id. at 646.
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control agency discretion.9  Thus, the Court distorted the
nondelegation doctrine to effectuate substantive economic due process
principles, apparently because it could not embrace those principles
directly.
The Court's exploration of other economic rights doctrines also
can be readily understood as the search for a doctrinal basis to
safeguard economic rights that would not create an obvious conflict
with its commitment to judicial restraint. First, it is not surprising that
of the possible doctrinal alternatives to substantive economic due
process, the Equal Protection Clause would receive the least attention.
Although equal protection escaped some of the ignominy associated
with substantive due process, the Court's post-New Deal jurispru-
dence treated due process and equal protection challenges to
economic regulation identically.99 More importantly, perhaps, the
Equal Protection Clause has been a centerpiece of the liberal
individual rights jurisprudence that conservatives characterize as
improper judicial activism."° Heavy reliance on the Equal Protec-
tion Clause to protect economic rights would thus be impossible to
reconcile with the conservative critique of individual rights."' 1
Second, the use of structural constraints, especially separation of
powers, makes sense in terms of this analysis. Although separation
of powers constraints had been relaxed in the wake of the New Deal,
unlike substantive due process, they were never expressly repudiat-
ed."3  Moreover, the Court could claim a textual or originalist
98. For example, a clear legislative directive to impose great costs with no discernible
benefits would present no nondelegation issue, even if it were unconstitutional on other
grounds. For further discussion of this criticism of Benzene, see Levy & Glicksman, supra
note 77, at 379-82.
99. Both doctrines employed an extremely deferential rational basis test. See supra
note 67 and accompanying text. Until recently, only one post-New Deal case had
invalidated economic regulation on equal protection grounds (absent a suspect
classification or fundamental right), see Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 465-69 (1957), and
the Court later expressly overruled that case, City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297,
306 (1976) (per curiam).
100. See supra note 82.
101. There is no apparent textual or historical basis for distinguishing economic from
other individual rights for purposes of equal protection scrutiny. While it has been argued
that the historical meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment was limited to the protection
of rights listed in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which included the economic rights to own
property, make and enforce contracts, and sue or be sued, see, e.g., BERGER, supra note
87, at 20-36, a strict historical reading would logically confine the clause to protecting racial
minorities, thus preventing its use as a broad-based tool for protecting economic rights.
102. The post-New Deal Court continued to recognize the nondelegation doctrine, for
example, but consistently distinguished Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry and upheld
legislation against nondelegation challenges. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S.
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foundation for separation of powers limitations in at least some
cases. 3 Separation of powers constraints may also have been an
attractive means for protecting economic rights precisely because they
do not involve a "rights"-based analysis at all, a fact that deflects
comparisons between the two types of decisions.Y
While structural constraints presented an attractive originalist
escape, they did not provide an adequate foundation for a jurispru-
dence of economic rights, and the Court was forced to retreat.
Separation of powers and federalism are clearly part of the intended
structure of the Constitution, but there is little textual or historical
justification for a strict application of either structural doctrine to
impose dramatic constraints on federal regulatory authority. 5 The
textual provisions regarding separation of powers are relatively scant,
and hardly permit extrapolation to the implementation of economic
regulation by administrative agencies, given that none existed in
1787.1"6 Thus, although a few constraints on administrative struc-
tures can be readily justified in originalist terms,"° there is no
historical foundation to require strict separation of powers in all
414, 423-27 (1944). Cases imposing limits on federal authority, however, were expressly
repudiated. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116 (1941). It is thus
unsurprising that the Court's activity in the federalism area has been cautious and quite
limited. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
103. The concern for textual or historical justifications for judicial constraints on
government action may also explain the Court's emphasis on the intent of the framers in
New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2421-23 (1992), which invoked federalism to
invalidate provisions of a federal statute requiring states to comply with its mandate to
create low-level radioactive waste-disposal facilities or "take title" to the waste at the
request of those who produce it. This historical justification is seriously flawed, however.
See Levy, supra note 28, at 515-22.
104. Of course, this feature also may render separation of powers constraints less
desirable to conservatives as a means of protecting economic rights, for at least two
reasons. First, in some circumstances imposition of structural constraints might adversely
affect economic rights by limiting agency discretion not to regulate or to deregulate. Cf
Levy & Glicksman, supra note 77, at 422 n.419 (criticizing Judge Bork's use of Benzene
analogy to expand agency discretion not to regulate in NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc)). Second, insofar as structural constraints do not depend on
traditional common-law baselines, they would also protect welfare and other affirmative
rights. See infra part III.B.1.
105. Alternatively, if structural constraints were read absolutely, they would require the
complete dismantling of modern government. See infra part II.B.1.
106. See generally Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government Separation
of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 CoLUM. L. REv. 573,578-80,667-69 (1984) (arguing
against strict, formalistic application of separation of powers).
107. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944-59 (1983) (relying on text and framers'
intent to invalidate the legislative veto).
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cases.' Federalism limits are also difficult to justify in strictly
originalist terms. While the framers clearly contemplated that the
scope of federal power would be limited by the enumeration of
powers and the reservation of other powers to the states, this
understanding was not codified in the form of any express reservation
of a certain "core" of sovereign powers to the state.1' 9
Third, we may understand the Court's exploration of the
Contract Clause as part of the search for an originalist escape. The
clause offers a plausible textual basis for judicial intervention that
apparently reconciles economic rights with principles of judicial
restraint. Because it is separate from the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses, moreover, the use of the Contract Clause to
enhance protection of economic rights does not conffict directly with
the conservative critique of the liberal individual rights jurispru-
dence." 0
But the Contract Clause provides neither adequate textual nor
strong historical support for a broad restriction on state regulatory
authority"' Although it expressly prohibits any law "impairing the
obligation of contract," that phrase is not self-defining. The Court
must decide what constitutes an impairment and what is meant by the
obligation of contract."' Given this ambiguity, an originalist would
108. Thus, for example, Justice Scalia's dissenting opinions in both Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654, 697-734 (1988), and Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413-27 (1984),
required him to go beyond a strictly historical view of separation of powers and rely on
his own interpretation of the constitutional structure of government. In Morrison, for
example, Justice Scalia emphasized the "unitary" executive and argued that (outside of
impeachment) the President must have absolute control over the decision to prosecute
members of the executive branch. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 727-32 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
He offers little support for this view, whose originalist foundations have been strongly
challenged. See Laurence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administra-
tion, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 12-85 (1994).
109. See generally Levy, supra note 28, at 515. The Court's effort in New York v.
United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992), to justify in historical terms a Tenth Amendment
restriction on federal power to compel states to implement federal policy was seriously
flawed. See Levy, supra note 28, at 515-22.
110. To the extent that previous law had essentially conflated due process, equal
protection, Contract Clause, and takirigs analyses by incorporating the rational basis test
into the inquiry under each provision, see supra note 67, it would be necessary for the
Court to separate the analysis under the Contract Clause. See infra note 176 and
accompanying text.
111. It is also worth noting that the Contract Clause does not apply to federal
regulation, which would leave a gaping loophole in any jurisprudence based on the
Contract Clause.
112. For example, one could plausibly argue that only laws rendering contracts
unenforceable "impair the obligations of contracts." See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET
AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1550 (2d ed. 1991) ("In a number of early cases the Court
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turn to evidence of the framers' understanding to determine the
meaning of the clause. The search would reveal that the framers
wanted to prevent states from enacting debtor-relief laws, but would
unearth little definitive evidence of any expectation that the clause
would broadly prevent economic regulation adversely affecting
contractual interests. 1 3  Thus, as in the case of the structural
constraints, aggressive application of the Contract Clause in a broad
range of cases would require the Court to intervene: in situations not
compelled by either text or clear evidence of original intent."4
The Court's current fascination with the Takings Clause
represents its litest and most far reaching effort to construct an
economic rights jurisprudence on originalist foundations. Like the
Contract Clause, the Takings Clause provides a textual basis for
economic rights decisions that separates it from both Lochnerian
substantive due process and modem individual rights decisions. But
like the Contract Clause, this originalist foundation will, I believe,
ultimately prove to be inadequate for a coherent jurisprudence of
economic rights."5
struggled with the issue of whether particular measures were 'regulations' interfering with
remedies, or genuine impairments of contractual obligations."); see also Epstein, supra note
15, at 708 (listing six interpretive issues).
113. Even Professor Epstein, for example, concedes that "the detailed history of the
drafting and ratifying conventions is of little use in resolving the specific interpretive
questions that have subsequently arisen." Epstein, supra note 15, at 708. Indeed,
Professor Epstein comes to differing conclusions about the implications of this history for
the scope of the Contract Clause than did the author on whom he relies for historical
information. See id. at 707 ("There is of course no guarantee that this brief sketch
captures the mood of the framers any better than its rival, which treats the clause as a
provision of minor importance.") (citing BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE
OF THE CONSTITUTION 243 (1938); Note, A Process-Oriented Approach to the Contract
Clause, 89 YALE L.J. 1623, 1626-27 (1980)).
114. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
115. One seldom remarked-upon originalist difficulty is that the clause does not itself
apply to the states, but rather was the first provision incorporated into the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233-41 (1897) (holding that just compensation requirement applies
to the states through the Due Process Clause). Some originalists conveniently ignore the
fact that the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause is inapplicable to the states and the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause does not contain a takings provision, and
the logical inference that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require states to
compensate for takings. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 91, at 829 ("The fifth and fourteenth
amendments prevent either the federal or any state government from taking private
property for public use without paying just compensation." (citing U.S. CONST. amends.
V, XIV, § 1.)). Not all originalists agree with Raoul Berger's rejection of the incorporation
of Bill of Rights provisions via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see
BERGER, supra note 87, at 134-65, but incorporation recognizes that due process has a
substantive component. This conclusion is difficult to reconcile with the language of the
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This is particularly true' for regulatory takings. While the term
"taking" can easily include physical invasions (perhaps even those in
which the government itself does not acquire possession), its ordinary
meaning would not seem to encompass use restrictions that merely
diminish value.116  Nor have advocates of an aggressive regulatory
takings jurisprudence advanced any clear evidence that the framers
intended to construct an elaborate regime of regulatory takings,1 7
as opposed to requiring compensation when the government exercised
its eminent domain or equivalent powers to condemn property. The
lack of an originalist foundation may explain the inconsistent results
in the takings cases. The Court cannot move quickly and aggressively
in the takings area because the entire regulatory takings jurisprudence
is, in a sense, precisely the kind of reasoning based upon broad
inferences of constitutional intent divorced from express language or
explicit history that is anathema to originalists.118 Thus, the leading
decisions, such as Lucas and Nollan, employ potentially limited
Due Process Clause, but see Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 WIs.
L. REV. 941, 983-1005 (arguing that due process was understood to have a substantive
component at the time the Fifth Amendment was adopted), and is the foundation for
liberal individual rights jurisprudence.
116. While Justice Scalia argued in Lucas that, contrary to earlier versions of the
Takings Clause, its text "can be read to encompass regulatory as well as physical
deprivations," Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886,2900 n.15 (1992),
this is a difficult stretch. The first definition of "to take" in my office dictionary is "[t]o
get into one's possession by force, skill, or artifice." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE
DICIONARY 1239 (2d ed. 1982). Not all definitions of "take" necessarily include the
acquisition of possession, but in its ordinary usage "take" implies acquisition of possession,
something that does not typically occur (except in a metaphysical sense) in "regulatory
takings" cases involving use restrictions. More importantly, even if the text of the clause
can include regulatory takings, originalism would require specific historical evidence of the
framers' intent to justify judicial intervention in the face of ambiguous language.
117. Indeed, what historical evidence there is suggests that the framers did not expect
regulatory measures to come within the purview of the Takings Clause. See, e.g., Lucas,
112 S. Ct. at 2915 (Blackmun J. dissenting); Note, Origins, supra note 47, at 708-15; Note,
Taking Back Takings, supra note 47, at 917-18. Even Justice Scalia conceded in Lucas that
"early constitutional theorists did not believe the Takings Clause embraced regulations of
property at all." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900 n.15. Thus, Professor Epstein must rely on a
purpose-oriented constitutional defense of his theories, see EPsTEIN, supra note 47, at 19-
31, an approach that would be unacceptable to a strict originalist.
118. The ultimate question is the level of generality at which one finds evidence of
original intent sufficient to justify judicial intervention. When criticizing liberal activist
judicial decisions, originalists typically demand evidence that the framers understood that
a specific type of measure would be unconstitutional; but they often do not demand the
same sort of'specificity when discussing decisions with which they agree. See, e.g.,
Dworkin, supra note 88, at 668-69; Glenn H. Reynolds, Penumbral Reasoning on the Right,
140 U. PA. L. REv. 1333, 1341-43 (1992) (citing penumbral reasoning in the Eleventh
Amendment context).
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rationales that can be tied to a more originalist understanding of the
Takings Clause." 9
The foregoing discussion is, of course, not a definitive treatment
of original intent with respect to structural constraints, the Contract
Clause, or takings analysis, and I do not mean to argue that activism
under these doctrines is fundamentally opposed to the framers'
expectations or that it is impossible to find a textual or historical
justification for economic rights activism. Rather, the discussion is
meant to suggest that one cannot simplistically conclude that, because
there is some textual and historical support for judicial intervention
under these doctrines, economic rights activism is more justified than
individual rights activism, which also has some textual and historical
support.120
In short, the effort to find an originalist escape has failed. None
of the doctrines explored by the Court provide a solid originalist
foundation for a broad reinvigoration of economic rights. Unable to
construct an originalist jurisprudence of economic rights, the Court
has largely retreated from the implications of its initial decisions in
each doctrinal area. The search for originalist escapes not only has
failed on its own terms, however, but also has prevented the Court
from developing an alternative analysis that can bring coherence to
the area of economic rights. Because the Court's commitment to
judicial restraint required it to seek an originalist escape, the Court
was prevented from confronting two underlying problems that
transcend specific doctrinal areas to produce confusion throughout the
jurisprudence of economic rights. First, as will be developed in part
II, the Court could not dismantle the dichotomy between economic
and other individual rights by integrating economic interests into a
comprehensive theory of rights. Second, as will be discussed in part
III, the Court has been unable to find a satisfactoy solution to the
119. The use in Lucas of a per se rule that attaches when there is a complete
destruction of economic value is much easier to square with the language of the Takings
Clause than would be a holding that broadly embraces heightened scrutiny of regulatory
purposes in every regulatory takings case. See infra part II.C.2. Such complete destruction
of use is closely analogous to physical interference with possession, and the recognition of
physical interference as a taking has a long jurisprudential pedigree, see Pumpelly v. Green
Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166,179-80 (1871), which has been referred to approvingly by
even such a formalist as Professor Currie, see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN
THE SUPREME COUR. THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, 353 (1985). Similarly,
Nollan emphasizes the affinity to a physical invasion as a partial justification for applying
aggressive scrutiny to the government action in question. See infra note 207 and
accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Riggs, supra note 115.
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problem of defining the baseline against which economic and other
individual rights are measured.
II. ORIGINALIST ESCAPES AND THE DICHOTOMY OF RIGHTS
Although the value of economic rights lies in their contribution
to individual and societal well-being,' the jurisprudence of constitu-
tional rights since the New Deal has been characterized by the
dichotomous treatment of economic and other individual rights.
Although this dichotomy originated with the liberal jurisprudence of
an earlier era, the search for an originalist escape has prevented the
conservative Court from dismantling the dichotomy and placing
economic rights into a broader jurisprudence of constitutional rights.
In the absence of an underlying theory of economic rights, the
reinvigoration of economic rights was impossible to control in a
coherent fashion. Unwilling to accept the far-reaching implications of
its initial decisions in these doctrinal areas, the Court has been forced
to retreat. The result has been doctrinal confusion and little
additional protection for economic rights.
A. The Economic/Individual Rights Dichotomy in Constitutional
Jurisprudence
While the economic rights central to the substantive due process
of the Lochner era were accorded almost no protection under liberal
jurisprudence, certain other rights received special consideration. This
special protection was usually based on some combination of text,
political-process theory, and fundamental rights analysis, but these
rationales are equally powerful justifications for aggressive scrutiny of
economic rights."2  Applied to economic rights, they could draw
considerable strength from the economic analysis and public choice
movements within conservative theory. But while the conservative
Court might have embraced political process and fundamental rights
analysis to integrate economic rights into the jurisprudential edifice
erected by its liberal predecessor," the rhetorical commitment to
121. See Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) (Stewart, J.)
("Property does not have rights. People have rights.")
122. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 18, at 1373-74 n.3.
123. When necessary to avoid confusion throughout the remainder of this Article, I will
use the term "conservative Court" when referring to the Supreme Court after the
reconfiguration of the Court through the appointment of conservative justices began to
take hold, and "liberal Court" when referring to the Supreme Court from about 1937 until
its recent reconfiguration. This terminology is used for convenience and in full recognition,
that the Court has never been, and is not now, either uniformly conservative or uniformly
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judicial restraint and the desire to limit individual rights precedents
prevented it from doing so.
1. The Rights Dichotomy and Liberal Jurisprudence
Even as the liberal Court rejected the substantive economic due
process of the Lochner era by adopting the deferential rational basis
test for economic rights, it indicated in the famous footnote four of
United States v. Carolene Products24 that the judicial deference
accorded economic regulation might not apply where government
action engages the explicit protections of the Bill of Rights, distorts
the political process, or burdens discrete and insular minorities.
Building on this analysis, the Court not only incorporated many Bill
of Rights provisions into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but also recognized certain nontextual rights as "funda-
mental" for purposes of equal protection and due process scruti-ny-.125
The dichotomous treatment of economic and other individual
rights is well illustrated by comparing the Court's decisions in Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas26 and Moore v. City of East Cleveland,27
both of which involved zoning restrictions that prevented more than
a specified number of unrelated persons from living together in a
single family dwelling. The Court upheld the restriction in Belle
Terre, in which the tenants were in fact unrelated individuals and the
restriction burdened principally the landlord's right to use the
property." But the Court invalidated the regulation in Moore
because it defined unrelated persons so as to prevent a grandmother
from living with her son, his child, and the child of her other son, thus
liberal.
124. 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
125. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text. Perhaps to avoid unfavorable
association with Lochner, the Court initially focused its fundamental rights analysis on the
Equal Protection Clause. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942)
(concerning the right of procreation). For purposes of equal protection analysis, the Court
also recognized a fundamental right to vote, see, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554-
55 (1964), to travel, see, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-30 (1969), and to
equal access to courts, see, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16-18 (1956). The Court,
however, also employed fundamental rights analysis in the due process context, in which
it recognized a fundamental right to privacy that encompasses important decisions about
marriage, procreation, and the family. See supra note 85.
126. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
127. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
128. Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 9. The Court in Belle Terre also rejected a freedom of
association argument for strict scrutiny advanced by the tenants, who were unrelated
individuals. IL at 8-9.
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burdening the fundamental right to privacy, of which the family is a
central component. 29
The liberal Court never fully explained why some rights are
entitled to special protection. Carolene Products suggests both a
textual and political-process rationale, but neither rationale provides
a complete justification for individual rights jurisprudence. Most
obviously, while there is a textual basis for according special status to
the explicit provisions of the Bill of Rights,13 it is hard to stretch
this reasoning to encompass nontextual rights. Justice Douglas's
attempt to do so in Griswold v. Connecticut, by advancing a
penumbral theory of the right of privacy,3' neither persuaded
conservative critics nor provided direction as to what "penumbral"
rights ought to be treated as fundamental. In any event, penumbras
provide little basis for distinguishing between economic rights and the
right of privacy, insofar as the explicit textual provisions respecting
economic rights may also have penumbras.
Political-process theory, which has been the more influential
justification for liberal jurisprudence, postulates that aggressive
judicial scrutiny is warranted to prevent the distortion of the political
process or to overturn government action that is the product of a
flawed political process.' Thus, government action is suspect when
it adversely affects substantive interests necessary to the proper
functioning of the political process, such as voting rights or free
speech, or when it is directed against unpopular groups that are
unable to protect themselves through the political process.'
Judicial intervention on political-process grounds avoids the restraint-
129. Moore, 431 U.S. at 498-99. Because a fundamental right was involved, the Court
employed strict scrutiny, requiring that the government's purpose be compelling and the
measure be narrowly tailored to further that purpose. The latter requirement includes
evaluation of whether the measure is over- or underinclusive and whether there are less
restrictive alternatives.
130. Provided, of course, that one overlooks (as did the Court in Carolene Products)
the originalist objections that might be raised to the entire incorporation doctrine. See
supra note 115.
131. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1964).
132. The antecedents of the "political process" conception of the Court's role lie in
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). This sort of reasoning was
advanced by Justice Stone in other contexts as well. See South Carolina State Highway
Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184 n.2 (1938) (regarding the dormant Commerce
Clause); Southern Pac. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 n.2 (1945) (same). The leading
scholarly exposition of the theory is JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST
(1980).
133. These ideas match the remaining two Carolene Products categories.
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based critique of judicial review as "countermajoritarian,"' because
the decisions of a distorted or flawed political process are no more
"democratic" than those of the unelected judiciary. Political-process
theory not only explains many liberal individual fights doctrines,
35
but also the general disregard for economic rights. Liberals assumed
that judicial intervention was unnecessary to protect economic fights
because the powerful business interests typically burdened by liberal
economic regulation are fully capable of defending themselves
through the political process.
36
Nevertheless, political-process theory is a problematic justification
for the rights dichotomy. First, blanket deference to economic
regulation is difficult to square with the recognition that the political
process may fail.13  Even if some economic interests are adequately
protected by the political process, others will not be.138  Political-
process theory thus does not explain the complete failure to accord
any protection to economic rights. Second, while political-process
theory explains some liberal doctrines, such as suspect classifications
and the protection given to speech and voting rights, it is difficult to
justify the special status of other substantive rights in process
terms. 139  We may suspect that any burden on fundamental rights
has been "externalized" so that it falls on unpopular minorities or
individuals because majoritarian forces would be unwilling to burden
their own fundamental rights, but this idea does not explain why the
suspicion should be greater for privacy rights than important
economic interests.
The Carolene Products rationales therefore must be supplement-
ed by some additional explanation of why some interests are entitled
134. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-19 (1986).
135. These include heightened scrutiny respecting voting rights (necessary to counter
distortion of the political process) and suspect classifications (because the political process
does not adequately protect certain groups).
136. Of course, not all economic regulation adversely affects powerful economic
interests. Indeed, one important insight of public choice theory has been the recognition
that much economic regulation involves rent seeking by powerful political constituencies.
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Process Protection and the Economic Rights Provisions
of the Constitution, 11 GEO. MASON U. L. REv. 73, 73 (1988); see also supra note 73
(discussing public choice view of economic regulation).
138. See TRIBE, supra note 18, at 1374. Indeed, liberals did seek to protect some kinds
of economic interests, such as government benefits, but the Court was uncomfortable with
the full implications of such cases. See infra notes 270-96 and accompanying text.
139. Professor Ely, for example, opposed the Court's decision in Roe on political-
process grounds. See John H. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf.i A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 926 (1973).
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to greater protection than others. Generally, the Court has employed
a fundamental rights analysis based on historical tradition and its own
intuitive sense of what rights are essential. 4 But this approach
does not explain the dichotomy of rights either, insofar as the same
sort of analysis arguably justifies treating economic rights as funda-
mental. 4' Aside from pejorative references to Lochner and
conclusory statements that economic regulation is subject to deferen-
tial rational basis review, however, the Court has not offered any
explanation for its refusal to treat economic rights as fundamental.
Ultimately, then, while penumbral reasoning, political-process
theory, or even fundamental rights analysis might justify intervention
on behalf of the kinds of individual rights promoted by liberals, these
rationales also could justify intervention on behalf of economic rights.
Because liberal jurisprudence left the dichotomous treatment of rights
largely unexplained, it was open to attack as simply another form of
Lochnerian activism on behalf of a different set of preferred rights.
Of course, it was precisely this sort of attack that figured prominently
in the conservative reconfiguration of the Court.
2. The Rights Dichotomy and Conservative Jurisprudence
The need for an originalist escape prevented the conservative
Court from addressing the dichotomy of rights, and this failure in turn
prevented it from developing a coherent jurisprudence of economic
rights. Although conservative theory provides a basis to use liberal
political-process and fundamental rights arguments for enhanced
protection of economic rights, the conservative critique of individual
rights activism made it impossible to integrate economic interests into
a broader theory of rights. Judicial restraint forced the Court to
pursue other doctrinal bases for economic rights, such as structural
constraints, the Contract Clause, and takings analysis.
Because the affinity between political-process reasoning and
public choice theory is fairly obvious, 4' one might expect conserva-
140. Specifically, the Court has recognized as fundamental those rights that are "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty" or those that are "deeply rooted in our traditions and
collective conscience." See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986)
(analyzing question of fundamental right to consensual homosexual activity under these
standards).
141. See infra notes 367-77 and accompanying text.
142. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Strict Scrutiny and Social Choice: An Economic Inquiry
Into Fundamental Rights and Suspect Classifications, 80 GEo. L.J. 1787, 1790-93 (1992).
Proponents of both approaches are skeptical that the political process will necessarily
produce results that further the public interest, and assume that officials may be motivated
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tive advocates of economic rights to embrace a public choice version
of process theory to argue that economic rights ought to be protected
in the same way that other fundamental rights are. Just as political-
process theory justifies heightened scrutiny of some government
action on the ground that legislation burdening historically disenfran-
chised groups is likely to be prompted by improper motivations,
public choice challenges the deference accorded government action in
the economic arena by demonstrating that special interests control the
legislative process to the detriment of the broader, more diffuse
general public.'43 From this perspective, if heightened scrutiny is
justified to "smoke out" bad motives, it ought to be applied, at least
to some degree, in economic cases as well.'"
Thus, public choice theory could be used to integrate economic
rights into a broader theory of rights, but such an option would be
difficult to square with the Court's denigration of nontextual and
nonhistorical reasoning in other contexts.45 This conclusion further
clarifies the Court's reluctance to rely on the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses, under which the political-process view has
flourished.'46 Although there are hints of political-process reasoning
in some of the Court's recent structural, 47 Contract Clause,'" and
to pursue the private interest of some at the expense of others. In a sense, then, public
choice advocates advance one particular version of political-process theory that emphasizes
economic motivations.
143. This view, however, also stands the Carolene Products view of process failure on
its head. While Carolene Products expresses special concern for discrete and insular
minorities, public choice would suggest that most legislation is designed to benefit special
interests (who have comparative advantages in organizing group action) and that the
majority is in need of judicial protection. See Christopher T. Wonnell, Economic Due
Process and the Preservation of Competition, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 91, 92 (1983)
(arguing that, while Lochner protected "vested interests from popular control," it also
"protected popular control from the possibility that concentrated interests might use the
state as a tool to secure monopoly privileges for themselves"); cf Bruce A. Ackerman,
Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 726 (1985) (arguing that heightened
scrutiny of measures adversely affecting "discrete and insular minorities" cannot be
justified in terms of political-process theory because such groups have comparative
organizational advantages). I suspect that the imperfect legislative process produces both
'types of legislation, as well as legislation intended by its supporters to benefit the general
public.
144. See infra part IV.B.2.
,145. Since public choice theory can be used to justify liberal individual rights
safeguards, see, e.g., Stout, supra note 142, at 1793-1821, it would be problematic for the
Court to embrace public choice reasoning with respect to economic rights while rejecting
it with respect to individual rights.
* 146. See supra notes 94-101 and accompanying text.
147. For example, there is a political-process component to the Court's recent Tenth
, Amendment decision in New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2,108, 2417-19 (1992). See
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takings decisions,'49 they are sporadic and undeveloped. The Court
has made no explicit effort to justify the reinvigoration of economic
rights in political-process terms.
Economic rights advocates might also justify enhanced protection
for property and contract rights by engaging in penumbral reasoning
and fundamental rights analysis. The treatment of economic rights as
fundamental finds some support in text, framers' intent, and tradition.
A number of constitutional provisions are clearly designed to protect
economic interests; the Contract and Takings Clauses are obvious
examples. 5" Moreover, there is some support for the view that the
Constitution was intended in part to be a charter of economic
liberties,' which arguably justifies treating economic rights as
fundamental. 52 In addition, there is a longstanding legal tradition
Levy, supra note 28, at 528-30.
148. The United States Trust principle that elevated scrutiny of measures impairing
obligations of contracts to which the state is a party partakes of political-process reasoning
because in such cases the state is more likely to be motivated by "self" interest than some
objective view of sound public policy. In addition, there is a hint of political-process
reasoning in the Court's efforts in Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton to distinguish Spannaus and
other cases as ones involving rules "limited in effect to contractual obligations or
remedies," as opposed to "a generally applicable rule of conduct." Exxon Corp. v.
Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 191 (1983). The premise of this distinction, though not fully
articulated, appears to be that limited purpose legislation is more likely to be prompted
by special interests than the public interest. See Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas
Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 418 n.25 (1983) (characterizing Spannaus as special
interest legislation).
149. Requiring compensation is thought to prevent the state from externalizing the
costs of regulation by imposing those costs on a few property owners, see Joseph L. Sax,
Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.I. 36, 46-48, 63 (1964), and thereby holding
public officials accountable for the costs. The Court's dicta regarding regulatory takings
analysis in Yee seem to reflect this idea. See infra note 227.
150. In addition, the Constitution limits the taxing power, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cI. 1; id. art. I, § 9, cls. 4-5, and requires uniform bankruptcy laws, id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
Likewise, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses were also intended to protect at
least some economic interests. Even under the narrowest view of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it was intended at least to ensure the rights of newly freed slaves to make
and enforce contracts, to own property, and to sue and be sued. See BERGER, supra note
87, at 18-20.
151. Although the specifics of Charles Beard's account of the Constitution, see
CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (1913), have been largely discredited, see ROBERT E. BROWN, CHARLES
BEARD AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 195-200 (1956), his underlying premise that
the framers were concerned with the protection of economic interests has stood the test
of time. See FORREST MCDONALD, WE THE PEOPLE: THE ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 4-7 (1958).
152. This historical justification is too general to satisfy the demands of strict
originalism, however. See supra notes 112-20 and accompanying text.
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of protecting property and contract rights.'53 This sort of fundamen-
tal rights analysis, however, requires the same nontextual reasoning
that conservatives have criticized in the individual rights sphere. 4
Put simply, the Court could not openly embrace the theoretical
construct of liberal individual rights jurisprudence without compromis-
ing its efforts to limit that jurisprudence. However, because the
doctrinal alternatives it pursued could not be sustained on purely
originalist grounds, the efforts to reinvigorate economic rights lacked
a solid theoretical foundation. As a result, those efforts were doomed
to failure.
B. The Rights Dichotomy and the Failure of Economic Rights
Jurisprudence
The lack of a theoretical foundation created insurmountable
difficulties regardless of the conservative Court's approach to
economic rights. When it attempted to ground economic rights in
originalism by employing formalistic, categorical reasoning based on
an expansive interpretation of text, the sweeping implications of its
logic were untenable, and the Court had to qualify its decisions in
ways that limited them sharply and that often created doctrinal
confusion. But when the Court used a more flexible approach that
incorporated heightened scrutiny of some economic regulations, its
reasoning was irreconcilable with the treatment of identical issues in
the due process and equal protection context. In this section, I
demonstrate these basic points by analyzing the Court's separation of
powers cases as examples of categorical reasoning and its Contract
Clause cases as examples of the heightened scrutiny approach. The
following section analyzes the takings area, in which the full
implications of the decisions are unclear, but the cases nonetheless
show evidence of both problems.
1. Categorical Reasoning and Structural 'Constraints
Categorical reasoning is attractive from the judicial restraint
perspective because it gives the appearance that judges do not have
discretion. 5 Instead, a given result is "required" by deductive
153. See, e.g., Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
154. See Reynolds, supra note 118, at 1341-43 (arguing that penumbral reasoning in the
Eleventh Amendment context demonstrates the hypocrisy of conservative calls for judicial
restraint).
155. I say "appearance" because formal categories are usually manipulable, and
therefore mask, rather than constrain, discretion. See infra part rV.C.2. At the same time,
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reasoning from textual provisions-despite the obvious problem of
interpreting text. But categorical reasoning is not without costs. In
its initial phases, categorical reasoning tends to rest on absolute rules
that have far-reaching implications and cannot be easily tailored to fit
the unique circumstances of individual cases. The consequences of
such broad rules force the Court either to distort precedent or to
create exceptions, especially in problem cases. Ultimately, the
doctrine becomes hopelessly confused and the Court may find it
necessary to limit the rule substantially or to abandon the categorical
approach altogether.
The problems associated with categorical reasoning are evident
in the conservative Court's separation of powers decisions. Formalis-
tic decisions such as Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co.,'56 INS v. Chadha,57 and Bowsher v. Synar58 en-
gaged in categorical analysis based on a strict reading of separation
of powers. In each case, the Court began with the premise that the
framers' intentions concerning the structure of government established
certain categories of permissible and impermissible action. In each
case, the government action in question was invalid because the Court
characterized it as falling outside the category of permissible
action." 9 While this kind of formalistic reasoning aided in the
Court's effort to claim originalist justifications for invalidating
government action, its implications are profound. Modern govern-
ment involves regulatory programs administered by agencies
exercising various types of government authority and subject to some
controls by all three branches of government."6 Despite lingering
questions regarding the constitutional legitimacy of the modern
administrative state, there is little support for dismantling it complete-
categories are not infinitely manipulable and the categorical approach is therefore less
flexible than more open-ended approaches. In addition, categorical reasoning often diverts
attention from important considerations by focusing on definitional issues.
156. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
157. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
158. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
159. See Marathon, 458 U.S. at 63-76, (describing categories of permissible non-Artigle
III tribunals); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 956-59 (holding that legislative veto is unconstitutional
because it is legislation that does not follow the prescribed method of enactment);
Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726 (refusing to recognize power of Congress to control dismissal. Qf,
officers performing executive functions except by impeachment).
160. See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth
Branch. Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency
Decisions, 1987 DuKE LJ. 387, 440.
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ly.' But given the nature of modem government, formalistic
application of a rigid separation of powers theory would lead to just
such a result.162
Thus, the Court in effect was forced to choose between narrowly
confining its formalistic decisions or setting off a chain reaction that
would dramatically alter the structure of government. From the
beginning, it was clear that the latter alternative was unacceptable to
the Court, which made every effort to limit the scope of even its most
aggressive separation of powers cases.e More significantly, later
cases upholding structural arrangements against separation of powers
challenges, including CFTC v. Schor,'64 Morrison v. Olson," and
Mistretta v. United States," rejected the strict, formalistic approach
to separation of powers in favor of an open-ended, pragmatic analysis
that imposes few restrictions on the structure of government.167
These cases confined the prior separation of powers decisions to a
narrow realm that did not seriously threaten the administrative state.
2. Heightened Scrutiny and the Contract Clause
A different problem arose in the Contract Clause context, in
which the conservative Court attempted to incorporate a form of
heightened scrutiny into its analysis. This approach, as developed by
the liberal Court in the context of individual rights, is generally more
flexible than categorical reasoning because the Court weighs various
161. See i at 392 & n.13 (citing authorities).
162. See Currie, supra note 35, at 40 ("It would be unnecessary to point out that the
Constitution vests legislative, executive, and judicial powers in separate and deliberately
constituted branches, if it were not that today's Government bears so little resemblance
to the constitutional model.").
163. In Chadha, for example, the Court observed that its formalistic analysis of the
legislative veto issue would not invalidate measures delegating significant policy discretion
to agencies. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 953 n.16. Likewise, in Bowsher, the Court qualified its
holding that Congress may not control the dismissal of officials exercising executive
powers, distinguishing provisions that limit presidential removal of officers to certain
specified causes so as to preserve the independent agencies. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 725 n.4.
164. 478 U.S. 833, 834 (1986).
165. 487 U.S. 654, 655 (1988).
166. 488 U.S. 361, 361 (1989).
167. A similar evolution is present in the Tenth Amendment area. See supra notes 23-
29 and accompanying text. League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976), established
a categorical rule against regulation of states as states, which subsequent cases replaced
with a kind of balancing-EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 226-27 (1983), for example,
distinguished Usery because the ADEA had a lesser impact on states-that was eventually
discarded altogether. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2423 (1992), then
introduced a more limited categorical rule that imposes few constraints on federal
regulatory power.
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pragmatic factors to determine the level of scrutiny and to analyze the
purposes of a particular government action."6 In the absence of an
originalist foundation or some other theory, however, heightened
Contract Clause scrutiny could not be reconciled with the refusal to
heighten scrutiny in other economic rights contexts. More generally,
this approach openly acknowledges a degree of judicial policy
discretion that is incompatible with professions of judicial restraint.
Rationality review is part of Contract Clause analysis, but its role
has never been entirely clear.169 Traditionally, the Court has
refused to invalidate every measure adversely affecting preexisting
contracts1 70 because such a result would allow private parties to
estop states from exercising their police powers. 1  Thus, a police
power measure that incidently disrupts contractual arrangements does
not violate the Contract Clause, an exception that virtually swallowed
the rule when the post-New Deal Court broadly defined the police
power and used the same rational basis test to evaluate measures
under the Contract Clause as under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses.
In Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus, however, the Court
suggested that heightened scrutiny of asserted police power justifica-
tions is warranted whenever a state regulation imposes a particularly
severe burden on some contracting parties. 3 This approach would
168. The current tiers of scrutiny also have categorical elements, however. See infra
note 385.
169. The Court has generally described the Contract Clause analysis as involving a
threshold inquiry into the existence of a substantial contractual impairment; if there is an
impairment, rationality review is then applied to determine whether the measure in
question may nonetheless be sustained. See, e.g., Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas
Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411-13 (1993). Although it is over 100 years old, see
Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 821 (1880), this analysis is nearly impossible to square
with the language of the clause because an admitted impairment is sustained because of
the government's purpose. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, supra note 15, at 750 ("Even if
we were unable to settle on a correct reading of the clause, we can be certain that the
Supreme Court's present interpretation is both wrong and indefensible."). I advance an
alternative formulation consistent with the text of the clause infra at notes 429-40 and
accompanying text.
170. In Ogden v. Saunders, the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Marshall, held
that the Contract Clause only applies to retrospective legislation. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213,
233 (1827). Prospective legislation cannot impair contractual obligations because no
obligation ever arises if a contractual provision is barred by pre-existing law.
171. See, e.g., Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905).
172. See, e.g., NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 19, at 400-01.
173. 438 U.S. 234 (1978). The Court stated the principle as follows:
The severity of the impairment measures the height of the hurdle the state legislation
must clear. Minimal alteration of contractual obligations may end the inquiry at its
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be a powerful tool for protecting economic rights and is more
nuanced than the categorical reasoning of the Court's separation of
powers cases, but balancing the burdens a regulation imposes on
contractual relationships against the benefits produced by the
regulation is neither compelled by the language of the Contract
Clause 74 nor supported by clear evidence of the framers' intent.75
Nor did the Court in Spannaus offer any other theoretical basis for
the approach, leaving it without any articulated doctrinal foundation.
The Spannaus reasoning is thus essentially indistinguishable from
Lochner-era activism or heightened scrutiny of individual rights.
Doctrinally, insofar as Contract Clause analysis is premised on the
notion that police power measures imposing an incidental burden on
contractual obligations are permissible, the same rationality inquiry
should apply in both the Contract Clause and substantive due process
contexts because the function of the inquiry in both contexts is to
determine whether a measure is a valid exercise of the police
power. 76 From the broader judicial restraint perspective, the more
open-ended the Court's balancing of competing interests, the more
difficult it is for the Court to defend its analysis as the product of
first stage. Severe impairment, on the other hand, will push the inquiry into a careful
examination of the nature and purposes of the state legislation.
Id. at 245 (footnote omitted). It is interesting to note that while the Court cited precedent
for the proposition that minimal impairments do not engage the Contract Clause, it offered
no authority for the proposition that severe impairments require greater scrutiny.
174. As argued supra at note 169, the text of the clause would seem to preclude any
reliance on state purposes to uphold a contractual impairment. A fortiori, it does not
provide a foundation for this sort of sliding-scale balancing.
175. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text. The Court in Spannaus did suggest
that "It]he severity of an impairment of contractual obligations can be measured by the
factors that reflect the high value the framers placed on the protection of private
contracts," Spannaus, 438 U.S.. at 245, but this is a far cry from strong historical
justification for elevated scrutiny based upon severity of impairments.
176. The best explanation for the consideration of purposes (in terms of the text of the
clause) is that every contract is implicitly conditioned by the state's reserved police power.
Thus, if a particular measure falls within that power, there has been no impairment. See,
e.g., Spannaus, 438 U.S. at 241-42. But under this analysis, the scope of the police power
should not depend on which constitutional provision is at issue. When the Court elevates
scrutiny, it does so not because the meaning of the police power has changed, but because
the exercise of that power comes into conflict with a constitutional right, and an otherwise
valid police power measure requires greater justification to withstand constitutional
scrutiny (or because there are reasons to suspect that a particular measure was improperly
motivated). This analysis cannot explain Spannaus, however, which did not characterize
contractual obligations as fundamental. Because fundamental rights analysis requires
heightened scrutiny whenever a fundamental right is burdened, moreover, it cannot explain
the use of a sliding scale in Spannaus.
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original intent and the greater the affinity between Contract Clause
analysis and liberal activism on behalf of nontextual rights.
Thus, it is not surprising that the Court quickly backed away
from its suggestions in Spannaus of sliding scale balancing. In Energy
Reserves Group, Ina v. Kansas Power and Light, the Court used a
notably weak, passive-voice phraseology to distance itself from the
idea of elevated scrutiny for severe impairments." Later in the
same discussion, the Court conspicuously omitted any reference to
heightened scrutiny for severe impairments, stating that deferential
review is required "[u]nless the state itself is a contracting party."'78
Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton,79 decided the same year as Energy
Reserves Group, cast even more doubt on the status of Spannaus's
severe impairment rationale. The Exxon Court's review of Contract
Clause doctrine made no mention of severity of impairment,18 and
the Court did not mention that factor in distinguishing Spannaus, but
emphasized instead that the challenged action in Spannaus operated
directly and exclusively to impair contractual obligations."'
This distinction shifted the analysis from the heightened scrutiny
approach of Spannaus toward a more formalistic, categorical
approach."s While the categorical approach in the separation of
powers area was expansive, however, Exxon created a very narrow
category, virtually defining Spannaus out of existence.'3 The Court
in Exxon characterized a provision that expressly prohibited producers
from passing costs on to the consumer as a generally applicable rule
because it "applied to all oil and gas producers, regardless of whether
177. 459 U.S. 400, 411 (1983) ("The severity of the impairment is said to increase the
level of scrutiny to which the legislation will be subjected.").
178. Md at 412-13.
179. 462 U.S. 176 (1983).
180. See id. at 190-91.
181. See id. at 191-92. For further discussion of this distinction, see infra notes 434-37
and accompanying text.
182. That the legislation in question was directed at altering the pension obligations of
particular employers was relevant in Spannaus to determine whether a sufficiently
important police power purpose could be identified to sustain the measure. See Allied
Structural Steel v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234,247-49 (1978). In contrast, the Court used this
argument in Exxon to distinguish between ordinary police power measures and those that
are directed toward altering contractual obligations. See Exxon, 462 U.S. at 190-92.
183. If the Court attempts to expand this category to provide broad protection for
economic interests, it will be difficult to control the implications of the analysis, and the
result is likely to be doctrinal confusion along the order of that created by recent takings
decisions. See infra part 2.C. A more constrained and purpose-oriented application of the
Contract clause could provide an appropriate role for the clause in a more coherent
jurisprudence of economic rights. See infra part IV.B.3.a.
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they happened to be parties to sale contracts that contained a
provision permitting them to pass tax increases through to their
purchasers."' 84  This definition of generally applicable rules can
apply to virtually any government action, even a measure that is
intended exclusively to abrogate contractual obligations."
In sum, then, the reinvigoration of the Contract clause could not
be sustained because there was no foundation for heightened scrutiny.
Neither text nor history provides an originalist explanation, and the
Court could not explicitly invoke liberal-style fundamental rights
analysis. Although Spannaus came close to doing so, later decisions
disavowed that analysis.
C. Whither Takings?
The future of the conservative Court's more recent exploration
of the Takings Clause as a possible vehicle for enhanced economic
fights protections remains in doubt, but even the most aggressive
decisions of the past few years apply only in limited circumstances.
The same problems that confronted the Court in the separation of
powers and Contract clause cases are likely to prevent any significant
expansion of these doctrines, and may well result in a substantial
retreat. Notwithstanding Dolan v. City of Tigard,"8 the Court has
limited Nollan's suggestions of heightened scrutiny in much the same
way that it limited Spannaus's sliding-scale heightened scrutiny
analysis before ultimately abandoning that analysis in favor of a
restrictive categorical approach. Conversely, there is every indication
184. Exxon, 462 U.S. at 191.
185. The pension funding provisions invalidated in Spannaus applied to all employers,
regardless of whether they had a pension plan or were quitting business in the state.
Spannaus, 438 U.S. at 238. Some employers were not required to provide additional funds
(if they were too small, did not leave the state, or already met the act's requirements) and
the only practical effect of the statute was to invalidate existing or future plan provisions
that did not meet the vesting requirements of the act in question. Id. But this was no
different from the Exxon pass-through prohibition, which "applied" to all producers, but
only affected them through the contracts they entered into for purposes of selling gas and
only altered their behavior if these contracts contained prices or escalator clauses that
passed the costs on to consumers. Exxon, 462 U.S. at 178-79. Thus, the Court's statement
in Exxon that the "effect of the pass-through prohibition on existing contracts that did
contain such a provision was incidental to its main effect of shielding consumers from the
burden of the tax increase," id. at 191-92, could just as easily apply to the statute
invalidated in Spannaus: Its effect on existing plans was only incidental to the main effect
of shielding employees from the burden of plant relocation. In both cases the state
legislature believed that certain types of contractual provisions were contrary to the public
interest and imposed statutory requirements that effectively invalidated those provisions.
186. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
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that the Court will restrict the potentially sweeping categorical
approach of the Lucas rule, which, like formalistic separation of
powers reasoning, is impossible to control if unleashed beyond the
narrow confines of Lucas itself.
Traditionally, the Court has analyzed takings challenges to
government action under one of two distinct lines of cases,"' First,
interference with certain core property interests, most prominently
physical invasion, is a taking per se (i.e., without regard to the extent
to which the property's value is diminished or the purposes that
support the government's action). While the occurrence of a physical
invasion is not always clear, once a physical invasion is found the
Court has treated the Takings Clause categorically, consistently
requiring compensation, even at the height of liberal deference to
economic regulation."s  Second, since Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon,"s9 which held that a local ordinance requiring coal to be left
in place to support the surface estate was a taking, the Court has also
recognized that a regulation preventing the owner from engaging in
some uses of property may be a "regulatory taking." Whether there
has been a regulatory taking depends on the application of an
admittedly "ad hoc, factual inquir[y]"'19 that generally involves
consideration of (1) the underlying purposes of the regulatory
187. Doctrinally, there are three issues that might arise in takings cases: (1) whether
there is a taking; (2) whether it is for a public use; and (3) whether the state has provided
just compensation. The most difficult of these issues under the Court's current
jurisprudence is whether a taking has occurred. The public use requirement was essentially
rendered moot in Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (upholding state
statute allowing housing authority to purchase rental property and to sell to tenants
because it served valid public purpose of reducing land oligopoly), and the determination
of just compensation generally presents few difficult problems, see, e.g., NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, supra, note 19, § 11.14.
188. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946) (holding that frequent
low flights over plaintiffs property which prevented all use constituted a taking because
it was "as if the United States had entered upon the land and taken exclusive possession
of it"); accord Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 90 (1962) (same). The Takings
Clause obviously requires compensation whenever the government formally exercises its
eminent domain power to acquire property. By extension and in light of the ordinary
meaning of the word "take," see supra note 116, when the government acquires or
transfers possession, or otherwise interferes with possessory rights, there has been a taking
per se. E.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982)
(holding that New York law requiring landlords to permit cable television companies to
install cable facilities on their property constituted a permanent physical occupation and
hence a taking); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979) (invalidating as
a taking Army Corps of Engineers' effort to require public access to a private marina
under a federal navigational servitude).
189. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
190. Penn Cent. Transp. Co v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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measure and its relation to those purposes and'(2) the extent to which
the measure diminishes the value of the property. 9' Because most
use restrictions diminish the value of property and effectively transfer
wealth,'" the regulatory taking question has proven far more
difficult for the Court.193
To expand economic rights under the Takings Clause, then, the
Court might engage in heightened scrutiny under regulatory takings
analysis or expand the kinds of property interests entitled to per se
protection. Recent takings decisions reflect both approaches to some
degree, but the trend appears to be away from heightened scrutiny
and toward the categorical approach of the per se takings line of
cases. Moreover, while the interests subject to per se protection have
expanded somewhat, the Court has avoided the most expansive per
se approach and given every indication that it will confine the
categories of interests entitled to per se treatment.
1. Heightened Scrutiny and Regulatory Takings
From the New Deal until 1987, the Court routinely rejected
regulatory takings arguments. 9 4 The purpose strand of the regula-
191. The precise relationship between these factors and their connection to the
underlying takings question remains unclear. See infra notes 209-23 and accompanying
text.
192. It is this premise that forms the basis for Professor Epstein's efforts to enhance the
protection of property rights by expanding the Takings Clause. See EPSTEIN, supra note
47, at 57 ("Let the government remove any of the incidents of ownership, let it diminish
the rights of the owner in any fashion, then it has prima facie brought itself within the
scope of the eminent domain clause, no matter how small the alteration and no matter
how general its application.").
193. The Court has struggled to develop a consistent means of determining when a
regulatory taking has occurred. Although Justice Holmes, who authored the Mahon
opinion, supplied the oft-repeated idea that a use regulation which "goes too far" is a
taking, Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415, he offered little guidance as to how the Court should
determine when that is the case. Since Mahon the Court has struggled with standards but
not results; until recently it uniformly rejected regulatory takings claims. See generally
Davis & Glicksman, supra note 47, at 395-439 (reviewing history of regulatory takings
jurisprudence in terms of various possible models of the relationship between substantive
due process and takings law). Even during the Lochner era, the Court rejected many
regulatory takings challenges. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272,279 (1928); Euclid
v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365,397 (1926). Indeed, Justice Holmes's expansive treatment
of the Takings Clause in Mahon is rather puzzling in light of his famous dissent in
Lochner. For the suggestion that Holmes sought, at the time of the "Red Scare," to blunt
efforts to characterize him as a socialist, see Davis & Glicksman, supra note 47, at 417-19.
194. An excellent illustration is Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104
(1978), in which the Court rejected a takings challenge to the city's landmark zoning law,
which prevented the construction of a multistory office building and thereby deprived the
property owner of millions of dollars in profits. After describing the purposes underlying
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tory takings inquiry has been subsumed into the most deferential form
of the rational basis test,95 making virtually any purpose both legiti-
mate and sufficient to withstand scrutiny. Nor has the "extent of
diminution" strand proven significantly more restrictive, as the Court
has little difficulty upholding measures that impose substantial costs
on owners so long as the owner retains some value.'96 As recently
as 1987, in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,197 the
Court appeared to employ this deferential approach, rejecting a
takings challenge to a measure requiring mineral-rights owners to
leave some coal in place to prevent surface subsidence. Despite the
obvious affinity between provisions at issue in Keystone and Mahon,
the Keystone Court concluded that the statute furthered legitimate
government purposes,"'8 and that the challenged provisions did not
the landmark zoning law and concluding that the law was an appropriate means of
accomplishing these purposes, id. at 107-08, the Court found that, although the value of
the plaintiff's property may have been greatly diminished, the plaintiff had not been
singled out in any way to bear the burden of historic preservation, a burden that was
shared by a large number of property owners within the city, id. at 131-35. Nor did the
measure "go too far" in diminishing the value of the plaintiff's property: No discrete
parcel of property rights subject to the Takings Clause had been destroyed and the owner
retained profitable uses of the property, especially since the owner received "transferable
development rights" of considerable value. Id. at 135-37.
195. This proposition was generally accepted until Justice Scalia challenged it in Nollan.
See infra notes 204-07 and accompanying text.
196. This reluctance to find regulatory takings contrasts sharply with the Court's
treatment of physical invasions, creating anomalous results. See infra notes 346-49 and
accompanying text.
197. 480 U.S. 470 (1987). Although Keystone is generally consistent with deferential
rational basis scrutiny of economic regulation, it does contain a puzzling reference to the
absence of less restrictive alternatives. After noting that the Mahon Court had rejected
the state's safety justification because a less restrictive notice alternative was available, the
Court in Keystone distinguished the act in question, which was "designed to accomplish
a number of widely varying interests, with reference to which petitioners have not suggested
alternative methods through which the Commonwealth could proceed." Id. at 486 (emphasis
added). Although it is only one part of a broader effort to distinguish Mahon, the
statement seems to imply that less restrictive alternatives would be an appropriate part of
the purpose inquiry. Since less restrictive alternative analysis is ordinarily reserved for
heightened scrutiny, the approving reference to such arguments would seem to support the
application of heightened scrutiny in regulatory takings cases.
198. The Court emphasized Justice Holmes's conclusion that the statute in Mahon was
adopted for "private benefit," and pointed to statutory differences as evidence that the
provision in Keystone reflected a public purpose. Id. at 486. The Keystone Court also
noted that the act in question was "a prime example that 'circumstances may so change
in time.., as to clothe with such a [public] interest what at other times.., would be a
matter of purely private concern.' " Id. at 488 (quoting Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155
(1921) (alterations original)). The Keystone dissenters argued that the act's purpose was
irrelevant under Mahon, 480 U.S. at 509-10 (Rehnquist, CJ., joined by Powell, O'Connor,
and Scalia, J.J., dissenting) (rejecting majority's interpretation of Mahon), because the act
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render coal mining of the property in question commercially
impracticable.19'
Close on the heels of Keystone, however, both Hodel v.
Irving' and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission2"' cast
doubt on this deferential approach by employing a form of heightened
scrutiny to conclude that the measures in question constituted takings.
In Hodel the Court concluded that a measure mandating escheat of
highly fractionated shares of Native American land might be
constitutional under ordinary regulatory takings analysis, but went on
to reason that the "character of the Government regulation here is
extraordinary" because the right to pass property is one of the
essential "sticks" in the "bundle" of property rights." Thus, while
there was a legitimate and important government purpose behind the
measure, the Court required that purpose to be accomplished by
means short of total abrogation of the right to pass property.203
More clearly, the Nollan Court employed heightened scrutiny
when it held, in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, that the
California Coastal Commission had "taken" a lateral access easement
when it conditioned approval of a rebuilding permit requested by the
destroyed an identifiable segment of property, id. at 517-18. It is interesting to note that
the analysis of the Keystone dissenters is virtually indistinguishable from that of the
majority in Lucas. See infra notes 235-44 and accompanying text.
199. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485,493-97. The Court in Mahon accepted as given that the
measure totally prevented the mining of coal. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393,413 (1922) (stating that "the statute [was] admitted to destroy previously existing
rights" as applied to the particular plaintiff); id. at 414-15 (concluding that the Court was
"warranted in assuming" that the more general effect of the statute was to make it
"commercially impracticable" to mine certain coal, which was "very nearly the same...
for constitutional purposes as appropriating it or destroying it"). The Keystone Court also
rejected the contention that a per se taking had occurred because the government had
completely destroyed a separate interest, the "support estate," recognized under state law.
Keystone, 480 US. at 500-02. For further discussion of this aspect of Keystone, see infra
note 243 and accompanying text.
200. 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
201. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
202. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 712-16.
203. Id. at 712, 716-18. This analysis leaves unclear whether Hodel is a regulatory
takings case involving heightened scrutiny or opens a new category of per se takings cases.
The Court employed a traditional regulatory takings analysis, and its suggestion that other,
less restrictive means might be used to accomplish the government's purposes seems to
reflect heightened scrutiny of an alleged regulatory taking. See supra note 198 (discussing
similar analysis in Keystone). But the Court's effort to characterize the right to pass
property as an interest on the order of the right of possession (which brings the case under
the physical invasion line of cases) suggests that the right to pass property is subject to per
se treatment. For discussion of Hodel's implications as a per se case, see infra notes 231-
34 and accompanying text.
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property owner on the owner's granting the easement.2' Justice
Scalia reasoned that the easement was not sufficiently related to the
permit requirement's stated purposes of promoting visual and physical
access to the coastline from noncoastal areas. 5 While he purported
to apply the usual test for government purposes under the Takings
Clause,2 6 Justice Scalia also pointed to the affinity between the
extraction of the easement in Nollan and a physical invasion as a
reason to treat with particular care the requirement of a "substantial"
relationship between the government action and the public purpose
it supposedly furthers.' w  The Court, per Chief Justice Rehnquist,
recently expanded upon the heightened scrutiny approach of Nollan
in Dolan v. Tigard,"8 in which it held that even when an easement
extracted as a condition of a building permit is substantially related
to public harms caused by the development of the property, the
government must prove that the scope of the easement extracted is
"rough[ly] proportional[]" to the harm caused.
Thus, just as Spannaus had apparently signaled heightened
Contract Clause scrutiny when an "impairment" was particularly
substantial, Hodel, Nollan, and Dolan might be read as supporting
heightened regulatory takings scrutiny whenever a particularly
important property interest is affected. This approach could draw
support from Justice Holmes's reasoning in Mahon, Which suggested
204. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837-39. It is striking that, despite his commitment to judicial
restraint, Justice Scalia authored both Nollan and Lucas, two of the most aggressive
takings decisions since Mahon.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 837. Recognizing that the analysis was inconsistent with the usual rational
basis test, Justice Scalia argued that the test for regulatory takings was different from that
employed under the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses. Id. at 834 n.3. Most
commentators disagree with this claim, see, e.g., Davis & Glicksman, supra note 47, at 439-
46, as did the Nollan dissenters, see Nollan, 483 U.S. at 843 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
While Justice Scalia was undoubtedly correct in noting a slightly different verbal
formulation in the takings area, he conveniently ignored the fact that this formulation had
been used consistently since the end of the Lochner era to reject regulatory takings
challenges.
207. Since the state had no obligation to grant the permit in the first instance, it had
not directly appropriated the lateral access easement, and there was no physical invasion
that would create a taking per se. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835-36. Justice Scalia reasoned,
however, that the effort to extract the easement as a condition of receiving the permit
required that the Court be especially attentive to whether the relationship between the
purposes of the permit requirement and the lateral access easement was in fact
"substantial." Id. at 841. Thus, as recognized in Dolan v. Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994),
Nollan involved an unconstitutional condition. Id. at 2316-17. For further discussion of
the problem of unconstitutional conditions, see infra notes 357-64 and accompanying text.
208. 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2319 (1994).
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that the greater the extent of diminution, the greater the police power
justification necessary to sustain it.' But just as Spannaus's sugges-
tion of heightened Contract Clause scrutiny based on substantial
impairments lacked an originalist or theoretical foundation, this kind
of regulatory takings scrutiny lacks any firm basis that could reconcile
it with the Court's commitment to judicial restraint.
There is no historical foundation for the concept of regulatory
takings, much less for heightened scrutiny of regulations that interfere
with particularly important property interests."' Indeed, from a
textual standpoint, it is hard to see why the government's purpose
should ever be relevant to whether a taking has occurred. Under the
ordinary meaning of the word "take," '' how a regulation interferes
with property rights would be relevant, but why the government chose
to adopt the regulation is completely irrelevant to whether there has
been a taking."2 The language of the clause seems flatly inconsis-
tent with the notion that, once a taking has occurred, compensation
may be avoided by demonstrating an appropriate public purpose.2 '
Thus, heightened scrutiny of regulatory measures that impose
particularly significant burdens of property rights must find some
justification other than originalism.
While various rationales have emerged since Mahon,"4 none
provides a suitable foundation for heightened scrutiny in the
regulatory taking context. First, the purpose inquiry may distinguish
between the exercise of the police and eminent domain powers on the
theory that the lack of a valid police power purpose means that
209. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,414 (1922) ("[Tjhe statute does not
disclose a public interest sufficient to warrant so extensive a destruction of the defendant's
constitutionally protected rights.").
210. See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 116.
212. Thus, in cases involving transfer of possession or physical invasion, the Court has
not considered purposes to be relevant. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. But
cf. Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1078-81, 1143-49 (1993) (arguing that the
"public use" of property distinguishes takings from other regulations).
213. The.clause provides: "nor shall private property be taken for public use without
just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Since compensation is required when
property is taken for "public use," the existence of a public purpose should not matter.
See, e.g., Laitos, supra note 47, at 13-14. Note that this problem is quite analogous to the
questionable textual basis for examining purpose under the Contract Clause. See supra
note 113 and accompanying text.
214. As a Lochner-era case, Mahon could treat aggressive scrutiny of economic
regulation as a given, but the Court's analysis of purposes was confusing at best. For
example, the Keystone majority and dissent disagreed as to whether purposes were even
relevant in Mahon. See supra note 198.
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government action must be sustained through the exercise of eminent
domain,2 15 but this rationale conflicts with the refusal to heighten
scrutiny of economic rights under due process because the scope of
the police power should be identical in both areas.2"6 Second, the
purpose inquiry may determine whether a particular use was ever
within the rights included in property ownership under the principle
that property ownership is implicitly conditioned by the right of the
government to regulate in the public interest,217 but this approach
215. This view assumes that the clause does not apply to valid police power regulations,
an idea that seems to originate in early rate-setting cases, under which rate regulation is
not a taking if it involves property subject to police power regulation because the property
is affected with a public purpose. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887)
(holding that statute prohibiting the manufacture of intoxicating liquor for use as a
beverage does not work a taking because its object is to promote the general welfare of
the community); see also Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188-89 (1928)
(invalidating ordinance that precluded commercial development of property and led to
dissolution of contract for sale as violation of Fourteenth Amendment because it bore no
substantial relation to public health, safety, or morals). There is also some support for this
rationale in Mahon, in which the Court stated that "the act cannot be sustained as an
exercise of the police power," and distinguished a prior decision involving similar
legislation on the ground that there was a valid safety purpose behind that statute. See
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-15 (1922). More recently, Nollan's
holding reflects this rationale insofar as the absence of a police power justification for the
extraction of a, lateral access easement converted the government action into a taking. See
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 838-39.
216. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (discussing analogous argument under
the Contract Clause). Justice Scalia argued in Nollan that application of a more stringent
purpose inquiry in regulatory takings analysis than in the due process or equal protection
contexts was perfectly reasonable because different constitutional provisions are engaged.
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 n.3 (1987). This argument is
unpersuasive if the function of the purpose inquiry is to determine whether a particular
measure falls within the state's police power. The police power does not derive from the
federal Constitution, and its scope as a source of authority does not depend upon the
federal constitutional provision invoked to challenge its exercise. See id. at 843 n.1
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Different constitutional provisions do place different external
limits on the exercise of the state police power, but those limits depend on what interest
is affected, not the state power exercised. Thus, Justice Scalia's argument tacitly
incorporates a kind of fundamental rights analysis.
217. While the first rationale focuses on identifying the governmental power exercised,
this view is concerned with defining "property" on the theory that nothing is taken if the
owner never had a property right in the first place. This implied police power limitation
is analogous to the implicit conditioning of contract rights under the Contract Clause. See
supra note 176. In Mahon, Justice Holmes recognized that "some values are enjoyed
under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power," but argued further that
"obviously the implied limitation must have its limits, or the contract and due process
clauses are gone." Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413. The obvious question then becomes the scope
of that reserved power, and narrowing its scope is the functional equivalent of heightened
scrutiny because both limit the purposes that can sustain government action. A
particularly troublesome issue over the years has been whether property ownership is
conditioned only by implied prohibitions against common-law nuisances or nuisance-like
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treats the takings issue as a matter of defining property and attaches
automatic takings status to anything interfering with property, thus
collapsing into the more categorical per se approach and confronting
the problems inherent in that approach.218 Third, the purpose
inquiry may relate to the notion that no compensation is required
when regulatory measures produce an "average reciprocity of
benefit," '219 but this rationale can be squared with the language of
the Takings Clause only if the "benefit" actually compensates the
owner for that which is taken.' a requirement that has never been
uses. Compare id. (concluding that preventing surface subsidence is not a public purpose
because "[a] source of damage to such a [single private] house is not a public nuisance
even if similar damage is inflicted on others in different places") with Miller v. Schoene,
276 U.S. 272, 280 (1928) ("We need not weigh with nicety the question whether the
infected cedars constitute a nuisance according to the common law ...."). The Court
appeared to reject definitively Justice Rehnquist's argument for a nuisance-type restriction
on the implied conditioning rationale in Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 134 n.30; id. at 145
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The nuisance exception to the taking guarantee is not
coterminous with the police power itself."). However, the question reemerged in Lucas.
See infra note 245 and accompanying text.
218. As applied by Professor Epstein, the definitional approach to takings law would
require compensation for every use restriction that diminishes value and does not reflect
a preexisting common-law nuisance restriction unless the property owner receives implicit
in-kind compensation equivalent to diminution in value. See EPsTEIN, supra note 47,
passim. Moreover, the nuisance exception will almost never apply, since it is unclear how
a measure can both reflect preexisting restrictions and substantially diminish value, except
perhaps where the market inaccurately predicted whether certain uses were permitted. See
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901 (1992) (noting that the
nuisance exception would be unlikely to apply on remand because neighboring property
owners had engaged in similar uses). Although the activist nature of this approach is
masked by the characterization of the inquiry as one based upon the traditional judicial
function of defining property (which is similar to the definitional quality of most
categorical approaches), it remains unclear why judicial determinations of the implicit
conditions on property ownership should be controlling over legislative ones. Moreover,
because this result would effectively grind government to a halt, it would be obviously
activist and apparently unacceptable to the Court. See infra notes 246-50 and accompany-
ing text.
219. This idea was suggested in Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415 (distinguishing prior decision
upholding requirement that coal be left in place along property lines because that
requirement "secured an average reciprocity of advantage that has been recognized as a
justification of various laws"), and figured prominently a few years later in Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). In Euclid, the Court approved the use
of zoning regulations to control land use on the ground that they secured an average
reciprocity of benefits. Id. at 394-95.
220. See EPsTEIN, supra note 47, at 195-215 (discussing "implicit in-kind compensa-
tion"). In other situations, the benefits that accrue to the public generally might explain
why the measure is within the scope of the police power, but not why a valid police power
enactment that diminishes value is not a taking without just compensation.
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imposed." Finally, Yee suggests that the purpose inquiry is
relevant to whether a property owner has been singled out to bear
costs that in fairness should be born by society as a whole,' but
such a fairness approach is precisely the kind of nontextual, open-
ended, and value laden approach that conservatives criticized so
forcefully in connection with liberal activism.'
Put simply, none of the rationales variously invoked to explain
the purpose inquiry provides a satisfactory basis for heightened
scrutiny in the regulatory taking context. Given the text of the clause,
they barely justify any purpose inquiry, much less explain why
scrutiny should be heightened in some cases or how such heightened
scrutiny differs from liberal fundamental rights analysis or Lochnerian
substantive due process. Thus, it is doubtful that the Court will
expand the application of the heightened scrutiny approach. While
Dolan confirmed that a form of heightened scrutiny applies to Nollan-
type extraction of easements as an unconstitutional condition on the
issuance of building permits,' 4 it does not expand the situations in
which such heightened scrutiny applies. In other decisions, the Court
has been understandably reluctant to develop Hodel and Nollan into
a broader doctrine of heightened scrutiny. Lucas pointedly opted for
per se analysis based on the lower court's finding of total destruc-
tion,' and Yee refused to consider an argument for heightened
221. In other words, an individual owner's losses need not be offset by actual benefits
accruing to the individual owner, even where new zoning regulations bar profitable prior
uses. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,491 n.21 (1987).
222. See Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1526 (1992). This idea is similar,
though not identical to, the notion of average reciprocity of benefit. Both are concerned
with the underlying question of whether a particular owner has been so disproportionately
burdened by a regulation that "fairness" requires compensation.
223. Insofar as the fairness idea connects the review of purpose with the inquiry into
the extent of diminution of value, it resembles the analysis in Spannaus. See supra notes
173-75 and accompanying text. For the same reasons the Court distanced itself from
Spannaus, see supra notes 176-81 and accompanying text, it is unlikely that the Court will
pursue this rationale aggressively, despite dicta supporting it in Yee, see infra notes 226-27
and accompanying text. In the final analysis, I believe that such concerns are best
addressed directly through a meaningful substantive due process analysis, rather than
through regulatory takings doctrine. See infra part IV.B.1.
224. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2300, 2317-20 (1994).
225. Heightened scrutiny was argued tangentially in the plaintiff's brief:
[I]t is not enough for a state to show that a legitimate exercise of the police
power supports the regulation. In addition the precise character of the regulation
needs to be examined, and it must also be shown that the regulation did not
severely prejudice the economic interests of the property-owner.
Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 16, Lucas (No. 91-453). The Pacific Legal Foundation
argued more directly in its amicus brief. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal
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scrutiny of regulatory measures under the Takings Clause,z 6 al-
though the opinion is replete with dicta that might be read as
supporting heightened scrutiny. 7
2. Categorical Reasoning and Per Se Takings
Until recently, per se takings have been confined to cases
involving physical invasions or interference with possession.2
Foundation in Support of Petitioner David H. Lucas at 13, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (No. 91-453) ("Nollan expressly requires courts to apply
a heightened level of scrutiny in examining the purpose and impact of suspect
regulations."). The per se rule of Lucas coupled with a common-law nuisance exception
incorporates a form of heightened scrutiny, but it is confined to cases of complete
destruction. While the Lucas Court did state in dicta that nearly total destruction remains
"keenly relevant to takings analysis generally," Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895 n.8, which might
support heightened scrutiny of particularly burdensome regulations, this support is at best
indirect and is buried in a footnote.
226. The Court concluded that although the regulatory taking argument was ripe, it was
not fairly included in the question upon which the Court granted review. Yee, 112 S. Ct.
at 1531-34. To justify this conclusion, the Court interpreted the question for review as
stated in the petition for writ of certiorari as incorporating the rationale of two federal
court of appeals cases cited by the petitioner, and erected a presumption (unsupported by
citation to authority) against broadly construing the question presented for review. Id.
Since the Court may request briefing of additional questions on its own motion, it could
have considered the regulatory takings argument, as it did in Lucas when it brushed aside
related concerns to hold that total destruction of economically viable uses constitutes a
taking per se. See id. at 2890-92. The Court's reluctance to consider significant regulatory
takings arguments is not confined to Yee. See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S.
1 (1988). See generally Davis & Glicksman, supra note 47, at 430-31 (discussing avoidance
techniques); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986);
Williamson Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); San Diego Gas &
Elec. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
227. See Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1528 (noting that argument respecting the wealth-transferring
effect of the provisions at issue, "while perhaps within the scope of our regulatory takings
cases, cannot be squared easily with our cases on physical takings"); id. at 1530
(recognizing possibility that provisions effectively creating a premium reaped by mobile
home owners at the expense of landlords "might have some bearing on whether the
ordinance causes a regulatory taking, as it may shed light on whether there is a sufficient
nexus between the effect of the ordinance and the objectives it is supposed to advance");
id. (noting that provisions denying landlords the ability to choose their incoming tenants
"may be relevant to a regulatory taking argument, as it may be one factor a reviewing
court would wish to consider in determining whether the ordinance unjustly imposes a
burden on petitioners"). Justices Blackmun and Souter found these statements sufficiently
troubling to write separate concurrences expressly disavowing them. See id. at 1534-35
(Blackmun, J., concurring) ("I, unlike the Court, do not decide whether the regulatory
taking claim is or is not ripe, or which of petitioners' arguments would or would not be
relevant to such a claim."); id. at 1535 (Souter, J., concurring) ("I concur in the judgment
and would join the Court's opinion except for its references to the relevance and
significance of petitioners' allegations to a claim of regulatory taking.").
228. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. This special treatment was justified
by reference to possession as one of the core interests of property ownership. Despite the
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Property owners often attempt (without much success) to expand the
category of per se takings, usually by identifying some separate
property interest allegedly taken. 9 Though not entirely consistent,
recent decisions seem to reflect a greater willingness to expand per se
analysis. Like other categorical approaches, however, this approach
is difficult if not impossible to limit coherently, and taken literally
would require the dismantling of modem government.' 0 Thus, the
Court is likely to confine the scope of per se takings to narrow
categories. Even if the Court is willing to accept the further confusion
of takings doctrine that would result from proliferation of those
categories, the per se approach cannot produce a coherent jurispru-
dence of economic rights.
Hodel's ambiguous reasoning expanded per se takings insofar as
it elevated the right to dispose of property upon one's death to the
same level as the right of possession" 1  But subsequent takings
cases neither discuss Hodel nor cite it for any significant proposition,
which cuts against such a reading. In Yee for example, there was
a powerful argument that the challenged regulatory regime transferred
a valuable premium from owners of a mobile home park to the
mobile home owners, 3 but the Court's analysis seemed to assume
importance of possessory interests, the finding of a taking in Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), underscores the anomalous results in per
se and regulatory takings cases. It is difficult to see how the owners were harmed by the
regulation in Loretto requiring cable access, since cable access is unlikely to decrease the
rent that owners can collect. Although they might have been able to charge the cable
company a fee for the access, this potential revenue is probably far less substantial than
the losses often incurred in cases rejecting regulatory takings arguments. The only
difference is the existence of a physical invasion, For further discussion of this anomaly,
see infra notes 346-49 and accompanying text.
229. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 500-02
(1987) (rejecting argument that the measure in question transferred a discrete "support
estate" from mineral owners to surface owners); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978) (rejecting argument that city had taken distinct property
interest in "air rights" by prohibiting construction of multistory office building).
230. See EPSTEIN, supra note 47, at 263-329 (arguing that land use restrictions, rate,
price, and wage regulation, much taxation, and most forms of government benefits,
including unemployment insurance and welfare, generally require compensation under
Takings Clause).
231. It is unclear whether Hodel reflects per se treatment or heightened scrutiny. See
supra notes 200-03 and accompanying text.
232. In addition to Yee, see Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n 483 U.S. 825, 831-42
(1987) (not citing Hodet); infra notes 235-37 and accompanying text (discussing Lucas).
233. The interaction of a rent control ordinance that allowed mobile home owners to
occupy a rental space at below-market rates and a state law that prevented mobile home
park owners from refusing to lease a space to the purchaser of a mobile home enabled a
home owner to extract higher prices on the sale of a mobile home. See Yee v. City of
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that the only way to bring the case under the per se rule was to
demonstrate a physical invasion.'
Lucas, however, gave an unexpected boost to the per se approach
by holding that total destruction of economically viable uses consti-
tutes a taking per se. 5 In this aggressive takings decision, which
like Nollan was authored by Justice Scalia, the Court rejected the
state court's conclusion that a coastal preservation regulation
depriving a landowner of all economically viable uses was not a taking
because it served the important public purpose of preventing
beachfront erosion and destruction of the dune ecosystem,236 thus
creating another category of per se taking.37 Despite its dramatic
Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1528 (1992) ("[A]ny reduction in the rent for a mobile home
pad causes a corresponding increase in the value of a mobile home, because the mobile
home owner now owns, in addition to a mobile home, the right to occupy a pad at a rent
below the value that would be set by the'free market."). The argument that this premium
was a distinct property interest, complete with reliance on Hodel, was advanced
emphatically in the Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation in Support of
Petitioners at *5-8, Yee (No. 90-1947), available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs file; see
also Brief for Petitioner at *13, Yee (No. 90-1947) (authored by Robert Bork), available
in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs file ("The right to possession includes the right to
exclude others, which is a fundamental property right."). But the Court never mentioned
Hodel in refusing to find a per se taking. See Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1528-31. Even if the
premium is not sufficiently important to qualify for per se treatment, if the expansion of
per se categories along these lines were a possibility, one would expect the Court to discuss
Hodel and distinguish it. For example, the Court might have reasoned that the premium
was not a property interest that had traditionally received recognition or protection, in
contrast to the right to pass property, whose traditional significance was emphasized by the
Court in Hodel.
234. The Court reasoned that "the existence of the transfer in itself does not convert
regulation into physical invasion." Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1529. In addition, the Court rejected
the argument that requiring park owners to lease spaces to anyone who purchased a
mobile home interferes with possessory rights on the ground that once the park owner
opened the land for rental by mobile home owners, the landlord-tenant relationship was
subject to regulation. See id. at 1528-29; accord FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245,
251-53 (1987).
235. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2895 (1992). The
plaintiff in Lucas had spent nearly $100,000 on residential beachfront property with the
expectation of developing it, but the subsequent adoption of the South Carolina
Beachfront Management Act effectively precluded him from building on the property. He
would, however, be permitted to build a walkway or small deck. Id. at 2889 n.2.
236. The South Carolina court distinguished between measures preventing public harms,
such as the Act in question, and those securing public benefits, which would require
compensation if they totally destroyed economic uses. Id. at 2890.
237. The majority and dissent disagreed as to whether Lucas created a new rule or
merely confirmed a preexisting one. Compare Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893 n.6 (majority
opinion) (stating that Lucas merely applies the existing rule) with id. at 2909 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (arguing that Lucas creates the additional burden on the state of "showing
the regulation is not a taking"). This disagreement is not surprising, given the ambiguity
of previous decisions. Since Mahon, the Court has frequently stated that a regulation that
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holding, Lucas's scope will ultimately depend on a number of
unresolved questions.
First, although total destruction appears to be a relatively
straightforward concept, it may be very difficult to draw the line
between complete and nearly complete destruction. Lucas offers little
insight on this question because there was a lower court finding of
total destruction?' s  A number of cases, some quite recent, have
tolerated a considerable diminution in value without finding a
complete destruction of economically viable uses." 9 If these cases
are followed, the state can escape the per se rule by leaving some
economically viable use intact, even if the value of the property is
substantially reduced by the prohibition of other uses.
Second, and more important for purposes of this analysis, the
scope of the per se rule depends on how the Court defines the
property interest against which complete destruction is to be
measured.2' Justice Scalia suggested in a lengthy footnote that this
question should be determined by reference to "whether and to what
degree the State's law has accorded legal recognition and protection
to the particular interest."241 Insofar as state law frequently breaks
up the bundle of interests that constitutes property into relatively
small pieces, this dictum might be applied to give the Lucas rule
destroys all economically viable uses of property constitutes a taking, see Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495-96 (1992); Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,295 (1981); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S.
255, 260 (1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.36 (1978),
but until Lucas it was unclear whether this was true regardless of the regulation's purposes,
see Keystone, 480 U.S. at 513 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
238. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2896 & n.9. Coincidentally, Mahon also took complete
destruction as a given. See supra note 199.
239. See, e.g., supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text (discussing Keystone); supra
note 194 (discussing Penn Central).
240. See, e.g., Note, The Effect of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council on the Law
of Regulatory Takings, 68 WASH. L. REv. 415, 416 (1993).
241. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7. Justice Scalia began by acknowledging that the
problem of defining the interest against which to measure a deprivation rendered the
"rhetorical force" of the per se rule "greater than its precision," and illustrated the point
by using the example of a large parcel of property, a portion of which can no longer be
put to profitable use because of a government regulatory measure. Id. Such a measure
can be characterized as either the partial diminution of the entire parcel, or the total
destruction of a smaller parcel. The problem is not limited to geography but includes the
possibility of separate types of legal interests within any parcel of property. The Court
found it unnecessary to resolve the issue in Lucas, however, because the fee simple interest
against which the total destruction of economically viable uses was measured "is an estate
with a rich tradition of protection at common law." Id.
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broad effect,'but such an outcome is doubtful.242 Prior to Lucas, the
Court had consistently measured the destruction of property by
reference to the largest possible interest and refused to consider
subsidiary interests that had been completely destroyed.243 This
question, moreover, is no different from the Hodel issue of whether
important sticks in the bundle of rights should receive per se
treatment; the subsequent history of Hodel, therefore, also suggests
that the Court will be unwilling to recognize additional subsidiary
interests as distinct for purposes of Lucas's per se rule.2" The
problem of identifying the underlying property interest is also
reflected in the creation of an exception to the Lucas per se rule for
regulations that reflect preexisting common-law nuisance restric-
tions.245
242. See infra notes 246-50 and accompanying text.
243. In Keystone, for example, the Court refused to treat the "support estate"
recognized under state law as a separate interest that had been completely destroyed,
stating flatly that "our takings jurisprudence forecloses reliance on such legalistic
distinctions within a bundle of property rights." Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,500 (1987); accord Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978) (refusing to treat "air rights" as a separate interest). Justice
Scalia's suggestion that smaller interests recognized by state law be used to determine
whether complete destruction has occurred is therefore plainly inconsistent with both
Keystone and Penn Central.
244. Lucas phrases the issue as one of identifying which property interests have
independent status for purposes of assessing complete destruction, while Hodel asks which
sticks in the bundle of rights are particularly important, but these inquiries have the same
practical effect and rely on the same considerations, such as a tradition of protection.
Thus, were the expansion of separate property interests likely, one would expect the Lucas
Court to use Hodel itself as an example of complete destruction of an interest (the right
to pass property on death) that has been traditionally accorded separate status and
protection under state law.
245. This exception rests on the theory that nothing can be taken that was not owned
in the first instance, and overhips with one possible rationale for heightened scrutiny. See
supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text. Depending on how strictly this exception is
applied, it may weaken the Lucas rule significantly. Lucas itself does apply the exception,
but the opinion gave every indication that the exception is meant to be a narrow one. See
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900 (stating that the regulation must "do no more than duplicate the
result that could have been achieved in the courts"); id. at 2901 ("[Ihe fact that a
particular use has long been engaged in by similarly situated owners ordinarily imports a
lack- of any common-law prohibition."); id. (asserting that the state "must do more than
proffer the legislature's declaration that the uses ... are inconsistent with the public
interest, or the conclusory assertion that they violate a common-law maxim"); see also id.
at 2901-02 (declaring that the state "must identify background principles of nuisance and
property law that prohibit the uses [the owner] now intends in the circumstances in which
the property is presently found"). This limited view of the nuisance exception is difficult
to square with Justice Scalia's recognition in Lucas itself that the purpose inquiry in
regulatory takings analysis began as a nuisance exception, but evolved into a broader
recognition that nuisance law was a regulatory system that dealt with competing beneficial
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It therefore seems likely that per se takings will be confined to
physical invasions and complete destruction of economically viable
uses, and that these per se categories will be defined narrowly.246
Every use to which property might be put can be characterized as a
separate interest, and smaller interests are more likely to be complete-
ly destroyed.247 Once the Court begins to recognize additional
uses. Id. at 2897-901. Insistence upon the common-law resolution of conflicting uses is
no more warranted in the case of complete destruction than partial destruction. Note also
that if strictly followed, a Court ostensibly committed to judicial restraint "has reassigned
a significant piece of the nation's ultimate land-use law authority from elected state
legislatures to the judiciary." Humbach, supra note 47, at 3. These difficulties may cause
the nuisance exception to expand over time.
246. Despite the attention given the decisions, both friends and foes of aggressive
takings doctrine have predicted that Lucas will have limited effect. See, e.g., Michael J.
Davis, Lucas and Takings: Private Property Redefined, 2 KAN J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 83, 88
(1993) ("If past is prologue, Lucas will have a short run on the constitutional stage, soon
to be replaced by a more sensible regulatory taking jurisprudence."); Richard A. Epstein,
Yee v. City of Escondido: The Supreme Court Strikes Out Again, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
3, 4 (1992) (arguing that Lucas gave some protection to landowners, "[b]ut its importance
is limited because the Court appears to have adopted a powerful 'hands off' attitude to all
forms of partial restrictions on land use"). Nor does an expanded concept of physical
invasion appear likely. The Court resisted the invitation to characterize the provisions in
Yee as effecting a physical invasion because they prevented park owners from excluding
mobile home purchasers from their property, despite two federal courts of appeals
decisions that had reached precisely that result. See Pinewood Estates of Mich. v.
Barnegat Township Leveling Bd., 898 F.2d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 1990); Hall v. City of Santa
Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270, 1276 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 940 (1988); see also
FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 251-54 (1987) (distinguishing Loretto and
holding that federal Pole Attachments Act did not constitute a physical invasion). In
addition, the Court in United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52 (1989), held that the
deduction of a percentage of an award by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal as a fee
to reimburse costs to the federal government was not a physical invasion. Id. at 62 n.9.
247. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Takings, 1987,88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600,1614 (1988)
("[A]ny land use regulation can be characterized as the 'total' deprivation of an aptly
defined entitlement."). If, for example, Hodel establishes the right to devise property as
a distinct interest whose total destruction engages a per se rule, it would seem to require
other interests to be similarly protected. This analysis would be particularly difficult to
reconcile with the Court's earlier decision in Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979), which
upheld a law banning sale of bald or golden eagle parts even though possession of these
items was not illegal. Id. at 67-68. If the right to devise property is sufficiently traditional
and important to justify treatment as a taking per se, it is hard to see how the right to
alienate property by means of sale is not. Thus, although Justice Brennan, joined by
Justices Marshall and Blackmun, wrote a brief concurring opinion in Hodel emphasizing
that Andrus remained good law, Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 718 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
concurring), Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Powell, wrote an
equally brief concurring opinion arguing that Hodel is indistinguishable from Andrus and
must be viewed as limiting that case to its facts, id. at 719 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Similarly, it is difficult to see why the Court should not also have recognized the support
estate as a separate interest in Keystone or air rights as a separate interest in Penn Central.
It makes no difference whether the issue is approached as one of recognizing separate
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property interests, the categorical approach, which is divorced from
any direct tie to original intent and lacks any alternative theoretical
foundation, offers little hope of limiting the per se rule in any
coherent way. 4  Under an expanded per se analysis, therefore, the
Court cannot stop short of dismantling modem government.249
Even if this approach is workable and limited to explicitly recognized
interests, it remains unclear why a state's treatment of property
should be dispositive of the constitutional question.250
property interests, which seems to be the focus of the Court's analysis, or as one of
according per se treatment to partial diminutions, as argued by Professor Epstein. These
approaches are flip sides of the same coin, and the outcome in either case is effectively to
require compensation for any regulation that diminishes the value of property.
248. Lucas's suggestion that the issue be resolved by reference to how the owner's
expectations have been shaped by the explicit recognition of property interests under state
law would leave numerous interests entitled to per se treatment:
The notion that any identifiable interest is entitled to separate protection under the
fifth amendment is astonishing. Carried to a logical conclusion, the concept could
virtually paralyze the economic regulation of land. The mind boggles at the conse-
quences if air rights, incorporeal hereditaments, the rights to be free from trespass or
nuisances, and all identifiable possessory rights are each entitled to individual
protection under the fifth amendment.
Davis, supra note 246, at 87. But see Note, "Property" in the Fifth Amendment" A Quest
for Common Ground in the Maze of Regulatory Takings, 46 VAND. L. REv. 1283,1330-32
(1993) (arguing for the recognition of a limited set of "narrow" property interests as
denominators for measuring diminution of value). The logic of this state law approach
extends even further. Property interests are also protected indirectly by contract law; a
property owner might contract with others to exchange virtually any use for consideration
and that contract would receive protection under ordinary common-law contract principles.
If, as Justice Scalia suggests, how an owner's expectations are shaped by state law
determines whether an interest warrants per se treatment, there is no obvious reason why
contractual protection should not also qualify property interests for per se treatment
because the owner's expectations are unlikely to depend on whether the interest is
reflected in property law or in a contract. See Kainen, supra note 15, at 478 (arguing that
contract rights are property rights and that Contract Clause impairment occurs when a
state retroactively interferes with contract rights and does not provide just compensation).
249. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 (stating that a per se rule for total destruction of
beneficial use does not engage the functional concern that "[g]oveinment hardly could go
on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying
for every such change in the general law" (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393, 413 (1922))); see also supra notes 160-67 and accompanying text (discussing
analogous problem in separation of powers area).
,250. Lucas's expectations rationale logically gives states complete control over defining
property, even to the point of emptying the Takings Clause of all meaning. See infra part
III.B.3. If the state's recognition of an interest creates expectations, its refusal to recognize
an interest should preclude them, and a state could qualify expectations by defining
property as subject to government appropriation without compensation. Recognizing this
problem, the Lucas Court indicated that there were constitutional limits on how the state
may implicitly condition property rights. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900 ("The notion...
that title is somehow held subject to the 'implied limitation' that the State may
-subsequently eliminate all economically valuable use is inconsistent with the historical
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Ill. ORIGINALIST ESCAPES AND THE BASELINE PROBLEM
The search for an originalist escape prevented the conservative
Court not only from integrating economic interests into a broader
theory of constitutional rights, but also from developing a baseline or
baselines against which to measure government action. Our concep-
tion of rights is predominantly negative; that is, government action is
suspect if it "burdens" rights in some way, but the government is not
required to take affirmative steps to enable the exercise of rights. 1
This conception of rights requires a baseline or baselines that
distinguish burdens from the "mere" denial of benefits. 2 The
erosion of common-law baselines in the post-New Deal period
facilitated the development of liberal jurisprudence but left the liberal
Court without any well-defined baselines. The conservative Court's
recent efforts to reinvigorate economic rights have failed in part
because its high-profile commitment to judicial restraint prevented the
reassertion of common-law baselines or the development of a
workable alternative.
A. The Erosion of Common-law Baselines and Liberal Jurispru-
dence
Lochner-era jurisprudence rested on the incorporation of
common-law property and contract rights as a prepolitical, natural-law
compact recorded in the Takings Clause that has become part of our constitutional
culture."). But if the Constitution determines what interests must be protected by the
state for this purpose, it should also determine what interests are sufficiently important to
require separate treatment. Cf. infra part IV.A.2. (discussing use of constitutionally
derived baselines).
251. See generally David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
864, 687-80 (1986) (comparing treatment of affirmative rights in United States and German
constitutional law). One important exception to this strictly negative view of rights is the
equal protection principle, which may entail a significant affirmative component. See infra
notes 342-45 and accompanying text.
252. For a general discussion of the role of baselines in constitutional reasoning, see
Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 387,413 (1981); Jeremy Paul, Searching for the Status Quo, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 743,
784 (1986) (reviewing EPSTEIN, supra note 47); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1413,1418 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87
COLUM. L. REv. 873, 874 (1987) [hereinafter Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy]; Cass R.
Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism (With Particular
Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593,594 (1990) [hereinafter
Sunstein, Unconstitutional Conditions].
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baseline. 3 Downward departures from this baseline (i.e., measures
interfering with property and contract rights) required a substantial
justification under a narrowly defined state police power, and the bare
desire to alter the distributional outcome of private conduct under the
common law was illegitimate 4  Conversely, other economic
interests, such as government benefits, were mere privileges beyond
constitutional protection2 5  But even before the demise of the
Lochner era, the Court also appeared to recognize that the common
law itself was merely a regulatory regime in which the government
chose to prefer some interests over others, 6 a view that undermines
the notion of the common law as a constitutional baseline. When the
liberal Court rejected Lochner, it implicitly rejected the view that
property rights are natural rights that exist independently of govern-
ment action in favor of the recognition that property rights are
created by the common law, which is merely one of many possible
regulatory system regimes. The resulting erosion of the common-law
constitutional baseline was consistent with liberal ideology in two
respects. First, the erosion made it constitutionally permissible for
government, which had created the common-law order, to alter that
regulatory system without the kind of health and safety reasons
demanded under Lochner. 7 Second, because common-law rights
253. See generally Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 252, at 883 (arguing that
Lochnerian assumptions regarding common-law baselines continue to influence numerous
modern constitutional decisions).
254. Lochner itself reflects these assumptions. In assessing whether the regulation of
bakers' hours was a valid police power measure, the Court reasoned that the absence of
colorable health or safety justifications exposed it as an illegitimate regulation of labor
relations. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 60-61 (1905). Regulation of labor relations
was illegitimate because it interfered with the common-law ordering, which allowed
employers and employees to negotiate employment on whatever terms they desired. Id.
at 62-64.
255. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 18, at 680-81.
256. In Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), for example, the Court held that the
destruction of valuable cedar trees on the plaintiff's property to prevent the transmission
of disease to the state's apple crop did not constitute a taking for which compensation was
required. Id. at 279. The Court expressly indicated that this result did not turn on
whether the trees would have constituted a nuisance at common law. Id. at 280. Instead,
the Court reasoned that when property uses conflict, the state must inevitably choose
between the owners-whether by action or inaction-and thereby harm one of them. Id.
at 279.
257. Put simply, if property rights are created by society through the governmental
establishment of a legal regime to protect them, there can be no natural right to any
particular property regime. See, e.g., Daniel W. Bromley, Regulatory Takings: Coherent
Concept or Logical Contradiction?, 17 VT. L. REv. 647, 653 (1993) ("[T]o have a right is
to have the ability to require some authority system to act on your behalf-that is, to act
so as to protect your particular interest against the interests of others."); Siegel, supra note
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became simply a type of government benefit, the traditional dis-
tinction between "rights" and "privileges" was no longer viable, and
some constitutional protection could extend to some affirmative
rights.'8
1. Deference to Economic Regulation
The demise of common-law baselines facilitated the deferential
approach to economic regulation by recognizing that all regulatory
regimes, including the common law, involve choices between
competing economic interests. From this perspective, there is no
constitutional reason to prefer the common law over any other
regulatory, regimeO 9  The erosion of common-law baselines was
most complete under the Due Process Clause, where the liberal Court
criticized the Lochner-era jurisprudence as improper activism,26
15, at 104-07 (describing how changing technology facilitated rise of natural monopolies,
which changed the concept of property ownership by linking it to what had previously
been only possible as a government privilege). See generally Joseph William Singer & Jack
M. Beermann, The Social Origins of Property, 6 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 217, 220-28 (1993)
(arguing that natural rights conception of property underlying recent takings decisions is
untenable in light of the social origins of property). In contrast, the central feature of
Professor Epstein's restrictive vision of government authority to adversely affect property
rights is his belief that property rights are natural rights that exist independently of
government action, although "the value of these rights in a state of nature is low because
some individuals continually try to take that which by right belongs to others." EPSTEIN,
supra note 47, at 3.
258. In other words, there is no conceptual difference between the "benefit" of
government protection of one's possession of goods or land and the benefit of, say,
government payment of medical expenses for those who cannot afford it. In both cases,
the government uses resources gained through taxation to do something that benefits some
members of society particularly and purportedly serves the general public interest as well.
259. For example, it makes no sense to distinguish for purposes of regulatory takings
analysis between regulations that prevent harms and those that confer benefits, because
whether a regulation prevents a harm or confers a benefit merely reflects the baseline from
which its impact is measured. See generally Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112
S. Ct. 2886, 2892-95 (1992) (discussing evolution of Court's conception of permissible
purpose in regulatory takings analysis). Consider Penn Central, in which then-Justice
Rehnquist assumed that the property owner began with the right to develop the property
and that the public was not entitled to the preservation of historic buildings that were
privately owned. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 142-46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). As a
result of this starting point, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the ordinance conferred a
public benefit rather than preventing a harmful use of the property. Id. One might as
easily argue that because those who purchase historically significant buildings do so with
an inherent obligation to preserve them, historic preservation ordinances prevent the
public harm of destruction of historic treasures. This argument, of course, assumes that
there is no clear evidence of the framers' intent to constitutionalize then-existing common-
law definitions of property. See supra notes 111-20.
260. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 73
ESCAPING LOCHNER'S SHADOW
accepted dissatisfaction with the outcome of common-law ordering as
a legitimate basis for regulation,26' and presumed that regulation
bears a rational connection to whatever purposes plausibly support
it. 2
62
This analysis also provided a basis for limiting the scope of
other provisions. If the state's regulatory system creates property and
contract rights, then the state has substantial power to define these
rights in ways that limit the Contract and Takings Clauses. Contract
Clause and regulatory takings analyses thus qualified contract and
property rights by the government's reserved power to alter the
regulatory system in the public interest 2  This reasoning effectively
incorporated the rational basis test from the due process context into
the Contract Clause and regulatory taking contexts.264
Even at the height of its deferential approach to economic
regulation, however, the liberal Court was not entirely comfortable
with the full implications of this reasoning. Logically, the state's
power to define contract and property rights through its choice of
regulatory systems would allow the state to condition contracts265
and property rights2 on the reserved power of the state to abrogate
261. Compare, e.g., Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64 (assuming that labor regulation is invalid
absent a public health or safety interest) with, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co.,
301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937) (accepting labor regulation as a valid public purpose).
262. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). An
equally deferential rational basis test is applied under the Equal Protection Clause. See
supra note 67 and accompanying text.
263. This point is fairly clear with respect to the Contract Clause, see supra notes 169-72
and accompanying text, but complicated in the regulatory takings context by the use of
several possible rationales for the purpose inquiry in regulatory takings analysis, see supra
notes 214-23 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, none of these rationales makes sense
except as a kind of qualification of property ownership by the state's police power,
whether on the theory that use restrictions are not takings if within the police power or
on the related theory that property rights are implicitly limited by the state's reserved
police power so that nothing is taken when police power measures restrict uses.
264. This appears to be true notwithstanding Justice Scalia's contrary reasoning in
Nollan. See supra note 206.
265. For a contractual obligation to be impaired, it must be created, a point long
recognized in the Court's treatment of prospective limits on contracts as entirely outside
the scope of the Contract Clause. See supra note 170. If no common-law baseline of
contractual freedom exists, this logic can be extended much further, and a state might
condition all contracts on the state's reserved power to abrogate any provision. See
General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 112 S. Ct. 1105, 1111-12 (1992) (using this scenario as
a reductio ad absurdum to justify the Court's refusal automatically to incorporate all
background law into contracts). For further discussion see infra notes 353-56 and
accompanying text.
266. For property to be taken, it must first be owned or possessed, an idea that
underlies the Lucas exception for common-law nuisances. See supra note 245 and
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those interests. Since this reasoning empties both the Contract and
Takings Clauses of all meaning, the Court could not fully embrace it.
Thus, the per se treatment of physical invasions survived the
repudiation of Lochner by the liberal Court, 67 and the liberal Court
continued to pay lip service to the Contract Clause and to regulatory
takings, although it uniformly rejected such challenges to economic
regulation.
2. Affirmative Rights
The erosion of common-law baselines also laid the foundation for
extending constitutional protection to interests previously regarded as
mere privileges. Just as downward departures from the common-law
baseline were inherently suspect under Lochner, any government
benefit over and above the common-law baseline received no
constitutional protection.2' But whether government action de-
prives the individual of a right or merely refuses to grant the
individual a privilege depends entirely on the baseline from which the
impact on the individual is measured.269 Thus, the rejection of
common-law baselines made it possible to view government benefits
as rights that engage constitutional safeguards.
Insofar as the liberal social programs of the New Deal and Great
Society created the modem welfare state, it is not surprising that
liberal jurisprudence has sought to accord these affirmative rights
some measure of constitutional protection.27 Liberal scholars such
as Charles Reich argued that, because government benefits are so
important to their recipients, they are a form of property entitled to
constitutional protection.27' Heeding this call, the liberal Court
began to recognize affirmative fights to certain kinds of government
benefits. This development was most pronounced in the procedural
due process context, where Goldberg v. Kelly's272 treatment of
accompanying text. Following this analysis, if a state's law defined property ownership as
inherently subject to a broadly defined state power, then complete destruction or even
physical appropriation might be sustainable on the theory that the owner never had a
"right" to be free from such action. See infra notes 353-56 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
268. Of course, to the extent that these interests may have had a contractual element,
they might receive protection, although doctrines such as sovereign immunity limited even
this protection.
269. See supra note 258.
270. For an interesting comparative discussion of the extent to which constitutional
doctrine recognizes affirmative duties, see Currie, supra note 251 at 872-86.
271. See, e.g., Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 785 (1964).
272. 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970).
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welfare benefits as "property" began a long line of cases recognizing
certain government benefits as liberty or property interests.273
While these cases initially employed an expansive analysis, even
the liberal Court was uncomfortable with the full implications of
affirmative rights; and later decisions limited the protection of
affirmative rights in various respects. 4 First, despite suggestions in
Goldberg that constitutional protection of government benefits
depends on the benefits' importance to individuals,275 the Court
adopted a statutory entitlement approach to affirmative rights276 that
left the creation of protected interests entirely to the discretion of the
state.277 Second, the Court did not insist that the full measure of
common-law due process be extended to entitlements, adopting
instead an open-ended balancing test to determine the process
due.278
Moreover, the Court was reluctant to accord substantive
protection to affirmative rights. Some cases did so in a limited
fashion when the rights to travel279 or freedom of speech were
implicated,"0 to achieve equal treatment as required by the Equal
Protection Clause,21 or when the government had disabled in-
273. See generally TRIBE, supra note 18, §§ 10-9 to 10-18 (discussing cases); NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 19, at 508-48 (same).
274. In these areas, doctrines introduced by the liberal Court provided the basis for a
nearly full-scale retrenchment by the conservative Court. See infra notes 290-98 and
accompanying text.
275. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 261.
276. This approach was also suggested in Goldberg, which relied in part on statutory
language that seemed to create an entitlement to benefits. Id. at 262. Later cases relied
on statutory entitlement to the exclusion of other factors. See, e.g., Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972).
277. This approach, which is quite similar to the treatment of property and contract
rights for purposes of economic regulation, see supra notes 263-67 and accompanying text,
creates a variety of logical difficulties. Most prominently, the Court has had difficulty
explaining why the state may freely choose not to create rights by avoiding statutory
language suggesting an entitlement, but cannot create a right conditioned on the state's
power to terminate it with minimal procedures. See infra notes 350-52 and accompanying
text.
278. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). The net effect of this
development was that while the "New Property" received some procedural protection, it
never received the same degree of protection accorded traditional property rights.
279. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969) (holding that denial of
welfare benefits to new residents for the purpose of deterring in-migration of indigents is
unconstitutional).
280. Branti v. Finkle, 445 U.S. 507, 518-20 (1980) (ruling that nonpolicymaking
government employee may not be fired on the basis of opposition to elected officials in
previous election); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion) (same).
281. See supra note 82.
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dividuals from protecting themselves, as in the prison context.W
But in cases such as Dandridge v. Williams, the Court definitively
rejected direct substantive claims to government benefits.2' Other
doctrines, including the state action requirement2 4 and the treat-
ment of disparate impact cases,' also reflected the continued
influence of common-law baselines. While this analysis is obviously
defensible in terms of judicial restraint,' considering the important
role of government benefits in liberal social policy, one might have
expected a more aggressive pursuit of constitutional protection for
these substantive interests.27
282. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976) (holding that deliberate
indifference to prisoners' needs violates Eighth Amendment); see also Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982) (indicating that state had affirmative duty to provide
adequate food, shelter, clothing, and medical care to persons confined in mental
institutions).
283. 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (declining to recognize fundamental right to welfare
benefits). By refusing to accord welfare benefits fundamental rights status, the Court
subsumed the analysis of benefits into the analysis of ordinary economic regulation and
applied the rational basis test. Id. at 485-86.
284. This requirement's treatment of private conduct as beyond the purview of the
Constitution presumes that government bears no responsibility for that conduct, while a
baselineless analysis recognizes that government creates the regulatory regime under which
private conduct is permitted. In Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), for example,
the Court held that racial discrimination by a state-licensed private club did not engage
equal protection because the state did not mandate or encourage discrimination. Id. at
176. This analysis starts with the baseline assumption that private actors are free to
discriminate, as they were at common-law. But if this freedom is a regulatory choice (the
common law could have started with the baseline assumption that individuals have a right
to be free from discrimination), then the state could be held responsible for creating the
conditions under which private discrimination flourishes.
285. Facially neutral government action that disproportionally affects minorities by
reinforcing preexisting inequalities is not discriminatory absent improper motive.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,245 (1976). This analysis assumes that the government
bears no responsibility for the social conditions responsible for the disparate impact, such
as the history of discrimination that contributed to lower test scores for African-Americans
in Washington v. Davis. If, on the other hand, the government bears some responsibility
for the creation of the societal baseline in which African-Americans perform poorly on
tests, then it arguably has an obligation to avoid apparently neutral measures that
perpetuate the effects of past discrimination.
286. In Dandridge, the Court invoked judicial restraint and held up the Lochner era as
a negative example of what would follow from the acceptance of welfare rights as
fundamental. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 484-85. The practical consequences of recognizing
affirmative rights are also highly problematic, because they might require a massive
expenditure of resources.
287. Consider also in this regard the Court's treatment of education. Although the
Court emphasized the vital importance of education in Brown, it refused to elevate
scrutiny of measures adversely affecting education. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973).
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Overall, then, the erosion of common-law baselines furthered the
goals of liberal jurisprudence, but the Court was troubled with the full
implications of a baselineless constitutional analysis. Thus, while the
demise of common-law baselines was virtually complete in the context
of economic regulation, the Court seemed to recognize that there
must be limits to the states' ability to define away contract and
property rights. More clearly, full recognition of affirmative rights in
a baselineless world would entail a massive judicial restructuring of
social institutions of such proportions that it gave even "activist"
judges pause.
B. The Baseline Problem and Conservative Jurisprudence
The tension between judicial restraint and economic rights
prevented the conservative Court from resolving the baseline
problem. Conservative economic theory might favor reassertion of
common-law baselines to protect traditional property and contract
rights, but judicial restraint made it impossible to pursue this course
outside the context of per se takings, and forced the Court to retain
a fully baselineless analysis of economic regulation under the Due
Process Clause. Judicial restraint also distorted the development of
alternative baselines, because the construction of baselines is an
activist endeavor. Thus, the Court sought to disclaim responsibility
for baselines by locating them outside the Constitution, resulting in a
poorly defined expectations approach based on the preexisting
recognition of contract and property rights under state law. On the
other hand, judicial restraint permitted the Court to reassert common-
law baselines as a means of restricting affirmative rights, except in the
area of procedural due process, in which an expectations model also
reigned. Thus, the conservative Court's economic rights jurisprudence
is characterized by three distinct approaches to the baseline problem.
1. Baselines in Conservative Economic Theory
Constitutional protection for traditional property and contract
rights requires a baseline system of economic ordering that gives legal
protection to the acquisition, possession, use, and disposition of land,
chattels, and intangible interests. In a baselineless world in which the
state creates property and contract rights by according them legal
protection, it can freely limit or extinguish them.' Thus, as dis-
.288. Whether property preexists government or is created by government is a central
point of disagreement between conservative and liberal views of economic rights. See infra
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cussed above, without a baseline against which to measure the impact
of government action, property and contract rights can be defined
away.s
9
Not surprisingly, common-law baselines generally correspond to
the insights of the conservative law and economics and public choice
movements. 29  The law and economics movement starts with the
descriptive claim that the generally laissez-faire common-law rules
promote "efficiency" in the sense that social utility is maximized
because market forces ensure that resources are put to their most
valued uses. 291 While most conservative economists recognize that
there are many market failures left uncorrected by the common law,
they are skeptical of the liberal assumption that government interven-
tion is likely to correct these failures, since government is not perfect
either. Insofar as public choice theory postulates that legislative and
regulatory action is usually the product of self-interested official
actions responding to rent-seeking interest groups, it reinforces this
opposition to regulatory measures by implying that regulatory
measures do not correct market failures but rather create dead-weight
losses by encouraging competition for monopoly rents.2 2
These arguments, if accepted, support common-law baselines. To
the extent that the market is generally efficient, common-law
baselines would make sense as a means of promoting the general
notes 457-61 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 265-67 and accompanying text.
290. Cf. G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REV.
431, 436-38 (1993) (arguing that the Court's restriction of the public policy exception to
contract enforcement goes beyond Lochner's constitutionalization of the common law,
reflecting "a sustained interest in reconstructing the American legal system to better reflect
economists' ideal of strict contract enforcement").
291. See generally POSNER, supra note 72, at 23 (arguing that common law is best
understood as a way of organizing society to maximize wealth). This claim rests on the
premise that markets operate to maximize social utility unless there is a market failure,
such as externalities or inadequate information. Insofar as common-law rules generally
reflect a laissez-faire attitude toward the market, enforce market transactions, and
intervene only in limited cases of clear market failure, conservative law and economics
scholars view the common law as generally superior to alternative regulatory regimes. It
follows that any departure from the common-law rules must be strictly justified in terms
of market failure. Although law and economics scholars frequently disclaim any normative
judgments about the relative priority of maximizing social utility and other values that
society might choose, such as fairness in the distribution of wealth or moral and ethical
judgments, that has not typically prevented them from criticizing legal rules that do not
conform to economic principles.
292. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
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welfare.293 Likewise, regulatory departures from the common law
would be suspect because they are most likely the product of rent-
seeking by special interests rather than public-regarding legislative
deliberations2 94 Moreover, since it is ordinarily assumed that
Article III safeguards leave judges free of the kinds of self-interested
motivations that distort the legislative and administrative process,2 95
it would seem to follow that close judicial scrutiny of regulatory
measures is appropriate.296
Common-law baselines are also consistent with the conservative
perspective insofar as they preclude or limit the recognition of
affirmative rights.2" Affirmative rights are inconsistent with conser-
vative economic theory because they create improper incentives for
individual recipients; resources spent in pursuit of government
entitlements, which merely transfer resources without producing
anything of value, are a dead-weight loss in economic terms.298
293. Of course, many advocates of economic analysis would shrink from
constitutionalizing economic theory, and I do not mean to suggest that the superiority of
a particular regulatory regime is sufficient to justify treating it as constitutionally
mandated. My point is simply that, given conservative economists' praise for the common
law as a reflection of sound economic principles, the constitutionalization of the common
law would generally accord with conservative economic theory. To the extent that the
common law does not reflect economic theory, of course, economists might prefer other
baselines. See Shell, supra note 290, at 482-86, 503-09 (arguing that Court's treatment of
public policy defense of enforcement of contracts departs from common law in ways that
reflect influence of law and economics).
294. Thus, for example, it is not surprising that Judge Frank Easterbrook supports a
rule of statutory construction that tends to preserve the common law, arguing that, unless
a statute expressly and clearly confers power on the courts to create a statutory common
law, it should be restricted to matters expressly resolved by its framers. See Easterbrook,
supra note 74, at 544-52. Although Judge Easterbrook defends this rule as the one that
would most likely be chosen by the legislature, the rule coincidentally tends to preserve
the common law in cases of statutory ambiguity. Judge Easterbrook also invokes both
public choice theory and the preservation of private social ordering (i.e. markets) to
support his argument that the legislature would prefer such a rule. Id.
295. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 134, at 25-27 (arguing that the independence of
judges and their training enable them to pursue enduring values). This notion can also be
supported in public choice terms. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Independence of
Judges: The Uses and Limitations of Public Choice Theory, 1990 3.Y.U. L. REV. 827,855.
But see William Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest
Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 879 (1975) (arguing that independence of
judiciary functions to enforce legislative interest group bargains).
296. Of course, not all conservatives support this view. See supra note 74.
297. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the
Constitution, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 695, 696; Richard A. Epstein, No New Property, 56
BROOK. L. REV. 747, 775 (1990).
298. Moreover, providing constitutional protection for affirmative rights is a particularly
stark form of judicial activism, because it is clear that the framers did not contemplate the
existence of such rights and because their recognition implicates further judicial
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Common-law baselines would enable the Court to safeguard property
and contract rights without according similar protection to affirmative
rights; without baselines, the legal recognition of property and
contract rights is merely another type of government benefit that
should receive the same doctrinal treatment as welfare benefits.
2. Common-Law Baselines and Judicial Restraint
Judicial restraint and the resulting search for an originalist escape
have limited the reintroduction of common-law baselines. To avoid
association with the Lochner era, the Court has left intact the
baselineless liberal analysis of substantive economic due process
claims. Also, because both the Contract Clause and the Takings
Clause incorporate the substantive due process rational basis test,2 99
the Court could not easily use common-law baselines under these
provisions without creating an apparent conflict with its baselineless
due process decisions. On the other hand, judicial restraint was
generally consistent with the use of common-law baselines to limit
affirmative rights, and the Court pursued this tactic rather aggressive-
ly, except in the procedural due process area.
The Court clearly could not enhance economic rights by
incorporating common-law baselines into substantive economic due
process analysis. Because of its association with Lochner-era activism
and its affinity to liberal individual rights doctrine, substantive due
process was "off limits."300 Thus, the Court continues to analyze
due process challenges to economic regulation without reference to
any baseline of property and contract rights."1 The same appears
involvement in matters of social policy.
299. See supra note 67.
300. See supra notes 57-61, 94-98 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia, later joined
by Justice Thomas, has argued, however, that forms of regulation that were permissible at
common law can pose no due process problems. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. v. Haslip, 499
U.S. 1, 38 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,
113 S. Ct. 2711, 2726-28 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (joined by Justice Thomas).
301. The Court not only has rejected common-law baselines in its economic due process
analysis, but also has declined to introduce an alternative baseline founded on expecta-
tions. General Motors Corp. v. Romein recognized that "[r]etroactive legislation presents
problems of unfairness that are more serious than those posed by prospective legislation,
because it can deprive citizens of legitimate expectations and upset settled transactions,"
112 S. Ct. 1105, 1112 (1992), but required only that the retroactive effect of the legislation
be supported by a rational legislative purpose, id.; accord Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v.
Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 730 (1984) (stating that to sustain retroactive legislation,
legislature must show only that "the retroactive application of the legislation is itself
justified by a rational legislative purpose"). The deferential analysis in the cases also
shows no indication of "rational basis with bite" scrutiny. See Romein, 112 S. Ct. at 1112
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to be true for equal protection challenges to economic regulation.3 02
The Court has not been much more successful at introducing
common-law baselines in any of the originalist escapes it has explored.
There were hints of a common-law baseline in the Court's separation
of powers decisions. Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co. 3°' emphasized the distinction between private and
public rights, seeming to elevate common-law actions to a categorical-
ly protected status for purposes of Article III analysis. 3" However,
this analysis was soon abandoned.315  Common-law baselines have
also figured in some takings decisions. 316 The Lucas per se rule
incorporates common-law baselines in cases of total destruction of
economically viable uses by requiring compensation unless the
regulatory measure in question merely replicates preexisting common-
law nuisance restrictions2 7  The use of per se analysis made the
(cursorily disposing of due process challenge to workers' compensation amendment with
retroactive effects); Gray, 467 U.S. at 730-31 (rejecting Fifth Amendment due process
challenge to retroactive effect of Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act). For a
discussion of expectations baselines, see infra parts II.B.3. & III.C.2.
302. An expectation baseline is implicit in Nordlinger v. Hahn's suggestion that
protection of reliance interests is a legitimate basis for legislative classifications, 112 S. Ct.
2326,2333-34 (1992), but this argument was used to expand legislative discretion. There
is no suggestion in Nordlinger or other recent decisions that classifications retroactively
burdening traditional property and contract rights ought to be scrutinized with particular
care. The Court has incorporated common-law baselines into equal protection analysis to
limit the scope of fundamental rights analysis, however, even though in theory equal
protection does not require a constitutional baseline because it measures government
action in terms of relative treatment. See infra notes 340-45 and accompanying text.
303. 458 U.S. 50, 69-70 (1982) (plurality opinion).
304. The Court reasoned that while Congress could freely allocate adjudication of
disputes respecting public rights to non-Article III tribunals, courts must retain the
essential attributes of judicial power with respect to traditional private rights such as
common-law contract or tort actions. Id. at 84-85.
305. The Court eliminated the categorical treatment of common-law rights in CFTC v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853 (1986). By redefining public rights to include any statutory right
closely associated with a regulatory regime, Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33,54-55
(1989); Thomas v. Union Carbide, 473 U.S. 568,588-89 (1985), the Court also allowed the
legislature to avoid Article III by replacing common-law rights with statutory ones.
Common-law baselines are retained under Article III, however, insofar as government
benefits are always "public rights" entitled to no Article IH protections. This overall
situation closely approximates the result in the substantive due process arena, but seems
inconsistent with the treatment of government benefits for procedural due process
purposes. See infra notes 334,350-52 and accompanying text.
306. Not surprisingly, Justice Scalia, who has taken a leading role in the Court's
aggressive takings jurisprudence, is also a strong proponent of common-law baselines, even
when these baselines might foreclose the economic rights arguments favored by
conservative politicians. See supra note 300 (discussing Justice Scalia's concurrences in the
punitive damage cases).
307. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
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incorporation of common-law baselines easier because per se analysis
survived the repudiation of Lochner and did not incorporate the
police power qualification found in regulatory takings.3"8 This factor
may also explain the implicit reliance on common-law baselines in
Nollan, in which the Court emphasized the affinity between compel-
ling a physical invasion and conditioning a rebuilding permit on the
property owner's ceding a public easement.3 9 However, neither the
Lucas per se rule nor the Nollan logic applies broadly.310
Judicial restraint presented barriers, both in terms of specific
doctrine and general principle, to the strict application of common-law
baselines in Contract Clause and regulatory takings analysis. To the
extent that rational basis scrutiny in the Contract Clause and
regulatory takings context determines whether there has been a valid
police power action, the reintroduction of common-law baselines into
these areas would be doctrinally inconsistent with the rejection of
common-law baselines for purposes of substantive economic due
process analysis. 311 More generally, because the use of common-law
baselines to block economic regulation is closely associated with
Lochner-era activism, a significant move in that direction, even under
different constitutional provisions, would be hard to square with
judicial restraint.
On the other hand, the Court's aggressive use of common-law
baselines to reject affirmative rights is consistent with judicial restraint
because it limits the circumstances in which courts overturn political
decisions. Thus, several recent decisions have refused to impose
308. See supra notes 187-94 and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 207 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia acknowledged in Nollan
that the state could constitutionally deny the rebuilding permit altogether, but elsewhere
in the opinion he asserted that "the right to build on one's own property-even though
its exercise may be subjected to legitimate permitting requirements-cannot remotely be
described as a 'governmental benefit.' " Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825, 833 n.2 (1987). This assertion clearly reflects the common-law assumption that
ownership and use of property is a prepolitical right, rather than a creation of law. See
generally Williams, supra note 47, at 462-74 (arguing that Nollan and First English mark
the Supreme Court's return to the Lochnerian vision of property as an absolute right).
310. See supra part II.C.
311. As noted previously, the scope of the police power does not depend on what
constitutional provision is involved, and the test to determine whether a particular measure
is within that power should be the same regardless of the constitutional provision at issue.
See supra notes 176, 216 and accompanying text. Spannaus and Nollan seemed to
disassociate due process analysis from the Contract Clause and regulatory takings inquiries,
but in the absence of a broader theory to explain such a development, the Court was
forced to retreat. See supra notes 176-85, 214-27 and accompanying text.
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affirmative duties on government with respect to bodily integrity,31
education,3 13 or public employment,314 even though all of these
interests are "recognized" for procedural due process purposes. 315
These decisions are particularly significant to the extent that they not
only refuse to treat affirmative rights as fundamental, but also suggest
that affirmative rights simply do not engage due process. 316  The
strengthening of common-law baselines is also evident in the Court's
retreat from the limited substantive safeguards it had previously
recognized for affirmative rights. 317 Finally, even when acknowl-
edged fundamental rights are involved, the Court has used common-
law baselines to refuse strict scrutiny on the ground that the state has
not imposed any burden on those rights. 318
312. Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 194-201
(1989) (refusing to recognize duty to prevent child abuse by custodial parent even when
officials have notice that abuse has occurred).
313. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450, 462-65 (1988) (denying existence
of state duty to provide free school bus service to indigent students).
314. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 1069-70 (1992) (holding that
state has no constitutional duty to provide a safe workplace for government employees).
Collins may also be understood as involving the interest in bodily integrity. See infra note
316.
315. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990) (bodily
integrity); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,542-44 (1985) (government
employment); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-74 (1975) (education).
316. The public employee in Collins, for example, had been injured on the job, which
engaged the underlying liberty interest in bodily integrity. See also Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261,
279-84 (recognizing that a state may require clear and convincing proof of an incom-
petent's wishes regarding withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment). Even if the state's
inaction (failure to train or provide a safe environment) did not "burden" this interest so
as to require elevated scrutiny, the Court should still have applied the rational basis test.
Collins held, however, that the state owed no duty under the Due Process Clause to
provide a safe workplace and thus did not ask whether the state's failure to provide one
was rational. Although the rational basis test is deferential, the refusal to apply even
deferential review has practical consequences. See Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy,
and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1277, 1283-84 (1993) ("To appreciate how
extraordinary this record [of rejecting affirmative rights] is, one need only juxtapose it with
the Court's treatment of other social and economic measures, where the Court has
routinely declared legislation unconstitutional even on a rationality standard.") (citations
omitted).
317. For example, although earlier decisions had strictly scrutinized the denial of
significant benefits to new residents as a burden on the fundamental right to travel, more
recent decisions use the rational basis test to invalidate such measures. See supra notes
39-40 and accompanying text. While the Court has thus far continued to invalidate the
denial of benefits to new residents, the use of the rational basis test is both more consistent
with common-law baselines and more likely to relax the constitutional limits on denying
benefits to new residents in the future.
318. The most obvious example of this tactic is in the abortion area. In Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), the Court held that the denial of Medicaid benefits for
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Because judicial restraint requires respect for precedent, 319
however, some forms of new property were too firmly entrenched to
be repudiated completely.320 Thus, while the conservative Court
could restrict the substantive protection accorded affirmative rights,
procedural due process safeguards for affirmative rights were too well
established for the Court to disavow completely its prior doctrine.21
The Court did, however, limit procedural due process by relaxing the
process due when "new" liberty or property interests are at stake.322
3. The Expectations Alternative
Although the conservative Court could not broadly reassert
common-law baselines, some sort of baseline was necessary to give
meaning to economic rights under the Contract and Takings Clauses
and to provide a framework for analyzing procedural due process
claims. Judicial restraint distorted the search for baselines, however,
abortions did not trigger strict scrutiny because the government had merely declined to
remove a preexisting obstacle (poverty) from the path of poor women seeking an abortion.
Id. at 308-11; accord Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469-71, 474 (1977). In recent decisions,
the Court has expanded this analysis to uphold significant restrictions on the use of state
or federal funds in connection with abortion services. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S.
173, 192-203 (1991); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490,520-21 (1989).
319. Not all observers accept respect for precedent as a component of judicial restraint,
see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 217 (1985)
(arguing that respect for precedent has a "ratchet" effect insofar as conservative judges are
expected to respect liberal precedents, but liberal judges do not respect conservative
precedents); Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 23, 25-28 (1994) (arguing that Marbury v. Madison's rationale for judicial
review of legislation applies equally to judicial decisions and requires courts to apply the
Constitution, not judicial decisions, as the superior law), but it is included in most
definitions of judicial restraint, see Levy & Glicksman, supra note 77, at 349-50. More
importantly, a substantial component of the Court's conservative wing emphasizes respect
for precedent as an element of judicial restraint. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112
S. Ct. 2791, 2808-16 (1992) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (Kennedy, Souter, Blackmun,
and Stevens, JJ., joining in part).
320. This was true with respect to procedural due process safeguards for entitlements
and a few substantive areas, such as First Amendment restrictions on terminating
government employment because of political affiliation. See Rutan v. Republican Party,
497 U.S. 62 (1990).
321. Although of relatively recent origins (Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, was decided
in 1970), affirmative rights to welfare benefits, government employment, licenses, and
other new property interests have been recognized in numerous Supreme Court decisions.
See generally TRIBE, supra note 18, §§ 10-9 to 10-18 (discussing cases); NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 19, at 508-48 (same).
322. See supra note 278 and accompanying text. By 1985, the balancing approach for
"process due" had been diluted to the point at which individuals are entitled only to an
informal pretermination opportunity to present their version of the facts. See Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 54546 (1985).
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because their construction is an essentially activist endeavor: Judges
establish a standard against which to measure government action.
The conservative Court attempted to avoid this dilemma through an
expectations-based approach that emphasized the unfairness of
frustrating justifiable reliance on the preexisting legal recognition of
a given interest.3' This approach is attractive from a judicial
restraint perspective because it externalizes the creation of property
or contract rights; the Court merely identifies rights created by
another source, such as state law.324 Coincidentally, this approach
appears to bolster traditional property and contract rights while
allowing the state to limit affirmative rights by declining to create
entitlements.
The expectations approach grew out of preexisting doctrine in
both the traditional economic rights and procedural due process
context. Contract Clause doctrine has long singled out retroactive
legislation for special concern,3' a principle that emphasizes the
expectations of the contracting parties. Regulatory takings analysis
also explicitly incorporates an inquiry into the extent to which a
regulation interferes with legitimate, investment-backed expecta-
tions.326 Likewise, the use of statutory "entitlement" to determine
the existence of a property or liberty interest in government benefits
reflects an expectations approach.327
323. This preexisting law need not correspond with the common law. Under the
expectations approach, a state might choose a wide variety of possible property and
contract regimes ex ante, but changes in those regimes would require special justification.
324. This appeal is similar to the appeal of originalism, which argues that open-ended
construction of broad language and the recognition of nontextual rights involve law-
making, while strict construction of text confines judges to application of law made
elsewhere.
325. See supra note 170.
326. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485
(1987) (rejecting claim that measure was a regulatory taking, because there was no "undue
interference with [owners'] investment-backed expectations"); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (indicating that regulatory taking analysis
includes consideration of "economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and,
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-
backed expectations"). The Court also explicitly tied expectations to the definition of
property in Penn Central, characterizing prior decisions as holding that "while the
challenged government action caused economic harm, it did not interfere with interests
that were sufficiently bound up with the reasonable expectations of the claimant to
constitute 'property' for Fifth Amendment purposes." Id. at 124-25. Measuring the extent
of diminution of property values also involves an expectations-based analysis by comparing
value before and after a regulation takes effect.
327. See infra note 334 and accompanying text.
1995]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
This approach can bolster economic rights if interference with
expectations is the basis for heightening scrutiny.3" In Spannaus,
for example, the Court emphasized the severe retroactive effect of
state law pension funding requirements to justify application of
heightened scrutiny.329 A similar analysis might be applied in the
regulatory takings context to justify heightened scrutiny of measures
causing a severe diminution of value.33 Hodel hints of such analy-
sis,331 and Nollan partakes of it to some degree.332 The expecta-
tions approach also provided the basis for treating government
benefits as property or liberty interests for purposes of procedural due
process on the theory that statutory entitlements created
constitutionally protected expectations.333
But the expectations-based approach is a two-edged sword. Just
as prior law can create expectations through legal recognition and
protection, it may also prevent expectations from arising by limiting
328. See, e.g., Robert A. Graham, Note, The Constitution, The Legislature, and Unfair
Surprise: Toward a Reliance-Based Approach to the Contracts Clause, 92 MICH. L. REV.
398 (1993) (advocating use of expectations-based approach for modest reinvigoration of
Contract Clause).
329. See Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 246-47, 249-50 (1978).
330. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
331. Although the Court's opinion in Hodel concluded that the expectation interests
at issue were "dubious," Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 715 (1987), five justices joined
concurring opinions in which frustration of expectations played an important role. Justice
Brennan's brief concurrence, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, remarked on the
continued viability of Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979), and stated simply that "the
unique negotiations giving rise to the property rights and expectations at issue here make
this case the unusual one," Hodel, 481 U.S. at 718 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis
added). Likewise, Justice Stevens's lengthier concurrence, joined by Justice White,
emphasized the importance of "giving a property owner fair notice of a major change in
the rules governing the disposition of his property" and the "unwarned impact" of the
measure, id. at 727 (Stevens, J., concurring), as well as the inability of the owner to avoid
escheat by taking appropriate steps, see id. at 728-33 (Stevens, J., concurring).
332. The Nollan Court used common-law baselines in its discussion of the conditioning
of the rebuilding permit, see supra note 309 and accompanying text, but the analysis also
reflects an expectations-based approach. Justice Scalia indicated that the commission's
public announcement of its policy on rebuilding permits prior to the owner's acquisition
of property did not limit the owner's property rights because "[s]o long as the Commission
could not have deprived the prior owners of the easement without compensating them, the
prior owners must be understood to have transferred their full property rights in conveying
the lot." Nollan, 483 U.S. at 833 n.2. Thus, the preexisting legal regime defined the scope
of rights acquired by the owner. This analysis also reveals the flaw in the expectations
approach-it has no meaning without some other baseline that limits the state's ability to
define away expectations. See infra part III.C.2.
333. Although some early cases premised "new" property rights on their importance
to individuals, later cases adopted an entitlement approach. See supra notes 275-76 and
accompanying text. At one level, this approach provided the basis for treating government
benefits as rights, but at another, it facilitated the erosion of affirmative rights.
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that recognition and protection. This point, is most obvious with
respect to procedural due process, for which the Court requires a legal
"entitlement" as a condition of according government benefits status
as a property or liberty interest and has repeatedly stated that mere
unilateral expectations are insufficient to create a constitutionally
protected interest.3 Similarly, the expectations-based approach
may limit the creation of contract and property rights. Prospective
legislation has long been considered completely beyond the purview
of the Contract Clause,335 and the permissibility of police power
regulations that incidentally burden contractual obligations has been
justified as a qualification implicitly incorporated in all contracts. 36
This kind of expectations-based approach also limits the scope of the
Takings Clause, insofar as property is acquired with the implicit
condition that its uses are subject to police power restrictions.337
334. For example, some decisions recognized that termination of public employment
may deprive employees of a reputational liberty interest, but more recent cases have used
expectations and entitlements reasoning to limit that interest. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424
U.S. 693 (1976). See generally TRIBE, supra note 18, § 10-11 (discussing relevant
decisions). More generally, the expectations approach gives practical control over the
creation of protected interests to the government, which might be expected to limit those
interests in order to limit the administrative costs associated with termination of benefits
or other government action.
335. See supra note 170. The premise that unlawful contractual provisions give rise to
no obligation measures the parties' rights from the baseline of their legitimate expectations
ex ante.
336. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. The Court has even indicated that
retrospective regulation in a heavily regulated field does not substantially impair
contractual obligations because parties who contract in such a field must expect that the
regulatory environment will change. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 194
n.14 (1983); Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400,416
(1983); Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32, 38 (1940).
337. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491-92
(1987); see also supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text. This problem may explain
Justice Scalia's inconsistent treatment of the baseline question in responding to the
dissent's argument in Nollan that the property owner had no legitimate expectation of
gaining a rebuilding permit without granting public access because the state constitution
precluded individuals from excluding a public right of way to navigable waters, see Nollan
v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1987), and because the state
commission had previously announced a policy of acquiring public-access easements as a
condition of granting rebuilding permits, see id. at 833 n.2. Justice Scalia accepted the
expectations-based premise that the state constitution prevented ownership from including
a right to exclude the public from access to navigable waters, but argued that the easement
in question did not fall within the scope of the provision. Id. at 832-33. With respect to
the commission policy, however, Justice Scalia used the Takings Clause to argue that the
commission's policy could not affect the expectations created by property ownership, an
argument that uses a constitutional baseline to limit the state's ability to define away
expectations. See supra note 332.
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These difficulties with the expectations-based approach will be
discussed further below.
C. The Baseline Problem and the Failure of Economic Rights
Jurisprudence
The Court's inability to resolve the baseline problem has
contributed to its failure to develop a coherent jurisprudence of
economic rights. As the foregoing discussion suggests, the current
treatment of the baseline issue is beset by two fundamental flaws.
First, and most obviously, the use of divergent baselines in different
contexts causes inconsistent and confusing results. Second, while the
Court is understandably reluctant to employ either extreme of
common-law baselines or none at all, the expectations model it has
chosen by default is circular, and it requires some independent
constitutional baseline to give it content.
1. Inconsistent Approaches
The Court currently employs: (1) a baselineless analysis for
substantive due process challenges to regulation adversely affecting
traditional economic interests; (2) common-law baselines for substan-
tive challenges based on affirmative rights and for regulatory
measures that completely destroy all economically viable uses of
property; and (3) an expectations baseline for Contract Clause,
regulatory taking, and procedural due process analysis. The use of
these divergent models creates doctrinal confusion.
The most direct conflict arises under substantive due process,
where the baselineless and common-law models are directly juxta-
posed. When government action burdens traditional economic rights,
as in General Motors Corp. v. Romein,331 the Court employs a
baselineless approach under which neither common law nor expecta-
tions baselines affects the level of scrutiny.39 This analysis logically
implies that affirmative rights should receive identical treatment, but
the Court in Collins v. City of Harker Heights" regarded the state's
failure to provide a safe workplace, which implicated the liberty
interest in bodily integrity, as entirely beyond the purview of the
Constitution in the absence of an independent constitutional duty to
338. 112 S. Ct. 1105 (1992).
339. This is the corollary of the Court's refusal to heighten scrutiny under the Due
Process Clause based on retroactive effect. See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
340. 112 S. Ct. 1061 (1992). 1
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act.341 If, as Romein and other cases hold, the property and liberty
interests protected by due process are not tied to a constitutional
baseline, no independent duty is needed. The Collins regulatory
decision not to further protect worker safety is no different from the
Romein regulatory decision to require employers to make retroactive
contributions, and both should be subject to rational basis scrutiny.
Reliance on common-law baselines to restrict affirmative rights
is also problematic in the equal protection context. The Equal
Protection Clause is one constitutional provision whose text seems
fully reconcilable with a baselineless analysis that creates affirmative
rights.42  The very notion of "equal protection" implies that
government treatment of individuals is measured not against some
external baseline, but rather against the treatment of other individuals
similarly situated within society.' The Court's refusal in Harris v.
McRae to scrutinize carefully Medicaid's different treatment of
women who choose to have an abortion and those who choose
childbirth is hard to reconcile with this relative notion of equal
protection,' even if it might make some sense from a due process
perspective.345
341. See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
342. Although the clause is phrased negatively ("nor [shall any state] deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1), this negative language affirmatively requires the state to provide the same protection
to all that it provides to some.
343. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-20 (1956) (holding that requiring
indigent defendants to pay for transcript of trial in order to appeal denies equal protection
even though there is no absolute right to appeal); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633
(1969) (applying strict scrutiny to durational residency requirements for government
benefits even though there is no substantive right to benefits). The implications of this
approach for a jurisprudence of economic rights is developed in part IV.B.2. of this
Article.
344. See supra note 318. It is also hard to square with the treatment of roughly
analogous First Amendment issues surrounding patronage practices in government
employment. Such claims also involve differing treatment with respect to a government
benefit (employment) on the basis of an individual's exercise of a constitutionally
protected right. In contrast to Harris, however, such a discriminatory denial of
employment benefits is unconstitutional, even if those benefits are not property for
purposes of due process. See Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62,75-76 (1990); Branti
v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 372-73 (1976).
345. This is true only if one starts with a baseline of no entitlement to medical benefits.
See Sullivan, supra note 252, at 1497-99. In the absence of baselines, there is no difference
between denying a benefit and imposing a burden. See supra note 258 and accompanying
text. Even when it starts with an expectations baseline, the Court's treatment of these
issues in the economic and individual rights context has not been consistent. See infra
notes 357-64 and accompanying text (comparing Rust and Nollan).
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The inconsistent results that stem from inconsistent baselines are
not limited to the affirmative rights arena; the two strands of takings
analysis also conflict. The Court used common-law baselines in
Lucas, but a loose expectations baseline coupled with a (usually)
deferential rational basis test governs the analysis of regulatory
measures that diminish, but do not destroy, economically viable
uses. 6 Given these divergent approaches, total destruction will
almost alvays be a taking, but nearly complete destruction will almost
never be. 7 While Justice Scalia may have been correct in Lucas
that "[tiakings law is full of these 'all-or-nothing' situations,''38
sharply divergent results should be tolerated only if there is an
underlying theoretical or doctrinal justification that explains them, a
justification that is sorely lacking in Lucas.49
2. The Failure of the Expectations Alternative
As if the doctrinal conundrums created by the use of inconsistent
approaches were not enough, the expectations model itself is
incapable of producing a coherent baseline because it is circular.
346. See supra notes 323-27 and accompanying text.
347. Compare Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-16 (1922) (holding that
total destruction of mineral interest constituted a taking) with Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 493-97 (1987) (concluding that nearly complete
destruction of mineral interest was not a taking).
348. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886,2895 n.8 (1992). Justice
Scalia also tried in Lucas to minimize the anomalous results by emphasizing that the extent
of diminution is "keenly relevant" in cases falling short of complete destruction, id., but
it is unclear how nearly complete destruction matters to regulatory takings analysis if the
Court continues to employ the rational basis test regardless of the extent of diminution.
Even if the Court were to elevate scrutiny based on extent of diminution, it would merely
create a different inconsistency-between the treatment of the police power in the
regulatory takings and substantive due process contexts. See supra note 215.
349. While Justice Scalia's "all-or-nothing" example of an owner whose land is
physically appropriated for a highway and the neighboring owner who incurs a loss of
value from the construction of the highway, Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895 n.8, is readily
explainable by reference to the text of the Takings Clause and the traditional treatment
of exclusive possession as central to the concept of ownership, no similar justification exists
for the broad per se rule of Lucas. Justice Scalia's reference to "the historical compact
recorded in the Takings Clause that has become part of our constitutional culture," id. at
2900, is unpersuasive as an originalist argument for the per se rule because the best
historical evidence suggests that the framers did not expect the Takings Clause'to apply
to regulatory measures, see supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia's
argument concerning the preconstitutional treatment of land regulation and his observation
that "text of the Clause can be read to encompass regulatory as well as physical
deprivations (in contrast to the text originally proposed by Madison)," Lucas, 112 S. Ct.
at 2900 n.15, only dispose of textual objections to the per se rule. They do not provide the
direct affirmative support for the rule normally required by originalism.
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"Expectations" are determined by reference to the background law
that confers an "entitlement" so as to make the expectations
"legitimate." But if the creation of an entitlement is a function of the
government's decision to accord a particular interest such status by
virtue of positive law, the government could freely decide not to
create any entitlements. Moreover, the government could condition
every apparent entitlement by reserving the power to terminate it,
effectively defining away all property, contract, and affirmative rights.
Thus, an expectations model ultimately collapses into a baselineless
world unless there is some external referent that limits the
government's ability to structure the background law so as to define
away rights.
The circular nature of the expectations model is reflected in what
we might call the "bitter-with-the-sweet" problem, after (then) Justice
Rehnquist's characterization of the argument for procedural due
process purposes in Arnett v. Kennedy."' This argument treats
procedural safeguards that apply to the deprivation of an interest as
part of the total "bundle" of rights that we call property. Since the
government creates a property interest by conferring benefits in the
form of an entitlement to government employment, welfare benefits,
or licenses, it would seem to follow that the government could
simultaneously limit the procedural safeguards that attach to that
interest. If property rights are defined in terms of the expectations
created by positive law, the logic of the bitter-with-the-sweet
argument is inescapable.351  To avoid this problem, the Court
separated the question of whether a property interest exists from the
question of what procedures must be followed to terminate it, then
identified an independent constitutional baseline to govern procedural
requirements.3 2
350. 416 U.S. 134, 152-54 (1974).
351. Although the majority of justices rejected the argument in Arnett and Loudermill,
the cases offer little explanation other than the emphatic statement that while state law
controls the creation of a property interest, the Constitution controls the minimum
procedural safeguards attached to that interest. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470
U.S. 532, 541 (1985); Arnett, 416 U.S. at 166-67 (Powell, J., concurring in part). The Court
did not explain, however, why this should be so. Logically, it would seem that either both
property and the procedural safeguards that attach to it may be determined by the
government, or that both should be determined by reference to some constitutional
minimum. As will be discussed more fully below, I prefer the latter alternative.
352. Bitter-with-the-sweet reasoning has been fully accepted in Article III cases, insofar
as Congress may freely vest adjudication of "public" rights in non-Article III tribunals, see
Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 54-65 (1989), on the theory that it need not
provide any access to court respecting public rights and that administrative adjudication
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Precisely the same problem confronts the Court with respect to
its Contract and Takings Clause jurisprudence. If the background
contract law of the state limits contract rights such that prospective
regulation can never violate the Contract Clause and all contracts are
qualified by the implied reservation of the state's police power, the
state could logically avoid the clause by reserving the right to
abrogate any contractual provision for whatever reason it chooses. 53
Likewise, the Takings Clause collapses under a purely expectations-
based model, because the state would be able to define property as
inherently subject to appropriation without compensation. 54
Indeed, even absent an explicit reservation of power, one can
effectively argue that contracting parties and property owners can
never rely on a given regulatory regime as static, but rather must
"expect" regulatory changes.3 5  Obviously, the Court would be
reluctant to countenance such an extreme result, but it can avoid this
logic only by supplementing the expectations model with some
independent constitutional baseline. 6
The circular nature of the expectations model also produces
conflicting results with respect to unconstitutional conditions, an area
in which the Court's analysis has been notoriously inconsistent.57
is better than none at all. Given the fact that both Article III and due process involve
constitutional restrictions on the means used to terminate public rights, these inconsistent
approaches are striking.
353. See supra notes 263-67 and accompanying text. The Court recognized this problem
in Romein, in which it used the possibility to justify its conclusion that not all state law is
automatically incorporated into a contract. See General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 112 S.
Ct. 1105, 1111-12 (1992). Ironically, in Romein the argument supported the Court's
conclusion that no contractual obligation ever arose because the state's workers'
compensation law had not become part of the employment contract between the company
and its workers. Id. at 1110-12.
354. See supra notes 263-67 and accompanying text.
355. This idea has been recognized in the Contract Clause context, in which the fact
that a contract was concluded respecting a heavily regulated activity diminishes the
likelihood that subsequent retroactive changes constitute a substantial impairment of
contract. See supra note 336. Professor Sax has advanced a similar argument to critique
Lucas, suggesting that the landowner had no legitimate investment-backed expectations
because he purchased coastal property against the background of increasing regulation.
Joseph L. Sax, The Constitutional Dimensions of Property: A Debate, 26 LoY. L.A. L.
REV. 23, 27 (1992); see also Note, Taking Back Takings, supra note 47, at 914, 915-21
(arguing that Lucas "confers a publicly-funded windfall on owners who cannot reasonably
expect to use their property in ways the state deems harmful").
356. Justice Scalia did just that in Lucas. See supra note 250.
357. An unconstitutional condition arises when the government has no constitutional
duty to act, but its refusal to act unless some condition is met nonetheless violates the
Constitution. Despite the force of Justice Holmes's notion that the greater power to deny
includes the lesser power to impose conditions, it has long been recognized that some
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This point is well illustrated by contrasting two recent decisions:
Nollan and Rust v. Sullivan."8 In Nollan the Court invalidated a
state agency's decision to condition the grant of a rebuilding permit
on the property owner's cession of a lateral access easement to the
public,359 but in Rust it upheld administrative regulations that condi-
tioned federal grants to family planning clinics on an agreement not
to provide any abortion counseling or referral services.
360
These cases cannot be reconciled under an expectations model.
In both cases the government offered something it was not required
to give: a rebuilding permit in Nollan and federal grant money in
Rust. 6' In both cases the government extracted in return the
relinquishment of a constitutional right: compensation for a public
access easement in Nollan, and free speech regarding abortion issues
in Rust. Yet in Nollan the Court reasoned that the "affinity" to a
physical invasion required the Court to be especially conscious of the
fit between the condition and the underlying purposes of the permit
regime,3 2 while Rust demonstrated no similar concern for the fit
between the challenged regulations and the underlying statutory
regime.3s These results can only be reconciled by reference to the
unspoken incorporation of an external baseline-apparently the
common law' 64
conditions may independently violate the Constitution. Most obviously, even if there is
no constitutional obligation to provide a given benefit, it is unconstitutional to confer that
benefit only on the condition that the individual is a member of particular racial group
(unless the condition withstands strict scrutiny). On the other hand, some conditions that
would be unconstitutional if directly imposed can be attached to the grant of government
benefits. For scholarly discussion of the Court's unconstitutional condition jurisprudence,
see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 105-235 (1993); Sullivan, supra
note 252, at 1421-42; Sunstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, supra note 252, at 596-608;
Symposium, Unconstitutional Conditions, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 175 (1989).
358. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
359. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837-39 (1987).
360. Rust, 500 U.S. at 203.
361. See id. at 177-78; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828.
362. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834-37. As discussed previously, the application of the purpose
inquiry in Nollan is widely regarded as much stricter than ordinary rational basis scrutiny.
See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
363. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 184-87 (emphasizing deference to agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutes). Like the lateral access easement in Nollan, the regulations at issue
in Rust were not directly connected to legislative purpose. Congress's desire not to fund
abortions as a method of family planning does not necessarily imply that clinics using other
funds for abortion counseling and referral should be ineligible to receive family planning
grants. The particular regulations at issue in Rust thus went beyond the immediate legisla-
tive purpose, just as the lateral access easement did in Nollan.
364. The only differences between the two cases are the benefits at stake-a rebuilding
permit versus federal grant money-and the underlying right at issue-exclusive possession
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IV. CONSTRUCTING A JURISPRUDENCE OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, the high-profile commit-
ment to judicial restraint has distorted the Court's effort to enhance
constitutional protection for economic rights. The resulting quest for
an originalist escape not only failed on its own terms, but also
prevented the Court from either integrating economic interests into
a broader theory of rights or developing a constitutional baseline for
evaluating economic rights. A sustainable jurisprudence of economic
rights requires the Court to correct these flaws. The Court must
make the case for economic rights directly as part of an integrated
theory of constitutional rights that employs a workable approach to
the baseline problem. 65 In this part of the Article, I will present
the foundations for such a jurisprudence, describe its basic contours,
and discuss some possible objections that might be raised from both
the liberal and conservative perspectives.
A. The Foundations for a Jurisprudence of Economic Rights
A coherent jurisprudence of economic rights must rest on a solid
doctrinal foundation that both justifies and limits judicial interven-
tion."' The prevailing fundamental rights and political-process
of property versus freedom of speech. Since there is no basis for treating the right of
exclusive possession as more important for constitutional purposes than freedom of speech,
the different treatment apparently rests on the assumption that the ability to rebuild is
more significant than the receipt of grant money. Thus, for example, Justice Scalia
reasoned that the owner's right to use property could not be characterized as a mere
benefit such that the owner had voluntarily exchanged the right to exclude the public for
the rebuilding permit, Nollan, 483 U.S. at 833 n.2, but this is true only if the owner's right
to use property exists independently of the state law recognizing that right.
365. The composition of the Court may at the present time be more favorable for such
a development than at any time since the New Deal. President Clinton's two appoint-
ments to the Court are clearly more liberal than the justices appointed by Presidents
Reagan and Bush, but at the same time they are not totally opposed to the recognition of
economic rights. See Paul M. Barrett, Supreme Court Nominee Wins Business's Approval,
WALL ST. J., May 16, 1994, at B1 (discussing Justice Breyer); Paul M. Barrett, Ginsburg
Business Rulings Show Balance, WALL ST. J., June 16, 1993, at B1 (discussing Justice
Ginsburg). These justices might join Justice Stevens and the more moderate Reagan and
Bush appointees (Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter), who have refused to reject
outright the liberal jurisprudence of individual rights, to forge a majority in favor of an
integrated approach to constitutional rights.
366. In this respect, I would differentiate the kind of coherence that supports a political
or economic theory from the kind of coherence that is integral to the judicial function.
See Bruce Chapman, The Rational and the Reasonable: Social Choice Theory and
Adjudication, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 41, 44-46 (1994).
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methodology can provide such a foundation, but only if the Court is
prepared to dismantle the longstanding dichotomy between economic
and other individual rights. To avoid the excesses of Lochner,
however, the Court must also reject the categorical elements of
current fundamental rights doctrine and engage in a more forthright
evaluation of the relevant considerations underlying constitutional
protection for both kinds of rights. This explicit jurisprudence of
constitutional rights also facilitates the development of constitutionally
derived solutions to the baseline problem.
1. The Case for Economic Rights
As suggested earlier, the same fundamental rights and political-
process analysis used to justify other individual fights applies to
economic rights. 67 Thus, there is good reason to provide constitu-
tional protection for economic rights.368
First, economic rights are fundamental in terms of the importance
attached to them by the framers, -their role in the traditions and
collective conscience that underly our conceptions of ordered liberty,
and their contribution to individual and societal well-being.369 The
framers' concern for the protection of economic interests is clear from
the text and history of the Constitution. Thus, even if neither the
language of the Contract and Takings Clauses nor the framers'
expectations justifies the broad role sometimes ascribed to the clauses
by economic rights advocates, those provisions (and others) reflect the
importance attached to economic interests by the framers.37 Just
as the nontextual right of individual privacy might be seen as
underlying various specific constitutional safeguards,371 so too a
367. See supra part II.A.
368. This conclusion is activist, but that should not foreclose a more realistic and
coherent approach to economic rights. See infra part IV.C.2.
369. While the Court's fundamental rights analysis remains somewhat vague, in general
terms it requires analysis of these three factors.
370. See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
371. Although the notion of constitutional "penumbras," taken literally, may be an
unconvincing justification for nontextual constitutional rights, it captures figuratively a
more compelling justification. To the extent that the Constitution reflects the framers'
belief in a fundamental principle, it is appropriate for the Court to apply that principle in
the context of modem society. While strict originalists would criticize this conclusion as
inconsistent with a properly limited judicial role, even advocates of originalism recognize
that the Court must occasionally go beyond text and specific historical expectations in
construing the Constitution. Judge Bork has defended Brown v. Board of Education
despite the absence of clear historical evidence that the framers of the Equal Protection
Clause intended to prevent segregated schools, see BORK, supra note 88, at 81-83, and
Justice Scalia could not justify the Lucas rule in originalist terms, see supra note 349 and
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nontextual right to be free of arbitrary governmental interference with
economic interests might be said to underlie the specific safeguards
incorporated into the Constitution.3'
There is also a longstanding tradition of legal protection for
economic arrangements that is clearly part of our conception of
ordered liberty. The common-law tradition of protection for
individual economic interests is indicative of their fundamental role
in the social order.373 In this respect, the complete abandonment of
economic rights in the post-New Deal period is the exception in terms
of constitutional history.374 Indeed, despite the extensive regulation
of economic activity, security in economic matters continues to play
a prominent role in the legal system.3 75
Finally, economic interests are also fundamental in terms of their
importance to individual and societal well-being.3 76  Satisfaction of
basic economic needs is a prerequisite to the exercise of other rights,
a factor that has sometimes been advanced to explain why certain
rights, such as voting or speech, are fundamental.3 The fun-
accompanying text.
372. In using this phrase, I have purposefully avoided any reference to particular
economic interests, such as property and contract rights, because economic rights
protection should not be so limited. See infra part IV.A.2. Once the analysis moves
beyond strict originalism, the appropriate inquiry is into the general principle embraced
by the framers rather than their specific understanding of the scope of that principle.
373. This does not mean, however, that the common law should be solely determinative
of what economic rights are recognized. See infra part IV.A.2.
374. Even before the Lochner era, the Court protected economic interests, relying
primarily on the Contract Clause and dormant Commerce Clause analysis. See generally
CURRIE, supra note 119, at 127-59, 203-36, 330-41, 403-15 (discussing relevant decisions).
375. Recognition and enforcement of property and contract rights are the underlying
premises of the common law in every state and are important issues in the legislative and
administrative process. The evolution of legal entitlements in the procedural due process
context also reflects the legal recognition accorded to nontraditional economic interests
under federal and state legal systems despite the absence of any constitutional obligation
to provide the entitlement in the first instance.
376. Advocates of judicial restraint are, of course, particularly critical of the notion that
an interest's importance to individual or societal well-being is relevant to the existence of
a constitutional right, because that analysis incorporates judicial values into constitutional
doctrine. But it is neither possible nor desirable for judges to separate completely their
deeply felt values from constitutional analysis. In my view, it is better for judges to
advance openly their values to defend their reading of the Constitution, rather than to
mask the role of values behind a formalistic analysis that purports to avoid judicial
discretion. See infra text following note 477.
377. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957,
1014-15 (1982). Most brutally, one who dies of starvation, disease, or exposure cannot
vote, speak freely, or exercise religious beliefs. More generally, economic security is the
foundation upon which individuals make basic choices concerning their personal
development and upon which families build for the future.
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damental nature of economic rights is also reflected in the widespread
recognition that protection of economic interests must play a central
role in the constitutional culture of the newly emerging democracies
of the east bloc.
Second, political-process reasoning supports protection of
economic rights. While the relaxation of the Lochner era's opposition
to economic regulation paved the way for many important and
desirable programs,378 the assumption that the political process
always affords adequate protection to economic interests has proven
to be unfounded. One need not completely deny the influence of
public interests in shaping social policy to recognize the corrupting
effect of special interests on the political process in the United States.
Judicial invalidation of special interest legislation is neither counter-
majoritarian nor contrary to the spirit of the Constitution.379
Indeed, given the widespread loss of faith in the integrity of public
officials reflected in such developments as the term-limit movement
or the potential emergence of a quasi-populist third party, meaningful
judicial review of government action would tend to reinforce
democratic institutions. If the Lochner era demonstrated the need for
flexibility in the area of economic regulation, the end of the twentieth
century has demonstrated that unbridled government discretion
respecting economic matters is equally inappropriate.
Consider, for example, Central States, S.E. and S.W. Areas
Pension Fund v. Lady Baltimore Foods,3" in which the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a provision exempting one and only
one employer, Lady Baltimore Foods, from liability under ERISA for
withdrawal from a multiemployer pension plan.38' The provision
was apparently the work of Senator Robert Dole, the powerful
378. Even most supporters of economic rights stop short of advocating a return to the
Lochner era. See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
379. Indeed, according to James Madison, the problem of faction is a principal
justification for separation of powers, of which judicial review is one component. See THE
FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 51 (James Madison). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups
in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29 (1985) (discussing implications of
Madisonian republicanism).
380. 960 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir.) (Posner, J.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 179 (1992).
381. 29 U.S.C. § 1461(h) (1988 & Supp. 1992). As is often the case with this sort of
individualized exemption (which is common in the tax context), the provision did not
mention Lady Baltimore by name. Instead, the exemption applied when withdrawal was
the result of a collective bargaining agreement and occurred before January 12, 1982.
Ironically, this language did not actually apply to any employer because Lady Baltimore
had withdrawn on January 12, not before. Undaunted, the court read the language
"before January 12, 1982" to include withdrawals occurring on that date. Lady Baltimore
Foods, 960 F.2d at 1342.
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Kansas Senator, providing "constituent service" to Lady Baltimore,
a Kansas corporation. Neither Senator Dole nor anyone else
advanced a public purpose at the time of the provision's adoption,
which suggests that the measure was a "naked preference" (to use
Professor Sunstein's term3 2). The court nonetheless applied the
most deferential version of the rational basis test,38  offered a
plausible public purpose for the exemption (that imposing liability on
Lady Baltimore under the circumstances would have been unfair), and
concluded that this justification was sufficient.3" This reasoning,
which is almost certainly a correct application of current law, il-
lustrates the need for more realistic scrutiny of economic regulation.
Economic interests should not be elevated to the status of
fundamental rights so as to engage strict scrutiny, however. Once
unleashed in the economic rights context, strict scrutiny (like other
categorical approaches) would be nearly impossible to control."5
More fundamentally, the strict scrutiny approach is an unnecessary
and undesirable artifact of the rights dichotomy. Under an integrated
jurisprudence of constitutional rights, a more nuanced analysis of all
constitutionally protected interests can be derived from the underlying
rationales for judicial intervention. This analysis should focus on two
factors: (1) the extent to which government action burdens funda-
382. See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 CoLUM. L. REv.
1689, 1689 (1984).
383. Judge Posner concluded that neither the individualized character of the legislation
nor the apparent political explanation for it altered the basic standard of review. Lady
Baltimore Foods, 960 F.2d at 1342-43.
384. Id. at 1343-44.
385. Traditionally, the outcome of a case depended on the category in which the Court
placed regulatory measures. If the rational basis test applied, a regulation would be
upheld, while strict scrutiny was the equivalent of per se invalidity. This all-or-nothing
approach placed tremendous pressure on the categorization process, which is far too crude
to capture the difficult range of issues presented in constitutional cases. Thus, the
categories have eroded and levels of scrutiny have proliferated. What began as two
levels-rational basis and strict scrutiny-soon expanded to include an "intermediate" level
of scrutiny in gender cases. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976) (holding that
gender classifications must serve important governmental objectives and be substantially
related to their achievement). More recently, a number of cases seem to employ a more
aggressive form of the rational basis test, commonly known as "rational basis with bite."
See supra note 39 and accompanying text. In the affirmative action context, the Court
appears to have moderated the otherwise fatal strict scrutiny test. See Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,480-89 (1990) (plurality opinion) (finding it unnecessary to decide
level of scrutiny for affirmative action because minority set-aside requirement for federal
contracts survives strict scrutiny); see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 509-11 (1989) (suggesting circumstances under which affirmative action will survive
strict scrutiny).
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mental economic or other constitutionally protected interests; and (2)
the extent to which particular actions are the result of political-process
failures. Before turning to a more detailed exposition of these
principles, however, I will consider the baseline problem that has
plagued the Court since the post-Lochner-era rejection of common-
law baselines.
2. Resolving the Baseline Problem
As described above, the rhetoric of judicial restraint forced the Court
to "externalize" baselines, which failed because none of the current
approaches is workable in all contexts."6 More fundamentally, it
makes no sense to say that the Constitution protects a right, but that
the creation and definition of that right should come from some other
source.3" On the contrary, it seems self-evident that the meaning
of a constitutional right should be determined by reference to the
Constitution. A better approach to the baseline problem is to
recognize that it is an interpretive question; i.e., the identification of
baselines should be part of the judicial function of giving meaning to
a constitutional provision in the context of a particular case.3" The
interpretive approach to the baseline problem addresses both of the
foregoing difficulties. If the baseline is derived from the constitution-
al right at issue, it need not be the same in every constitutional
context, but rather can be given content according to the particular
provision involved. The interpretive approach also directs the
baseline inquiry into appropriate considerations, such as assessing the
impact of government action on the constitutional interests at
issue.8 9
386. Across-the-board application of common-law baselines would entail a return to the
Lochner era; the logic of a fully baselineless analysis potentially both undermines the
notion of economic rights altogether and justifies unlimited judicial intervention on behalf
of affirmative rights; and the expectations alternative is essentially circular. See supra part
I.B. & C.
387. The logical inconsistency revealed by the '"bitter-with-the-sweet" argument
underscores this point. See supra notes 350-56 and accompanying text.
388. This approach is activist insofar as courts assume responsibility for determining the
baseline, but that does not warrant its rejection. See infra part IV.C.2.
389. The analysis in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), for example, disposes of the
constitutional challenge to the denial of Medicaid funding for abortions by assuming that
poverty is a state of nature and that the poor therefore cannot make affirmative claims on
government. See supra note 318 and accompanying text. This assumption not only ignores
the role of government policies in producing the distribution of wealth, but also directs the
inquiry away from the application of constitutional principles. The analysis should focus
on whether the government's denial of funding for abortions is consistent with the due
process right to make decisions on whether to beget or bear children and whether it
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In considering the constitutional baseline for particular interests,
the Court should not attach dispositive significance to conceptual
distinctions between "negative" and "affirmative" rights. This dis-
tinction employs common law or expectations baselines that reinforce
the status quo as if it were an inherently just state of nature.39
Given the acknowledged social injustices that have contributed to the
status quo and the government's role in reinforcing them, this view is
both unrealistic and pernicious.391 Attaching constitutional sig-
nificance to the status quo protects the advantages of those with
wealth and power in our society, even if that wealth is the product of
social injustice.
Indeed, the Court's effort to develop the Contract and Takings
Clauses as originalist escapes has distinctly class-based implica-
tions.3  Whether using a common law or expectations baseline,
these clauses elevate traditional property and contract rights to
preferred status, and thereby reinforce the existing distribution of
wealth.3"s Enhancing the constitutional status of property rights
protects the accumulation of wealth and enhancing the status of
contractual obligations protects the superior bargaining power that
wealth brings,.9" while allowing the Court simultaneously to down-
discriminates in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Different people might come
to different conclusions on these issues, but the debate would at least address the right
questions.
390. In this sense, both the common-law and expectations-based approaches to the
baseline problem are similar. Both treat the state of affairs prior to government action as
presumptively valid and require changes to be justified.
391. For further discussion of this issue in connection with the problem of redistributive
purposes, see infra part IV.C.2.
392. This effect is so pronounced that the case law may reflect the conscious or
unconscious pursuit of doctrinal positions that furthered the interests of conservative
justices' political constituencies. In other words, despite the supposed insulation of the
Court from political pressures, its behavior can be explained in public choice terms. The
preference for a particular set of rights, whether the "liberal" panoply of individual rights
or the "conservative" emphasis on property and contract rights, is little different from the
adoption of regulatory policies that favor some interests over others. But see POSNER,
supra note 72, at 534 (arguing that the utility from the pursuit of ideological positions that
further a judge's personal interests is so remote and diffuse as to be easily outweighed by
other factors).
393. Of course, this theory assumes a static distribution of wealth, and proponents of
traditional economic rights will be quick to point out that individuals move between
socioeconomic levels. While I do not mean to suggest that government intervention is the
only means through which the distribution of wealth in our society is altered, few would
deny that it is easier for those with wealth to retain that wealth than for those born into
poverty to acquire it.
394. Taken to a logical conclusion, protection of traditional property and contract rights
produces the Lochnerian result that redistributive purposes are constitutionally invalid.
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grade the limited protection accorded affirmative rights under the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. 95 This logic even
produces class-based differences in the ability to exercise
noneconomic rights, insofar as many rights are of no use without the
economic means to exercise them.3 6
This is not meant to suggest that the status quo is irrelevant or
that the Court should be oblivious to the consequences of imposing
affirmative duties on government. These considerations are relevant
to the process of giving meaning to constitutional provisions in the
context of a particular case. Thus, the Court might legitimately
consider reliance interests in assessing the impact of government
decisions on individuals, or recognize the consequences of imposing
an affirmative duty on government in assessing the scope of constitu-
tional protection afforded particular interests. But the Court should
not follow its current pattern of dismissing constitutional claims on the
bare assertion that they seek recognition of affirmative rights.3"
B. The Contours of an Economic Rights Jurisprudence
Although I shall not attempt to describe an appropriate economic
rights jurisprudence in detail, its general contours follow logically
from the foregoing analysis. Economic rights safeguards should rest
on an explicit consideration of the justifications for judicial interven-
tion as applied to the circumstances of a given case in the context of
the constitutional provision at issue. This approach has significant
implications for all of the substantive doctrines discussed in this
article.398 First, the Court's substantive due process analysis should
incorporate a "proportionality principle" requiring governmental
decisions to be sustained by public purposes proportional to their
adverse impact on constitutionally protected interests. Second, equal
protection analysis of nonsuspect classifications should employ a form
For further discussion of this issue, see infra part IV.C.1.
395. See supra notes 297-98 and accompanying text.
396. See supra notes 312-18 and accompanying text (discussing the use of common-law
baselines to deny individual rights claims); Sullivan, supra note 252, at 1497-99. The same
argument is also powerful in the context of speech, where it can be said (only partially in
jest) that the right of "free" speech is expensive to exercise.
397. In this respect, I believe cases like Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 112 S. Ct.
'1061 (1991), Kadrmas v. Dickerson, 487 U.S. 450 (1988), DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty.
Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989), and Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) are
based on faulty reasoning and were probably wrongly decided.
398. Although my analysis also has significant implications for structural constraints,
whidh are part of the broader pattern, these doctrines involve additional considerations
that tequire separate treatment and I will not address them here.
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of rational-basis-with-bite review that is designed to protect against
political-process failures. Third, the Contract and Takings Clauses
should be limited in light of their historical purposes; only measures
directed toward relieving contractual obligations should violate the
Contract Clause, and the concept of regulatory takings should be
abandoned altogether.
1. Proportionality as a Requirement of Due Process
To the extent that scrutiny of regulation rests on the notion that
economic rights are fundamental in a constitutional sense, the analysis
of those rights is appropriately grounded in due process.'" These
considerations are best expressed through a unified proportionality
principle that applies to both economic and other individual rights
interests. This principle might be expressed as follows: "Due process
requires that government decisions be sustained by legitimate public
purposes of sufficient weight to justify their impact on constitutionally
protected interests."4" Such an approach requires the Court to
assess the impact of government decisions in constitutional terms and
then to scrutinize the public purposes offered in support of those
decisions. The precise outcomes that this analysis would or should
produce must await judicial development, but its essential features
and certain basic points are reasonably clear.4"1
399. The use of fundamental rights analysis in the equal protection context is another
distortion produced by the dichotomous treatment of rights and should be replaced by a
straightforward due process analysis. To avoid association with Lochner, the liberal
Court's early individual rights decisions often relied on the Equal Protection Clause. E.g.,
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). For further discussion of this approach, see
GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 819-20 (12th ed. 1991). Equal protection
theory can be stretched to encompass concern for fundamental rights, but they are much
more logically analyzed under the Due Process Clause.
400. The idea of a constitutional proportionality requirement is not novel; it is implicit
in the multitiered analysis currently employed by the Court. Cf. San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that a
"principled reading" of equal protection cases reveals a "spectrum of standards ...
depending [on] ... the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely
affected and the recognized invidiousness of... [the] classification" involved). A similar
principle is a common feature of other countries' constitutional jurisprudence. See, Lk.,
David P. Currie, Lochner Abroad: Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection in the
Federal Republic of Germany, 1989 SUP. Cr. REv. 333, 343 (discussing proportionality
principle in German constitutional law).
401. The proportionality principle, even with the additional elaboration offered in this
section, leaves considerable room for judicial discretion, and may be criticized as overly
optimistic about the desire or capacity of judges to refrain from indulging their personal
ideological preferences. Judicial discretion, however, is neither entirely avoidable nor
entirely undesirable. See infra notes 472-73 and accompanying text.
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The "impact" side of the proportionality principle requires an
assessment of the constitutional importance of a particular interest
and the effect of a government decision on that interest. The
importance of an interest should be determined in light of the factors
currently used to determine whether rights are fundamental, including
constitutional text and history, whether an interest enjoys a tradition
of legal protection or is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and
whether it is foundational in a personal, social, or political sense.
Under this analysis, traditional property and contract rights would
clearly receive some measure of protection, but other economic
interests, such as government benefits and public employment, would
be protected as well.'
The question of how to measure the impact of government action
engages the baseline problem. As described above, the baseline
against which to measure the impact of government action should be
derived from the same considerations that drive the assessment of
constitutional importance attributed to particular interests. 3 The
greater the constitutional importance attached to a particular interest,
the greater constitutional protection it should receive, and conse-
quently the "higher" the constitutional baseline. In some instances,
this baseline may include an affirmative duty to make the exercise of
a particular right possible.'
Because the significance of economic rights lies in their contribu-
tion to individual well-being, moreover, it would be inappropriate to
measure the impact of government decisions on economic interests
strictly in terms of monetary value. 5 A sizeable financial impact
402. This conclusion is supported by the framers' broad concern for economic interests,
the large body of precedent recognizing "new property," and the importance of these
interests to the individuals affected.
403. See supra part IV.A.2.
404. Thus, for example, although the framers may not have emphasized education as
a constitutional right, it is of great importance in light of both a longstanding social and
legal tradition of recognition and its foundational character as a prerequisite to effective
exercise of other individual rights and freedoms. Given the importance of education and
the impact of denying access to education, Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450
(1988), arguably was decided wrongly. On the other hand, because affirmative duties
impose significant costs on government, the other side of the balance may weigh against
the recognition of affirmative duties, even in Kadrmas. At the very least, by rejecting the
claim on the assumption that due process never imposes affirmative duties, the Court
faijed to come to grips with the essential issues raised by the denial of free transportation
,to -rural students who cannot afford to pay for bus service. Cf. supra note 389 (advancing
similar argument respecting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980)).
405. While this point is obvious in terms of individual rights whose value cannot be
quantified in monetary terms, it might be incorrectly assumed that the constitutional and
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on large corporations should not necessarily engage greater scrutiny
than a lesser aggregate impact on an individual whose personal
circumstances are dramatically affected.6 This point not only
reflects the basic premise that economic rights are individual rights,
but also makes some economic sense insofar as it reflects the
decreasing marginal utility of money.'
On the other side of the proportionality principle, the Court must
assess the public purposes supporting government decisions and the
fit between those purposes and the action taken. Scrutiny of purpose
ensures that the public benefits sought by government action are
sufficiently weighty to counterbalance the adverse impact on
constitutionally protected interests, and scrutiny of fit is a means of
quantifying the actual benefit achieved that could not be achieved
through alternative and less burdensome means.4"s Because the
level of scrutiny should vary depending upon the impact of govern-
ment decisions on constitutional interests, the Court should avoid
developing categories of scrutiny to which particular levels of
rationality review attach.'
market value of economic interests are necessarily the same. Market value may well be
the best or only way to quantify the damages in the event of a constitutional violation, but
constitutional considerations implicit in the proportionality requirement go beyond the
strict monetary value of a particular economic interest. For example, government action
that effectively deprives a person of her home engages considerations beyond the market
value of the home.
406. The issue in the case of the corporation would be the impact on shareholders and
employees of the corporation.
407. Judge Posner has argued against this sort of reasoning on the ground that it
assumes individuals have the same utility function for money, when it is equally plausible
that individuals who accumulate wealth do so because they value money more highly. See
POSNER, supra note 72, at 458-61. Whatever the force of this argument in connection with
the relative utility of having additional wealth to purchase nonessential goods and services,
at the extreme ends of the spectrum it is reasonable to assume that the marginal utility of
money is greater for those in poverty than for the wealthy.
408. This rationale intentionally avoids the notion that scrutiny of fit is a means of
determining whether legitimate purposes offered in support of a measure are pretextnal,,
because the due process proportionality principle is designed to balance the individual and
government interests rather than detect flaws in the political process. Pretext and actual
purposes are political-process questions that should be addressed under the equal
protection analysis advanced in part IV.B.2.
409. Depending on the importance of the individual rights interest at stake, there will,
of course, be a natural tendency to express the proportionality principle by using adjectives
such as "important" or "compelling" to describe the government interest and "substantial
relationship" or "narrowly tailored" to describe the fit between the purpose and the means
chosen. So long as such descriptive approaches do not harden into discrete levels-of
scrutiny, the desired flexibility of analysis will be retained. The key point is that the
analysis should remain focused on the importance of the interests at stake rather than.
shifting to categorization in ways that obscure the articulation of the underlying values that
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A requirement that government decisions be sustained by public
purposes proportional to their adverse effect on constitutionally
protected interests is a reasonable construction of due process. 410
The notion of "substantive due process" may be an oxymoron difficult
to reconcile with the text of the Constitution, but substantive review
under the Due Process Clause has been present in one form or
another for at least a century.411 Moreover, while the proportionali-
ty principle replaces the existing multi-tiered doctrine with a more
flexible analysis, current doctrine actually incorporates a crude
proportionality principle by raising the level of scrutiny for govern-
ment decisions affecting fundamental rights.412
2. Equal Protection and "Rational-Basis-with-Bite"
Just as concern for the importance of a particular interest is best
expressed through due process analysis, political-process concerns are
best expressed under the Equal Protection Clause. Absent a suspect
classification, the Court should address these concerns by modifying
the rational basis test to require that the government identify a public
purpose actually furthered by its decisions, regardless of the substan-
tive interest at issue. 3 Because equal protection addresses relative
treatment rather than protection of substantive interests per se, this
test should be applied without reference to a constitutional or external
baseline.
The equal protection premise that government may not single out
disfavored groups for adverse treatment is reinforced by political-
process theory, so it makes sense to scrutinize government decisions
support the decision.
410. This is not to say that the principle is justified on strictly originalist grounds. But
originalism is not, and should not be, the sole touchstone of constitutional interpretation.
See infra notes 472-78 and accompanying text.
411. Even the deferential rational basis test assumes that the Due Process Clause
affords substantive as well as procedural protection.
412. See supra note 400. Unlike the "rough proportionality" requirement for un-
constitutional condition takings cases articulated in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct.
2309, 2320-21 (1994), however, I would not place the burden of proving proportionality on
the government.
413. That some substantive interests may be regarded as more important than others
is generally irrelevant to the level of equal protection scrutiny, although it may be of some
relevance to the fit inquiry. See infra note 427. Thus, fundamental rights equal protection
analysis should be folded into the due process proportionality requirement. On the other
hand, the suspect classification analysis currently employed makes some sense in political-
process terms, although a less categorical approach to suspect classifications might be
desirable (especially with respect to disparate impact analysis). A thorough treatment of
suspect classification doctrine is beyond the scope of this Article.
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for political-process failure under the Equal Protection Clause. Thus,
equal protection scrutiny is generally understood in political-process
terms as an evidentiary inquiry designed to distinguish government
action in the public interest from government action that serves the
particular interests of its immediate beneficiaries at the expense of
those who are politically powerless. 414 The purpose strand of the
inquiry requires the government to identify the public interest to be
achieved, and the fit inquiry determines whether this ostensibly public
purpose is merely pretextual. Under current doctrine, however, the
rational basis test ordinarily is so deferential as to be meaningless. 415
The insights 6f public choice theory and the realities of modern
politics suggest that this abdication of judicial review is wrong because
even measures that do not allocate burdens and benefits according to
suspect classifications may be the product of political-process
failure.416 Thus, it is appropriate to subject them to meaningful
rationality review informed by the insights of political-process theory.
The first requirement of a meaningful rational basis test is that
government action should be reviewed in light of its actual purpos-
es.417 The current acceptance of any conceivable purpose, whether
or not it actually motivated the legislature,418 is inadequate to ensure
that government decisions further some public purpose. It is
generally not too difficult to devise the kind of post-hoe rationaliza-
tion invited by this rule, even for obvious special interest legisla-
414. This view obviously assumes that there is such a thing as the public interest, as
opposed to the mere accumulation of private interests. Even recognizing the difficulties
implicit in the concept, it is a cornerstone of our political system and an essential premise
of constitutional analysis that government should act in the public interest. While a
comprehensive theory of what government purposes are permissible is probably impossible
to develop despite the best efforts of many scholars who have addressed the issue, from
a more pragmatic perspective it is possible to construct a workable conception of
permissible government ends. See infra notes 457-68 and accompanying text.
415. This assumes that recent cases employing a form of rational basis with bite are
aberrational.
416. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text. I have omitted reference to
fundamental rights because fundamental rights scrutiny is inappropriate in the equal
protection context. Although the jurisprudence advanced in this Article does not explicitly
address the suspect classification strand of equal protection doctrine, it suggests a less
categorical approach to those issues. See supra note 413.
417. This actual purpose review is part of the modified rational basis test advanced by
Gerald Gunther. See GUNTHER, supra note 399, at 620-22.
418. Although Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster County, 488 U.S. 336 (1989)
seemed to cast doubt on this component of the equal protection rational basis test, it was
reconfirmed in FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2098 (1993). See
supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
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tion.419 Actual purpose review would require the government,
including the legislature, to articulate its purposes at the time it
acts.42 In addition, courts should consider evidence that the
legislature was in fact motivated by purposes other than those ar-
ticulated,42'1 as well as other circumstances that suggest a process
failure. 22
A political-process approach to rationality review also clarifies
the function of the fit inquiry as a means of determining whether
proffered public purposes are pretextual.4' When a measure is
substantially overinclusive or underinclusive in terms of a given
purpose, it suggests that some other purpose is truly at work.
Likewise, if the stated purpose can easily be accomplished through
some other means that involve less extreme differences in treatment,
419. See, e.g., supra note 383 and accompanying text (discussing Lady Baltimore Foods).
420. This requirement imposes a burden on state legislatures that, in contrast to
Congress, often produce no explicit statement of purpose, either in a statutory preamble
or committee reports. But this burden is no objection to actual purpose review. If the
purpose of legislation is not clear to the legislature or is not a "public" one, then the
legislation should not be adopted. Thus, judicial scrutiny that requires the articulation of
reasons furthers the rationality of policymaking without substituting judicial policy choices
for those of the political branches. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 160, at 436-38. Such
a judicial role is consistent with political-process reasoning and reinforces the framers'
expectation that the legislative process would be deliberative. Requiring state legislatures
to articulate statutory purposes might also provide incidental advantages, such as
facilitating the interpretation of statutes.
421. If the plaintiff can establish that the legislature attempted to mask its real
motivation in light of some ostensible public purpose, that is almost a sure sign of process
failure. This inquiry presents some difficult evidentiary and conceptual issues, such as the
treatment of legislation reflecting mixed motives, some of which are illegitimate, but these
problems do not justify total disregard of evidence that legislation was adopted for
improper reasons. Under current law, the Court has at times refused to consider "real"
motives. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968) (refusing to consider
whether criminal penalties for destruction of draft cards were motivated by opposition to
the message expressed). This refusal is inconsistent with disparate impact analysis, which
explicitly requires litigants to demonstrate that invidious discrimination, rather than
articulated public purposes, has motivated particular government acts. See supra note 285.
Such inconsistencies are resolved by clarifying the evidentiary function of rationality
review.
422. Thus, while Judge Posner's refusal to treat such evidence as relevant in Lady
Baltimore Foods, see supra note 384 and accompanying text, was correct as a matter of
current law, it would be incorrect under the modified rationality review advanced in this
Article.
423. For this reason, the Court's disparate impact analysis has always seemed to me
deeply flawed. If the key issue in disparate impact cases is whether facially neutral
measures are actually prompted by improper motivations, then it seems both illogical and
unfair to require proof of bad motive in order to engage meaningful scrutiny of fit. The
fit inquiry would seem redundant after bad motive is proved, and preventing consideration
of fit at the proof-of-motive stage denies claimants a powerful evidentiary tool.
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the failure to pursue alternatives suggests that the legislature has
ignored the interests of those adversely affected (or even singled them
out to bear the burdens of government action). This perspective
suggests modifications of the current rational-basis-fit inquiry in the
equal protection context. First, contrary to current law, substantial
over- and underinclusiveness or obvious less discriminatory alterna-
tives should not be ignored; they support an inference that stated
purposes are pretextual. Second, the Court should also consider
whether the government policy will in fact further its stated pur-
pose.424 This is not to say that a perfect or nearly perfect fit is
necessary, but rather that the greater the problems of fit, the stronger
the inference that ostensible public purposes are pretextual.
The evidentiary conception of rationality review also has
important implications for the relationship between the purpose and
fit strands of the inquiry. Since both parts of the inquiry go to the
evidentiary question of whether government action is the product of
a good-faith pursuit of the public interest, they should be considered
together. The inference created by a bad fit may be bolstered by
more direct evidence of bad motive or process failure presented at the
purpose stage of the inquiry. Thus, in the absence of direct evidence
of bad motive or process failure, all but the most extreme fit problems
should be tolerated, but when there is evidence of bad motive or
process failure, lesser problems of fit might tip the balance.
Finally, equal protection scrutiny should not be premised on any
particular baseline, constitutional or otherwise. The essence of equal
protection is an assessment of the relative treatment of some
individuals in comparison to others, rather than the identification of
particular substantive interests that warrant constitutional protec-
tion.4" Even if the difference between imposing a burden and
denying a benefit were coherent in other contexts, it is entirely
424. While the Court should not require the government to prove that its action (or
inaction) will accomplish its purposes, a litigant's evidence that government purposes are
not being furthered ought to be relevant to the fit inquiry. For discussion of the proof of
legislative facts at trial, see John Frazier Jackson, The Brandeis Brief-Too Little Too Late:
The Trial Court as a Superior Forum for Presenting Legislative Facts, 17 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 1 (1993).
425. One can of course easily conceive of equal treatment as a substantive interest, but
this would not alter the analysis. The "baseline" under this approach would be equal
treatment, and it would remain unnecessary and inappropriate to analyze the treatment
of individuals with respect to any conception of baseline rights to particular economic
interests.
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inappropriate for equal protection analysis.426 No constitutional or
external referent is necessary to measure differences in treatment. 27
Moreover, because the remedy for equal protection violations-equal
treatment-leaves the government enormous discretion to set the
level of total resources expended in furtherance of a particular policy,
a baselineless equal protection analysis does not raise the specter of
judge-made affirmative duties bankrupting government or distorting
the allocation of limited resources.428
3. A Limited Role for the Contract and Takings Clauses
The Contract and Takings Clauses should play a limited role in a
jurisprudence of economic rights. Broad application of these clauses
has proven to be unworkable and would be unnecessary if due process
and equal protection doctrines were modified as described above.429
Each provision should nonetheless retain a meaning consistent with
its text and history. The Contract Clause should prevent state laws
whose purpose is to abrogate the obligations of a party or parties to
a contract. The Takings Clause should require compensation for ap-
426. This further demonstrates the analytical flaws in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980). See supra notes 342-45 and accompanying text. Whether the denial of Medicare
benefits imposed an obstacle or merely refused to remove one is irrelevant for equal
protection purposes. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 315. The government treated women
differently depending upon how they exercised their constitutionally protected right to
choose between an abortion and carrying a child to term. See id. at 302. This disparity
in treatment is indistinguishable from Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), in which
the state denied welfare benefits to those who exercised their constitutionally protected
right to travel. The key question in Harris, as in Shapiro, was whether it is permissible for
government to discourage individuals from exercising a constitutionally protected choice
in a particular manner. Compare Michael J. Perry, Why the Supreme Court Was Plainly
Wrong in the Hyde Amendment Case: A Brief Comment on Harris v. McRae, 32 STAN.
L REV. 1113, 1115-17 (1980) (arguing that Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), precluded
government action premised on moral objections to abortion) with Peter Weston,
Regarding Perry, Why the Supreme Court Was Plainly Wrong in the Hyde Amendment
Case: A Brief Comment on Harris v. McRae, in Correspondence, 33 STAN. L. REV. 1187,
1187-89 (1981) (rejecting this interpretation of Roe in defense of Harris result).
427. It does not follow, however, that the importance of the interests at stake or the
degree of disparity are irrelevant to equal protection rationality review. Particularly stark
disparities respecting important interests may raise the inference of process failure because
one would otherwise expect strong political opposition (at least in the absence of an
equivalent benefit). This idea is closely related to the inquiry into less discriminatory
alternatives.
428. Since there is no minimum substantive requirement under equal protection, the
government might remedy unequal treatment by "raising" the treatment of the relatively
disadvantaged, "lowering" the treatment of the relatively advantaged, or both.
429. See supra parts IV.B.1-2. The text and history of these provisions, however,
remain relevant to evaluating property and contract interests for purposes of due process
analysis.
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propriation of property or physical invasion, but the entire regulatory
takings doctrine should be abandoned.
a. The Contract Clause
The current approach to the Contract Clause should be replaced
by one more consistent with its text and history. The language of the
clause, which bars any "impairment" of contractual obligations, is
flatly inconsistent with the idea that some contractual impairments can
be sustained because of a valid state purpose, even one that survives
heightened scrutiny.430 On the other hand, if every government
measure that renders a contractual provision unenforceable
constituted an "impairment" that is per se invalid, the clause would
sweep too broadly.431 This seemingly insurmountable dilemma can
be avoided by developing an appropriate definition of "impairment"
in light of the purposes of the Contract Clause.
In general terms, this approach would bar state "debtor-relief"
laws and perhaps other measures whose immediate purpose and effect
is to abrogate existing contracts. It is well understood that the
original purpose of the Contract Clause was to prevent states from
adopting debtor-relief laws, whose proliferation after the Revolution-
ary War had been a major source of friction and injustice under the
Articles of Confederation.432 Although the problem was described
by the framers as an individual rights issue, there is also a federalism
component that suggests a limited application of the clause.433 The
individual rights conception of the Contract Clause is hard to square
with the absence of a similar provision constraining federal power,43
430. See supra note 169.
431. See Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473 (1905); supra notes 170-72 and accompany-
ing text.
432. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
433. Compare the Commerce Clause, which implicitly limits state regulation of
interstate commerce not because the framers opposed commercial regulation per se, but
because states had adopted discriminatory and conflicting measures. On the other hand,
there is no prohibition of state regulation of interstate commerce that corresponds to the
Contract Clause, which may import a different principle underlying the two provisions,
See generally CHARLES L. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 67-98 (1969) (arguing for an increased reliance on structural rather than textual
reasoning in constitutional adjudication).
434. In U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, the Contract Clause appears (after a semicolon)
together with prohibitions against bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and grants of titles
of nobility. While equivalent prohibitions on federal action can be found for bills of
attainder and ex post facto laws in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, and for titles of nobility,
in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8, an analogous prohibition on federal laws impairing
obligations of contracts is conspicuously absent. To the contrary, the Constitution
expressly grants the federal government power to make uniform bankruptcy laws. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. This structure suggests that the framers did not inherently object
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which is particularly striking considering the framers' general lack of
concern for protecting rights against state, as opposed to federal,
interference.43 5
All this is not to say that the Contract Clause has no individual
rights component, but rather that the framers' concern for particular
abuses caused by interstate rivalries and tensions does not easily
translate into a broader doctrine of absolute protection of contractual
obligations.436 Indeed, given the need to mollify antifederalists by
avoiding excessive interference with state sovereignty, it is highly un-
likely that the framers meant to prevent completely any state laws
that happened to abrogate some contractual provisions. Such a result
would paralyze state government and would surely have been the
source of strong opposition.
Thus, "impairment" as used in the Contract Clause prohibits only
debtor-relief laws, or perhaps more broadly, laws whose purpose is to
relieve some parties of their contractual obligations.437 No broader
role for the Contract Clause is required by its history; nor is it
to debtor-relief laws (the federal bankruptcy power is not constrained by any express
requirement that laws be prospective only), but rather were particularly concerned that
state laws would be discriminatory or excessive. Against this view it can be argued that
the Contract Clause is located among the individual rights-based limits on state power in
Article I, § 10, rather than among its federalism-based limits. See Clarke, supra note 15,
at 188 (stating that placement of the Contract Clause in Article 1, § 10 supports both a
narrow reading of the clause as applied to debtor-relief laws and a broad reading of the
clause as applied to retroactive alteration of the legal consequences of one's acts).
435. The federalism perspective on the Contract Clause makes sense in political-process
terms as well. State debtor-relief laws were often intended to benefit a state's citizens
rather than to allocate the risks of insolvency among contracting parties or to further some
other broad public purpose. This bias was the product of political-process failure because
nonresidents were not represented in the state. Placing the bankruptcy power at the
federal level corrected this defect. This kind of reasoning also underlies dormant
Commerce Clause analysis. See authorities cited supra note 132; see also McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 425-37 (1819) (using similar reasoning to conclude that
states do not have the power to tax federal institutions).
436. On the other hand, the framers' concern for the impact of these abuses on
individuals and commercial activity does reflect the high value they placed on contractual
interests, which is relevant to the treatment of such interests in the due process context.
See supra notes 370-73 and accompanying text.
437. Under this view, Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934),
probably was decided incorrectly, because the Court upheld a state debtor-relief law. See
id. at 409-15. Conversely, Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978), is
arguably wrong because the pension funding obligation was not a debtor-relief law. See
id. at.252-55. On the other hand, the measure was intended to relieve the employees'
contractual obligation to work for a specified number of years to gain vested benefits,
which might justify invalidation under the Contract Clause. Overall, however, Spannaus
is better handled under the due process and equal protection analysis advanced in this
Article.
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necessary to protect economic interests if due process and equal
protection analysis is developed along the lines described above.4 31
On the other hand, this definition of impairment preserves the central
meaning of the clause and affords it an appropriate role in the overall
jurisprudence of economic rights.
Recent decisions are on the right track in distinguishing between
measures whose principal function is to alter contractual obligations
and those that do so only as an incidental effect.439 This approach
clarifies the role of the purpose and fit inquiries in Contract Clause
cases as an evidentiary device that may assist the Court in determin-
ing whether legitimate public purposes offered to support legislation
are merely pretextual.' The development of this test and other
devices for applying the historical understanding of impairment would
improve the application of the Contract Clause.
b. Takings
Takings doctrine also should be restructured to reflect the text
and history of the Takings Clause. In particular, the entire regulatory
takings doctrine should be rejected as unfounded, unworkable, and
unnecessary.44' The concept of a regulatory taking is neither
inherent in the language of the Takings Clause nor supported by the
original understanding of the framers. 2 Since regulatory takings
438. But see Note, Rediscovering, supra note 15, at 1420-23 (arguing against the
"economic nationalism" approach to the clause "because it does not frame principles at
a level of abstraction that rises above historical context").
439. See supra notes 181-85 and accompanying text. Problems in applying this
distinction are produced in part by the incoherent doctrinal background against which it
has been developed. In addition, because the distinction has been incorporated in an
effort to recharacterize prior decisions that did not employ it in the first instance, this
approach has not been well developed or carefully considered. Once the distortion created
by the misguided quest for an originalist escape is removed, however, this view of the
Contract Clause can be developed further.
440. This understanding, in turn, would support the application of a form of rational
basis with bite similar to that advanced for equal protection analysis. See supra part
IV.B.2. The principal difference would be that the evidentiary inquiry is directed toward
uncovering a particular state purpose rendered illegitimate by the Contract Clause.
441. I am not the only observer to suggest this resolution of the doctrinal morass
created by the recent takings decisions. See John D. Echeverria & Sharon Dennis, The
Takings Issue and the Due Process Clause: A Way out of a Doctrinal Confusion, 17 VT.
L. REV. 695, 716-18 (1993) (arguing that the Takings Clause "should be interpreted to
apply only to outright appropriations or physical invasions of property, and to regulatory
activities that are the functional equivalent of appropriations or occupations"). Such a
solution makes no sense, however, unless it is part of a broader restructuring of the
jurisprudence of economic rights.
442. See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text. Just as the text of the Contract
Clause is incompatible with upholding an impairment because it serves a police-pdwer
purpose, the language of the Takings Clause is difficult to reconcile with theo notion that
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law can be abandoned without compromising the text or original
understanding of the clause, the key question is whether it is
necessary or desirable in light of broader principles that animate the
clause.
Although the basis for regulatory takings law has never been
entirely clear, three principal rationales seem to underlie various
expressions of the doctrine.' 4 First, there is the conceptual view
that property is a bundle of rights and that any diminution of that
bundle takes property.4 " Second, the Takings Clause is said to
reflect the unfairness of singling out a few property owners to bear
the costs of government action that benefits society as a whole."'
Finally, regulation that "goes too far" may be seen as analogous to
physical appropriations, at least in terms of its effects on property
owners."6 In a coherent jurisprudence of economic rights, however,
none of these rationales provides a persuasive foundation for current
regulatory takings doctrine.
The "bundle of rights" rationale is flawed for several reasons,
many of which were touched upon earlier in this Article. Most
importantly, it would convert every regulatory measure into a taking,
and cripple the government.447 Such an extravagant reading of the
clause is neither required by text and history4" nor necessary to
the "purposes" of a regulation are relevant to whether it has "taken" something. The
Fifth Amendment's use of both the term "take" and "deprive" also argues against the
conclusion that destruction of uses constitutes a taking. "Take" connotes acquisition of
possession, while "deprive" does not. Thus, regulatory restrictions that destroy certain
sticks in the bundle of rights may be deprivations, but they are not takings.
443. These rationales overlap with, but are not identical to, the rationales for the
purpose inquiry that were discussed supra notes 214-23 and accompanying text. It is
indicative of the incoherence of regulatory takings doctrine that the relationship between
the concept of regulatory takings and the elements of the regulatory takings inquiry is
poorly defined.
444. The most complete articulation of this view, of course, has been undertaken by
Professor Epstein. See EPSTEIN, supra note 47.
445. This conception of the clause was advanced in Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S.
Ct. 1522, 1526 (1992). See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text. A related point is
that the Takings Clause produces more economically rational decisions by forcing
government to internalize the costs of its regulatory programs.
446. This rationale was suggested in Lucas. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 (1992).
447. See supra notes 240-48 and accompanying text. Because only regulations that
merely restate preexisting common-law restrictions would be permitted, this view freezes
the status quo in place, or at least requires compensation for every change in the status
quo that cannot be justified in very narrow terms.
*448. As noted above, the evidence of framers' intent does not support any regulatory
takings doctrine, much less the extreme view implicit in the bundle of rights approach. See
supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
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protect essential economic interests," 9 a goal that is better ac-
complished through the due process analysis advanced above. The
effort to force these concerns into a form of takings analysis has only
served to obscure the essential considerations in balancing individual
economic interests against the legitimate needs of government.45
Likewise, the unfairness of requiring a few to bear the costs of
public benefits for the many is not a sufficient justification for
continuing regulatory takings analysis under an improved economic
rights jurisprudence. This rationale reflects political-process con-
cerns45' that are poorly addressed in modern regulatory takings
doctrine. The equal protection analysis advanced in this Article
would be a preferable means of identifying such cases.452 Because
there is no way to determine objectively whether a given distribution
of costs and benefits is "fair,"453 the crucial question is whether
449. Professor Epstein's contentions notwithstanding, the Lochnerization of takings law
is not politically feasible, nor in my view socially desirable. Professor Epstein's theories
rest on assumptions about individual autonomy and the inherent justice of preserving the
status quo from governmental interference that omit central considerations. See infra
notes 460, 464.
450. Despite the poor textual fit and the ambiguous state of current doctrine, one might
adopt the substantive due process analysis advanced in this article under the Takings
Clause. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2319 (1994) (adopting rough
proportionality requirement for the extraction of easements as a condition on granting
building permits). Justice Holmes's analysis in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393 (1992), for example, is suggestive of a proportionality requirement. See id. at 414;
supra note 209 and accompanying text. But locating the analysis under the Takings Clause
would be a poor second best.
451. That only a few individuals are made to bear the costs may be suggestive of a
process failure, insofar as their small number deprives them of significant clout. In other
words, when a few individuals bear all the costs there is an externality: Government
officials can get the political benefit of addressing public concerns or satisfying special
interests without bearing the political costs of finding the money to do so. See Sax, supra
note 149, at 76 (arguing that the Takings Clause was designed to deal with cases "of
essentially individualized cost-bearing of some public improvement").
452. Indeed, the connection between this rationale and the Equal Protection Clause was
implicitly acknowledged by Justice Scalia in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825 (1987). See id. at 835 n.4 ("If the Nollans were being singled out to bear the burden
of California's attempt to remedy these problems, although they had not contributed to
it more than other coastal landowners, the State's action, even if otherwise valid, might
violate either the incorporated Takings Clause or the Equal Protection Clause.").
453. In some instances, it is not unfair to impose costs on a few. Most obviously, if
some people create harms that are imposed on society as a whole, then it is fair that they,
rather than society, should bear the costs of preventing or ameliorating those harms.
Whether a particular segment of society ought to bear a particular set of costs is likely to
depend upon one's ideological and economic perspectives. See infra notes 457-66 and
accompanying text.
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there is reason to believe that the political process has failed to afford
reasonable protection to those who bear the costs.
While the first two rationales for regulatory takings are better
captured through other constitutional provisions, the idea that
excessive regulation is analogous to a physical invasion evokes the
specific content of the Takings Clause. This reasoning would at most
apply to Lucas-type cases of total destruction of economically viable
uses, however, and could not justify current takings analysis of use
restrictions that do not involve complete destruction.4' Even this
limited view of regulatory takings doctrine is unsound. Total destruc-
tion of property interests recognized at common law often may be
inconsistent with constitutional principles, but there are some
governmental or societal purposes of sufficient magnitude to warrant
destruction of property interests without compensation.455 While the
Lucas rule might be qualified in some way to account for these cases,
the task of distinguishing permissible from impermissible cases of total
destruction is better accomplished through the due process and equal
protection analysis advanced in this Article.45 6
454. The extension of the clause beyond government acquisition of possession or title
to include physical destruction or its equivalent is generally well accepted. See supra note
188 and accompanying text. But cf Rubenfeld, supra note 212 (arguing that no taking has
occurred unless there is public use of the property). It is a small step from there to the
Lucas rule for total destruction of economic use. See supra note 446 and accompanying
text. This analogy to physical destruction, however, does not justify the more open-ended
analysis of regulatory measures that do not entail total destruction of economically viable
uses. Although the analogy to physical destruction can be combined with bundle of rights
thinking to create a textual justification for Professor Epstein's view of regulatory takings,
this view is undesirable for other reasons.
455. Taken literally, for- example, the Lucas rule would require compensation for the
Emancipation Proclamation, which destroyed ownership rights and prevented uses that
were not "nuisances" at common law. Cf. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 406-27
(1856) (treating escaped slave as property for due process purposes). I would argue,
however, that the total destruction of such ownership rights did not constitute a taking
because the "rights" were not justly acquired and overarching moral concerns justified
their abrogation. While the slavery example is hyperbolic, it illustrates the basic point:
There are situations in which uses of property that are permitted at common law violate
existing or emerging social values of such dimension that the total destruction of those uses
need not be compensated. See, e.g., Sax, supra note 355, at 30-31 (asserting that
prohibition of construction on earthquake fault lines should not be a taking even if it
completely destroys the value of land purchased before the prohibition and the prohibition
does not restate a background principle of nuisance law).
456. That analysis explicitly incorporates the relevant considerations, while the
manipulation of per se rules typically involves formalistic distinctions not necessarily
reflective of those considerations.
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C. Objections
While I shall not respond to every possible objection to the
jurisprudence advanced in this Article, there are two central issues
that must be addressed in order to complete the argument for a
coherent jurisprudence of economic rights. First, when, if ever, are
redistributive purposes legitimate? Second, once protection of
economic rights is countenanced, how can improper judicial activism
be prevented? Each of these questions presents a basis for criticizing,
from both the liberal and conservative perspectives, the analysis
proposed in this Article.
1. Redistribution
The question of redistribution, i.e., the permissibility of govern-
ment action that alters the existing allocation of wealth, is perhaps the
central substantive problem of any economic rights jurisprudence." 7
Much of the current debate on redistribution reflects two extreme
positions that rest on fundamentally opposed conceptions of the
source of property rights. To those who regard property as a natural
right that exists independently of government action, redistribution is
impermissible except when it is intended to redress the wrongful
conduct of a property owner or when the owner is compensated in
kind.458 To those who regard property rights as created by govern-
ment through the legal system, however, there is nothing inherently
fair or just about the current definition of property rights, and
reallocation of those rights through regulation is generally permissi-
ble.459 The analysis in this article, which strikes a middle ground
457. The inability to produce a consistent answer to this issue may underlie many of
the doctrinal difficulties in the Court's current analysis.
458. This view was central to Lochner-era jurisprudence. See supra notes 253-55 and
accompanying text. It is also the premise of Professor Epstein's book. See EPSTEIN, supra
note 47, at 3-6. One need not subscribe to the natural rights view to oppose redistributive
legislation, however. Even if property rights are the creations of government, opposition
to redistribution may be based on the notion that government action is itself flawed and
is likely to produce dead-weight losses from rent-seeking behavior. See supra notes 72-73
and accompanying text. These utilitarian questions should not be resolved by a
constitutional rule, however, as they involve empirical and policy judgments that are best
left to the political process, provided that the constitutional interests sacrificed by
regulation do not clearly outweigh the public benefit to be achieved (due process
proportionality) and the political process operates appropriately (equal protection
scrutiny).
459. See Singer & Beermann, supra note 257, at 228-30. This is the premise of the post-
New Deal rejection of economic rights. See supra notes 257-62 and accompanying text.
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between the two extremes, is likely to be criticized from either
perspective.
While the extreme views of property are attractive because they
provide simple answers to difficult questions, neither strikes an
appropriate balance between individual and community in a complex
society. The need to balance individual and community is reflected
in our constitutional heritage, which partakes of both the classical
liberal tradition invoked by natural rights theorists and the republican
tradition that supports government action on behalf of the public
interest. The natural rights view elevates the individual over com-
munity and fails to recognize that with individual rights comes
responsibility.41 The treatment of property as an empty concept
entirely at the mercy of the state, on the other hand, ignores the
fundamental importance some economic interests hold for individu-
als. 461  At a more practical level, the laissez-faire regime
constitutionalized by the Lochner era proved unworkable in the
industrial age, while the costs of unrestricted government power over
economic interests have become all too apparent in modem society.
The challenge for a coherent jurisprudence of economic rights is
to strike an appropriate balance between individual and community
interests respecting economic rights and to define appropriate roles
for the political and judicial processes in finding that balance in
specific cases. While the jurisprudence outlined in this Article does
not provide all the answers to these difficult questions, it does suggest
that welfare and other government programs that provide for basic
human needs, as well as transitional programs that ease economic
dislocation such as unemployment compensation or retraining, are
constitutionally permissible.
Even under a more natural rights-oriented view of property, such
redistributive programs are justifiable responses to public goods and
externality problems. The "social safety net" is a public good in the
460. In other words, Professor Epstein's natural rights theory, which rests on notions
of individual autonomy, is incomplete. See supra note 47. Because we live in a society
and are interdependent, autonomy alone cannot define our social relationships. With
autonomy comes responsibility, and a system of rights that ignores the correlative duties
is just as distorted as a system of duties that ignores rights. This argument is made in a
general way by Professor Mary Ann Glendon in her book, RIGHTS TALK. See MARY ANN
GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DIsCOuRSE 136-44
(1991).
461. See supra notes 376-77 and accompanying text.
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sense that we all benefit from the existence of such programs,462 but
no individual has the incentive or resources to provide them and
problems such as free riders and transaction costs limit concerted
action in the private sphere. 3 Conversely, while society as a whole
may be better off with a system of property rights and contractual
freedom that facilitates the accumulation of wealth, a cost of that
system is economic dislocation and poverty. In economic terms, this
cost is an externality that should be borne by those who benefit from
the system.4 4
In addition to economic justifications for redistributive programs
of this type, society can make a moral or ethical judgment to alleviate
the impact of poverty. Thus, even if redistribution is economically
unwise because it creates disincentives to productive activity or dead-
weight losses from rent-seeking behavior, it would be untenable to
read the Constitution as precluding the value judgment that extreme
inequalities of wealth are morally unacceptable. It is highly unlikely
that the framers categorically rejected this broadly shared value
judgment, which is reflected in most major religions (and other
462. In the absence of a social safety net, large portions of the population have no stake
in the social and economic order, which leads to a decline in the cultural norms that
maintain it. Cf. JAMES M. BUCHANAN, FREEDOM IN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTRACr'
PERSPEcrivES OF A POLITICAL ECONOMIST 207-11 (1977) (discussing fragility of the social
order and its implications for egalitarian redistribution).
463. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 72, at 463-66; SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 72,
at 603-04.
464. Professor Epstein argues that welfare programs, with few and very narrow
exceptions, always violate the Takings Clause on the theory that those who are taxed to
support them did not create the need by engaging in wrongful conduct and because the
benefit in terms of social peace does not constitute a sufficient like-kind compensation.
See EPSTEIN, supra note 47, at 306-23. But these conclusions do not inevitably follow from
Professor Epstein's natural rights premise. He also recognizes that the system of property
and contract rights upon which individual wealth is based is essentially a public good, at
least when transaction costs would preclude its creation through voluntary exchanges. See
EPSTEIN, supra note 47, at 202; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 357, at 26 (arguing that
government is necessary to protect private property). Conversely, the unequal distribution
of wealth, including poverty, is a cost of a capitalist economic system, and addressing those
difficulties is defensible as necessary to sustain that system. Professor Epstein's refusal to
treat these costs as externalities on the grounds that the conduct producing them is not
wrongful is puzzling, given his earlier writing on torts in which he advanced a theory of
strict liability based upon the responsibility of all actors for the consequences of their acts,
regardless of whether those acts are wrongful. See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict
Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 189 (1973). Professor Epstein's view that welfare
programs create incentives that increase demand for benefits (i.e., exacerbate the problems
they are intended to solve), see EPSTEIN, supra note 47, at 321-22, raises empirical and
policy questions that cannot be resolved by an absolute constitutional rule.
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moral/ethical systems), ' so as to-prevent any governmental redistri-
bution of wealth. This conclusion is reinforced by the recognition that
the current distribution of wealth is in part the product of historical
injustices. 41
The problem thus becomes how to distinguish permissible
redistributive purposes from "naked preferences" that are impermissi-
ble because they further private rather than public interests. 467
While this problem may present some difficult cases, the analysis
outlined above is generally capable of resolving them. Meaningful
equal protection rationality review would help to ensure that non-
redistributive purposes are not pretextual, and would implicitly
require the fairness of redistributive purposes to be discussed
openly.41 The due process proportionality principle would also
provide a constitutional framework for weighing the government's
purposes against their impact on individuals.
2. Judicial Activism
There can be little doubt that the jurisprudence advanced in this
Article contemplates a kind of judicial activism. It envisions a more
significant role for judges in reviewing the constitutionality of
government decisions affecting economic interests, and it does so on
the basis of an open-ended, nonoriginalist doctrine that invites judges
to exercise discretion and weigh values. This activism is likely to
provoke criticism from both the liberal and conservative perspectives.
From the liberal perspective, the proportionality requirement and en-
hanced rationality review would vest great discretion to block
economic regulation and social programs in the hands of a generally
conservative judiciary 9 From the conservative perspective, the
465. This principle can also be defended in Rawlsian terms as the choice that people
would make if placed behind a "veil of ignorance" regarding their place in the economic
system. SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 72, at 605. See generally JOHN RAwLs, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (advancing theory of justice based on rules that would be
adopted if people did not know their position in society).
466. See SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 4-7.
467. In Central States Pension Fund v. Lady Baltimore Foods, 960 F.2d 1339, 1343-44
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 179 (1992), for example, Judge Posner posited that the
exemption from pension fund withdrawal liability might be justified on fairness grounds.
See supra note 381 and accompanying text.
468. Under actual purpose review, the fairness justification for redistribution must be
articulated contemporaneously with government action. It is unlikely that invoking
fairness arguments would be politically feasible if the particular act of redistribution is a
naked preference.
469. Although redistribution is not per se prohibited and property and contract rights
are not given absolute protection, one might imagine that, placed in conservative hands
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proposed analysis rejects originalism and reinforces liberal decisions
by integrating economic and other individual rights into a single
jurisprudence.47 It would also lay the foundation for further liberal
activism, particularly regarding affirmative rights, if the composition
of the Court changes.47
My answer to both sets of criticisms is the same. First, the
degree to which judicial activism is actually constrained under current
doctrine is exaggerated. While the rhetoric of restraint is frequently
invoked, that has not prevented activist decisions.472 It is simply not
possible to eliminate discretion from judicial decisionmaking; nor is
it desirable. Language is too imprecise and the variety of circum-
stances too myriad for judges to act as machines whose sole function
is to apply law made elsewhere to specific cases.473 It is, after all,
the function of judges to exercise judgment.
Second, these criticisms underestimate the degree to which
activism under the proposed analysis would be controlled by
institutional constraints. The Court as a whole is steeped in the
culture of judging, and an activist justice (whether conservative or
liberal) must persuade at least four others to join a decision.474
Thus, an activist decision must be sufficiently defensible in doctrinal
terms to gain acceptance.475 Moreover, although the Court is not
and stripped of the rhetoric of restraint, this sort of analysis might result in excessive
intervention.
470. To the extent that conservatives value judicial restraint over economic rights, this
is likely to be too high a price to pay for enhanced economic rights protection.
471. For example, my analysis argues in favor of recognizing some affirmative rights
and is critical of decisions such as Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.297 (1980). Even Professor
Sunstein, who has sharply criticized the continued dominance of status quo baselines, also
suggests judicial restraint respecting affirmative rights. See SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL
CONSTrrU'rION, supra note 4, at 151-52.
472. Justice Scalia, for example, has been perhaps the Court's most outspoken
proponent of judicial restraint, even in the economic rights context, but he has been its
most activist justice in the takings area, authoring both Nollan and Lucas, and dissenting
in other cases declining to find a taking. More generally, doctrines of judicial restraint can
be manipulated to achieve desired policy results. See Levy & Glicksman, supra note 77,
at 317-54.
473. One need not embrace the radical indeterminism advanced by some members of
the critical legal studies movement, see Peter C. Schanck, The Only Game in Town: An
Introduction to Interpretive Theory, Statutory Construction, and Legislative Histories, 38
KAN. L. REV. 815, 820-26 (1990) (describing technique of "deconstruction" as applied by
critical legal studies movement), to recognize that constitutional provisions and other legal
rules are seldom absolutely clear, at least with respect to issues that come before the
courts.
474. Appellate courts are also collegial, and subject to review as well.
475. Academic criticism reinforces this collegiality constraint insofar as most judges and
justices are concerned with their broader reputations as jurists.
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directly accountable in political terms, the appointment process does
tend to moderate the Court when it takes a particularly activist
stance.4 6  For example, the reconfiguration of the Court has
moderated the most activist application of Roe v. Wade, but collegiali-
ty and the cultural constraint of stare decisis has prevented the most
extreme step of overruling it.4
Ultimately, then, the choice is not between restraint under the
current system and unbridled activism under the analysis proposed in
this Article, but rather between a distorted (and in some respects
dishonest) doctrine in which activism is hidden behind the manipula-
tion of formal categories and a jurisprudence in which the values that
prompt judicial intervention are openly debated. 1[n my view, the
institutional mechanisms that constrain judicial behavior will operate
more effectively,478 and the doctrine will be more consistent and
rational, if the Court abandons the search for an originalist escape
and addresses the problem of economic rights directly.
CONCLUSION
Doctrinal coherence matters. It is more than an aesthetic preference;
it is more than a chimera rendered empty by the indeterminacy of
language. It is the essential character of the judicial art that distin-
guishes the judiciary from political institutions. In the absence of
doctrinal coherence, constitutional jurisprudence is doomed to failure.
This is the fate that has befallen the Court's recent efforts to
reinvigorate economic rights, just as the doctrinal incoherence of
liberal individual rights jurisprudence opened it to conservative
criticism and facilitated its erosion. This is unfortunate, because both
types of rights have an important role to play in constitutional
jurisprudence.
To restore doctrinal coherence to the treatment of economic
rights, as well as other individual rights, it is necessary to free
constitutional analysis from the enduring spectre of Lochner. Only
476. Although this change may take some time, history suggests that it does occur, as
evidenced by the reconfiguration of the Court after both the Lochner and Warren Court
eras.
477. See supra notes 90, 318 and accompanying text.
478. Manipulation of formalistic categories, for example, neither instills in the public
the constitutional values at stake nor provides a basis for public assessment of the Court's
implementation of those values. Indeed, the more intellectually dishonest the Court's
decisions seem to be, the more likely it is that the Court will be perceived as a purely
political actor. Thus, open articulation of the values at stake would enhance the Court's
institutional standing as well.
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then can a frank and balanced approach to both types of rights be
developed. This approach would rest on an integrated fundamental
rights and political-process analysis that applies to both types of
constitutional rights, and would recognize the baseline problem for
what it is-a question of constitutional interpretation. The basic
implications of this analysis are reasonably straightforward. They
include the development of a due process proportionality principle,
enhanced equal protection rational basis review derived from political-
process considerations, and the limitation of both the Contract and
Takings Clauses, including the outright rejection of regulatory takings
law. While the analysis does not completely resolve all the difficult
problems that might arise, it directs the Court to the right questions.
The analysis contemplates a measure of judicial activism, but
measured and intellectually honest activism is preferable to a false
restraint grounded in manipulation of doctrine.
